A League of Their Own Imagination
I recently heard some very smart people condemning the idea of a “League of Democracies” as dangerous and divisive, yet another major strategic blunder advanced by John McCain, the neoconservatives, and the liberal hawks. They were so insistent on this idea that the League of Democracies was a dangerous and wrongheaded idea that I quickly concluded that there might be something to it.
Note that in the mid-1990s serious foreign policy scholars tended to believe that NATO expansion was a bad idea. I agreed with them. In fact, I still think it was a bad idea. But there’s no denying that NATO expansion to the Visegrad states has been widely viewed as a success, and that the expansion that followed also went relatively smoothly. That doesn’t mean the same would be true if we encroached further on Russia’s Near Abroad. Nevertheless, it is useful to keep this in mind.
So what are the key objections to a Concert of Democracies? The first is that it would enrage China, Russia, and authoritarian states in the Middle East. It would be used to legitimate the use of force — as in the invasion of Iraq — yet it would have no legitimacy in the eyes of most people in the world. That Robert Kagan is a prominent advocate of a Concert of Democracies is enough to turn some stomachs. But what even the most sophisticated observers fail to understand is that a Concert wouldn’t enable or facilitate armed intervention; rather, it would make armed intervention more rather than less difficult. The UN Security Council contains a number of authoritarian states that can be reliably expected to veto an armed intervention, thus encouraging Kosovo-style workarounds. It is easy to dismiss China’s strong defense of state sovereignty as narrowly self-interested. The ur-idea behind the Concert is to create a smaller, more exclusive club has greater normative authority to veto proposed interventions. In “The Next Intervention,” Kagan and Ivo Daalder wrote,
A policy of seeking consensus among the world’s great democratic nations can form the basis for a new domestic consensus on the use of force. It would not exclude efforts to win Security Council authorization. Nor would it preclude using force even when some of our democratic friends disagree. But the United States will be on stronger ground to launch and sustain interventions when it makes every effort to seek and win the approval of the democratic world.
Lest we forget, the United States failed to build such a consensus in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. Any imaginable Concert would include France, Canada, and other historic allies who were strongly opposed to an invasion on President Bush’s timetable. So the Concert concept is actually a critique of unilateralism. Daalder is a vocal critic of the Bush White House, and he strongly opposed the Iraq invasion. He very shrewdly sees this proposal for what it is.
As for the legitimacy question, let me put it bluntly — the UN Security Council is a farce. Neither India nor Brazil are permanent members. Both would be members of any Concert of Democracies worthy of the name, most likely in prominent roles. Some suggest that China and Russia would seek to develop alternative institutions, and that this would prove polarizing. Perhaps some democratic states that jealously guard their sovereignty would join them. That would, in my view, be all to the good: a Concert that couldn’t retain, say, Brazil shouldn’t exist, and peaceful competitive pressures are a good thing. The Cold War confrontation helped drive the United States to improve our abysmal domestic human rights record — I’m referring to the fact that Jim Crow seemed all the more embarrassing and obscene when we were appealing to post-colonial states as the champion of freedom and democracy.
Then there is the European Union question. The European Union has been extraordinarily successful in radiating peace and prosperity throughout the European continent, yet there are thorny questions regarding its further expansion. Is Turkey, for example, sufficiently European? If not, the world is in for a rude shock. It is easy to imagine resentment building in Turkey if it is rebuffed. But of course this begs the question: what of the rest of the world, which lies far outside the charmed circle? The magnet of EU membership simply doesn’t apply to, say, the Central African Republic. It’s not absurd to posit that a Concert of Democracies could have a strong economic component, that it could serve as a global and incipiently universal version of the liberal European order. In fact, McCain proposed exactly that.
“It could act where the U.N. fails to act,” McCain says.
Such a new body, he says, could help relieve suffering in Darfur, fight the AIDS epidemic in Africa, develop better environmental policies, and provide “unimpeded market access” to countries sharing “the values of economic and political freedom.”
And, McCain adds, an organization of democracies could pressure tyrants “with or without Moscow’s and Beijing’s approval” and could “impose sanctions on Iran and thwart its nuclear ambitions” while helping struggling democracies succeed.
Surely fighting the AIDS epidemic is a global public good, and surely it makes sense that states clustered by similar regime type would have an easier time reaching consensus on how to go about doing that.
Critics focus on China’s exclusion from the club. The real question mark is over the putative exclusion of, say, Thailand or Singapore, two of the many states over which China exerts a powerful magnetic pull. Again, I’m not totally sure it’s bad for the world if China and the EU, with America as a junior partner, are bidding for the allegiance of such swing states. It’s not, I’ll admit, an obviously good thing for the states doing the bidding. For one thing, it won’t be cheap. The Cold War on the Periphery involved so-called “client states” turning their so-called patron, the United States, into a patsy — Pakistan was ostensibly a bulwark against Soviet expansion, yet they used us in their local conflict against India, which in turn drew India into the Soviet orbit, at least when they weren’t trying to hustle money out of us too.
To me, the striking thing about McCain’s endorsement of a League of Democracies isn’t that it is a naked power-mad attempt to ram armed interventions down the world’s throat. Rather, it is the incipient utopianism of the proposal — we would focus aid, presumably large amounts of aid, and we would open our markets to states that share our normative commitments. This sounds more like the germ of some kind of world-state than a militarist plot.
And that’s actually not a bad reason to oppose it. I’m not sure. Where I part company with Kagan, a thinker I greatly admire, is in my far more relaxed and sanguine view of rising Chinese power. When I see China, I see its extreme vulnerabilities. I’m also sympathetic to the crude Angellian view that our economies are irreversibly intertwined, and that this matters more now than in the days of Anglo-German antagonism. I also think that when it comes to trade, unilateral liberalization (by the US and other countries) should co-exist with a lot of policy experimentalism (to manage the impact of open markets). When people talk about renegotiating NAFTA, I always think, “Yeah — the Mexicans need more room to maneuver, and Canadians deserve fairer treatment.” That’s not the kind of renegotiation NAFTA’s American critics have in mind, however.
The League is not an entirely serious idea. It’s hard to see it getting off the ground. What’s in it for the Europeans, really? But when we take the idea seriously, it has a number of surprising implications, not all of them calamitous.
And who would be invited into this league of democracies? Would Iran? Venezuela, a country with by many metrics a more robust and authentic democracy than our own? Of course not. By concert of democracy, John McCain means anyone who tows the American line. Think about what you know about the neoconservatives. What possible other purpose can this venture have then to further American interests? Their explicit goal is and has always been increasing American dominance of world affairs. Why would they create an institution that could meaningfully retard that goal? Neoconservatives hate the UN because sometimes, it acts in some small capacity as a check on American expansionism, or at least as a condemnation of the same. If this concert of democracies could do that, they wouldn’t advocate it; and if it’s incapable of doing that, the idea has no merit to begin with.
Why are you so eager to find unscrupulous motives on the part of those who would check American manipulation of foreign countries, but so utterly, childishly credulous of the stated aims of those who have proven they deserve no such trust?
— Lifafa Das · Jun 15, 12:12 AM · #
Do any of the league’s advocates actually argue that it would function as a further check on American unilateralism? I’m pretty sure its biggest boosters are quite convinced that a league would legitimize American interventionism, not hamper it.
You can’t have your cake and eat it. A truly inclusive league would probably provide a check on American unilateralism precisely because it contains countries like France, Germany and sundry Third World democracies. A more pliant league would probably exclude or marginalize these objectors, which in turn would undercut the organization’s central claim to legitimacy. In fact, I could easily imagine the league devolving into a permanent version of Bush’s coalition of the willing.
Now, you might argue that league doesn’t necessarily have to be a vehicle for humanitarian interventionism. Instead, it could focus on global “public goods” like AIDS prevention and market integration. These are laudable goals, but a new layer of multinational bureaucracy sounds pretty redundant to me. The World Health Organization and the UN Global Fund already suck up most of our AIDS funding. The World Trade Organization is on hand with a ready-made framework for economic integration. Regional organizations like the EU and ASEAN incentivize local stability and (in some cases) democracy.
So what benefit does the league provide that isn’t already available via older, more established organizations? Advocates for a league of democracies should at least acknowledge that the organization entails some risk of alienating important non-democratic countries, and if the league doesn’t uniquely enhance certain weaker aspects of our foreign policy, there really is no point in taking the risk in the first place.
— Will · Jun 15, 01:31 AM · #
I don’t know whether I agree with this or not (frankly, I’ve had too many beers tonight to render a judgement I’d be willing to stand behind) but post like these are why I read the American Scene. Check my knee-jerk liberal tendencies! I kind of like it.
— Christopher M · Jun 15, 02:57 AM · #
“Would Iran? Venezuela, a country with by many metrics a more robust and authentic democracy than our own?”
Goodness gracious me! Would you care to explicate some of these metrics? I would love for America’s ragtag democracy to learn how it can be better mended.
“Why are you so eager to find unscrupulous motives on the part of those who would check American manipulation of foreign countries, but so utterly, childishly credulous of the stated aims of those who have proven they deserve no such trust?”
You mean like certain other foreign countries, right? Because I would find it astounding if your incredulity stopped at America’s borders.
— Blar · Jun 15, 07:50 AM · #
Goodness gracious me! Would you care to explicate some of these metrics? I would love for America’s ragtag democracy to learn how it can be better mended.
A higher percentage of Venezuela’s people vote in their elections. The people are more educated about individual issues in their democracy. There is vastly more grassroots activism and organization in Venezuela than in the United States— you know, actual democracy. Unlike in the United States, people who are lower and middle class actually get elected to political positions in Venezuela and the rest of South America; they aren’t drawing from the proportionally tiny group of the vastly wealthy. (Here’s a fun experiment: try to find members of Congress, or governors, or Cabinet members, or presidential candidates, who aren’t wealthy. Take your time.)
You mean like certain other foreign countries, right? Because I would find it astounding if your incredulity stopped at America’s borders.
This is pure non sequitur. No one is contending that foreign governments aren’t leveraging their own ends. What Reihan and others are contending is that this “concert of democracy” would have its value rooted in principals of democracy and human rights. And that’s nonsense— it’s being proposed, and would be implemented, solely because of its potential to further American interests. Reading comprehension, please.
— Lifafa Das · Jun 15, 05:48 PM · #
The problem with a league of democracies is that only three countries would be members: The US, Israel, and the Marshall Islands. The Europeans states, not to mention democracies like South Africa, have no interest in a new organization that competes with the UN. (In Norway, admittedly an extreme example, the UN has a lot of legitimacy.) Especially when it is thought out by the despised neocons, and especially when it is presented as a way for the US to intervene in yet more countries.
Besides, as someone already mentioned, Why the extra layer of international bureaucracy? When the West is united, as over Kosovo, it is still strong enough to do whatever it likes.
— Norway · Jun 15, 07:59 PM · #
Lifafa: Your examples are entirely cultural and not relevant to whether or not a country deserves admittance into a hypothetical League of Democracies. Country X may have a culture of greater political participation than country Y, but that does not make the system in country Y less democratic. Would admittance in your reckoning be determined by voter turnout, or income distribution among elected representatives? Would Australia, with its compulsory high voter turnout, be more democratic that the United States?
I would think that judgment would involve the implementation and efficacy of actual democratic institutions and principles. Countries have very little control over political participation, unless you are talking about compulsory voting laws and the like, but they can affect, say, freedom of the press, or unharassed political opposition. The political involvement of a population is irrelevant if the actual political system is undemocratic.
Also, the “unscrupulous motives on the part of those who would check American manipulation of foreign countries” is entirely relevant to the issue, because it is the root and rationale for opposition to the U.N. When, to cite a particularly flagrant example, Libya chairs a U.N. human rights commission that condemns Israel but fails to condemn Cuba or Sudan, it makes one wish to look for alternatives in world governance.
I’m also a bit perplexed as to your insistence that the ““explicit goal” of advocates of a League of Democracies “is and has always been increasing American dominance of world affairs.” Do you think any legitimate League of Democracies would exclude France, or Germany, or indeed fail to give them prominent positions? Do you imagine such countries would tow the line on every American interventionist project? Or is your vision of the geopolitical scene such that only those on America’s list of enemies can provide a reasonable check on American hegemony?
For the record I am unpersuaded on the merits of a League of Democracies. I don’t know if Europe would actually sign on, and I am wary of the prospect of a Warsaw Pact redux. But if your argument against such a League depends on a prima facie suspicion of the motives of those who propose it, while ignoring the actual, widely-recognized, hostile motives of non-democratic countries in the U.N. and the problems they cause, then yours is an argument of misplaced naivite and intolerable unseriousness.
— Blar · Jun 15, 11:37 PM · #
You asked me to provide metrics by which Venezuela is a more robust democracy. I’ve done so. I don’t know what you mean by “purely cultural”; I think it’s self-evident that citizen engagement and participation are absolutely elementary prerequisites of functioning democracy. The South American democracies leave us in the dust. Any coherent definition of democracy and its strength, it seems to me, must be based on the principles of democracy as a system and not on the content of the policies which democracy has created. But you seem to have some sort of assumptions about how a democracy is supposed to function, instead of basing your opinion of how democratic a country is on the process through which they elect their leaders. The classic example is Hamas. The United States said over and over again that it believed in the principles of democracy. But when the Palestinian people legitimately elected Hamas over Fatah, the US immediately began to undermine that government. Rather than really being interested in democracy, the US was interested in supporting those whose policies adhered to American interests. As usual.
When you say that the bad motives of countries who check American power is precisely the problem, you’re showing your hand; you start from the assumption that the content of American policy must be more “democratic” than that of its opponents. Now, if you want to articulate a “concert of the moral countries”, “concert of countries we dig”, a “concert of America-endorsed countries”… be my guest. But don’t tell me that the principle behind this organization is democracy. Venezuela and Iran elect their own leaders, and while their democracies are flawed in many ways, they are significantly more democratic than many of the regimes the United States defends and supports. A concert of democracies is going to be a group that includes some countries who have reprehensible behavior. A concert of democracies in the mid-1930s, for example, would have to include German and its democratically elected Nazi government. If not, then it’s not a concert of democracy; it’s a concert of approved countries.
The idea behind the concert of democracies is that the international community would reward those countries whose people are self-governing. But I don’t believe, in practice, that’s what would be rewarded; I believe what would be rewarded would be how closely the policies of these countries hew to American desires. Why do I think that? Because the neoconservatives have made absolutely plain that they think the value of international institutions is only in their ability to further American ends. This isn’t mind reading. You don’t have to guess at the motives of the neocons. It’s all out there in writing, in papers and columns and op/eds. Again and again and again, they’ve challenged the legitimacy of the UN and other international institutions for challenging American power, and made it clear that they feel America should feel free to act unilaterally in its dealings in the globe. So why should I believe that this concert of democracies is anything else but another tool to achieving those goals?
— Lifafa Das · Jun 16, 12:43 AM · #
Again, I’m not totally sure it’s bad for the world if China and the EU, with America as a junior partner, are bidding for the allegiance of such swing states.
I’m fairly sure it would be. Notice that there are more democracies in South America now that the Soviets aren’t supporting totalitarians while we support authoritarians. A new Cold War with China is a negative-sum game not only for the two players, but for basically everyone else.
— Consumatopia · Jun 16, 02:23 AM · #
Reihan presents some excellent arguments for this idea. An alliance of democracies would have credibility. It might serve as a democracy and liberalization magnet, just as the EU does.
However, those who say it is very dangerous have a point. You say “peaceful competition is a good thing” and point to the Cold War as an example. I will make the radical argument that the cold war was, in fact, a bad thing. The entire world was almost annihilated by nuclear weapons. Millions died in proxy wars between the two main players in the ideological struggle. Do we really want to engage in another grand struggle with the world`s two greatest illiberal countries (China and Russia)? Both have nuclear weapons and both are beginning to project their influence abroad.
— Turko File · Jun 16, 08:28 PM · #
“…John McCain means anyone who tows the American line.”
Do they cleat it to their boat or hook it on their bumper hitch?
— CJ · Jun 18, 01:43 AM · #