A Little Too Ironic
Matt Yglesias today praises Ray Takeyh’s piece of last week, which notes how
a parade of Bush administration officials have offered a new threat and new justification for prolonging America’s errant war in Iraq: containing Iran.
The ironic aspect of this is that Iran not only enjoys intimate relations with the Shiite government in Baghdad, but that its objectives in Iraq largely coincide with those of the United States.
Matt goes on to observe
that the Iranians have decided to cut Muqtada loose and fully line up behind the ISCI government. That counts as a form of good news, I’d say, but it also shows how ridiculous the administration’s talk of anti-Sadrist operations as somehow crucial to curbing an Iranian takeover are.
I’m not known to trot out neoconservative talking points, but why, one wonders, would Iran ‘cut loose’ al-Sadr in the first place? Possibly because the recent Government attack on Sadr’s brigades actually worked — insofar as success means marginalizing those militias and drying up their internal and external support. Even the puffed-up and rather abortive attack that took place was enough to call Sadr’s value to Iranian policy into serious question. After all, not only does Iran enjoy intimate relations with the Shiite government in Baghdad, but its objectives in Iraq largely coincide with our own.
In an even wider pallet of ironies, probably the biggest policy relations coup accomplished by this recent Bush Parade is managing to re-accredit the Iran card as a ‘new’ threat and ‘new’ justification. Iran, not Iraq, has been the longstanding regional bogey — and not just for American audiences but, perhaps even more importantly, Arab ones. The latest string of spooky stories is a fresh take on an old favorite, trimmed in suitably contemporary detail, but even in the annals of recent history we see Iran right up there to begin with on the old Axis of Evil list.
Ray Takeyh’s no slouch, and Matt is right to be cataloging ironies here, but neither of the two seem to be digging quite deeply enough. One of the reasons Iran’s objectives overlap so much with our own in Iraq is that Iran shares with the US an interest in exclusively dominating Iraqi politics, power, and resources. Yet further, on its face this point makes less of a justification for launching a war with Iran than it does for tightening control in Iraq.
In the grand scheme of things, the point both gentlemen probably want to draw out is one I readily admit: that no matter how well we do, over whatever length of time, the minute we close up shop in Iraq, that country will slip instantly and intimately into Iran’s sphere of influence — and out of ours. Unless, that is, we can somehow institutionalize a set of unbreakable political arrangements that maintain a Sunni counterweight. This should not be mistaken for the lazy argument which presumes Shiite Iraqis have no interest in their own sovereignty. But from the perspective of some US policymakers, an Iraq that’s a province of Iran versus an Iraq that’s a friend of Iran denotes a distinction without a difference. Shockingly enough, this isn’t a judgment reserved for cabalist neocons. It captures plain old realpolitik, too — and, thence, our bipartisan consensus on Iraq. Sadly, this consensus is utterly at a loss concerning how to create the necessary political environment: so its motto reduces simply to Stall For Time.
UPDATE: Andrew agrees.
Yet further, on its face this point makes less of a justification for launching a war with Iran than it does for tightening control in Iraq.
I hate the fact that you can probably have predicted the fact that I would comment on this, and what my comment is likely to be.
That aside, it hurts my brain, truly it does, to have to argue endlessly with those who insist that we must remain in Iraq to preserve democracy, and turn around and be confronted by someone who matter-of-factly discusses the utility of “tightening control in Iraq.”
Not that you are beholden to anyone else’s arguments, of course, and you don’t get many appeals to Iraqi democracy around here, anyway. Reihan has quite explicitly denied those arguments here before. I find I’m generally disarmed when I encounter straightforward endorsements of American control of Iraq…. I’ve decided the reason that’s the case is that my opposition is based on very simple and traditional notions of democracy, self-determination, and the essential rights of nations and people.
Don’t think that I’m entirely unsympathetic to what you’re saying. You’re right, that without an American presence, Iraq is likely to fall under Iranian influence/control. (Of course, that’s a not unforeseeable consequence of a policy of invasion and deposition.) The difference simply is that I don’t think that whether or not Iraq fails under Iranian control is the United States business, anymore than it’s the business of Swaziland or Bhutan or Lichtenstein, and since it is inevitable that the people of Iran and Iraq will determine what eventually happens to Iran and Iraq, I don’t see much point in playing Atlas. And, again— as long as their is a superpower “creating political environments” in other countries, those countries have no hope for meaningful democracy.
— Freddie · Apr 21, 05:02 AM · #
Well, right. I concur entirely with your last paragraph, with the footnote that it’s not ever settled or clear what ‘the business’ of the United States means. Not for want of good answers, but after all this is what arguing about foreign policy and IR theory are all about. The critical line comes in your second-to-last sentence: it does seem inevitable, doesn’t it? Especially if there’s, like, democracy in Iraq? But in a way that puts us back to square one. Even if only the interim is ours we may still be stuck with — or even running into the arms of — a long Hamlet routine. This is probably bad-but-also-inevitable. Hopefully something that can be made into a worthwhile learning experience. But lessons are costly, and ultimately this war is lost when we can no longer afford the cost.
— James · Apr 21, 12:59 PM · #
“ the minute we close up shop in Iraq, that country will slip instantly and intimately into Iran’s sphere of influence — and out of ours. “
We’re screwed in Iraq. Sometimes it’s best to just admit you made a mistake. If you keep trying to fix something unfixable you often make it worse. Becasues what are you suggesting here? That we stay in Iraq forever? Or that we somehow put the Sunnis on the throne? Or, even more farfetched, orchestrate a democracy not dominated by Shiites who want close ties to Iran? Having Iraq under the influence (I don’t think the sunnis or some of the kurds will lay down to being an IRanian province, so I’m just going to say “influence”) of Iran is not the best thing, but it’s not the end of the world either. We beat the Nazis, delt successfully with the Soviet Union for 40 years, we will probably survive Iran’s opposition. Or, we could find some common ground. But just becasue an Iranian influcnced Iraq would not be the best thing to have happen, doesn’t mean we can prevent it. You have to be realistic and conservative with the lives and resources of our citizens.
— cw · Apr 22, 04:15 AM · #