Putin and the Presidency
I want a president who is as formidable statesman as Vladimir Putin. Bush is, despite his admirable efforts in Iraq since the ’06 election, feckless by comparison. Putin is playing a different game — how does each move ricochet? How will each move shape the Europe of the 2020s or the 2030s?
On foreign policy, I sometimes think Andrew and I live in parallel universes. Unlike Andrew and Matt, I was very impressed by the latest WSJ op-ed from Lieberman and Graham. Here is Andrew’s characterization of the argument:
What they are laying out in very clear terms is the agenda of a McCain presidency. The agenda is war and the threat of war — including what would be an end to cooperation with Russia on securing loose nuclear materials and sharing terror intelligence, in favor of a new cold war in defense of … Moldova and Azerbaijan. I’m sure McCain would like to have his Russian cooperation, while demonizing and attacking them on the world stage, but in the actual world, he cannot.
The thing is, cooperation and forthright disagreement can coexist. Reuel Marc Gerecht always argues that Arab publics want democracy for their own reasons, not ours. Similarly, Russia is willing to cooperate on some issues that directly impact their own security interests. That won’t change when we call them on behaving like a spoiler state. The Russian-Iranian relationship has existed for a long time. Will rolling over for Russia over Georgia make them less inclined to act on behalf of Iran? The idea is a little odd. We forget that American magnanimity doesn’t actually heal all wounds or melt away all potential conflicts. (I worry that Obama and Biden don’t fully get this.) As for nonproliferation, a strong Russian state is simply less likely by nature to be a sieve for loose nukes.
And here is Matt’s:
Given that we have no way of forcibly dislodging Russia from Georgia, a person genuinely concerned with Georgia’s interests might see a bargaining opportunity. Here we have a missile defense program that terrifies the Russians, yet does us no good against the rogue states that are nominally its target. A deal could be struck here. A deal that would not only help secure our objectives in Georgia but would also allow the US-Russian bilateral relationship to refocus on vital issues of terrorism and nuclear proliferation rather than ethnic disputes in a remote mountain region.
Frankly, I think this reflects different time horizons. Matt and Andrew are both receptive to the attractive notion of a great power concert — let the Russians have their sphere of influence, and let’s play ball on the big boy issues. Which makes sense in theory.
But Russia isn’t just miffed about being humiliated. They’re not looking for a pat on the head. Right now, the Russian government aims to drive wedges between the Western allies — by exploiting Europe’s reliance on Russian energy, and particularly German reliance; by using its intelligence networks and its political weight in Bulgaria to make deeper defense cooperation within NATO difficult if not impossible; and by using a sophisticated information strategy to mislead Western publics about its activities in its so-called Near Abroad. Pro-Western forces in Ukraine are divided, just as the status of Crimea is becoming a live issue, one on which the Russians are making alarming noises. The Poles increasingly feel as though they can’t rely on Germany to protect their security interests. This is recipe for strategic rivalry and spiraling tensions. A more accommodating posture toward Russian will most likely make matters worse.
This doesn’t mean we should seek confrontation. It means that we should deepen our partnerships in the region, whether it’s on developing energy alternatives or in improving the deterrent capabilities of the region’s militaries. That is the agenda Lieberman and Graham are laying out — one that is as long-term as Putin’s. It’s not an agenda of war and the threat of war, but rather one that makes armed conflict less likely.
The problem I keep arriving at is how to demonstrate appropriate international condemnation of Russia’s (inexcusable) actions towards Georgia while not implicitly condoning Georgia’s (inexcusable) attacks on South Ossetian separatists, citizens, and Russian soldiers.
I’m afraid this kind of separatism/annexation border dispute, when the people involved genuinely want to be absorbed into a bordering country— and from what I understand, the people of the region largely do— is a really tough nut for me to crack in a general principles kind of way. I don’t know how the international community should response; I don’t think a general rule against secession and annexation makes sense, because I can easily imagine situations where allowing internal secessionist movements would be the best thing to do. But it’s also too easy for the actions of the international community to be driven by good state/bad state considerations if those kind of standards are inconsistently applied.
— Freddie · Aug 29, 04:34 AM · #
“The thing is, cooperation and forthright disagreement can coexist.”
Very good paragraph, there. Good points.
— The Reticulator · Aug 29, 04:39 AM · #
I honestly think you’re the best neoconservative voice today. Couldn’t agree more (I agree with you, therefore you are talented).
I also believe Putin should be the yardstick for every president. In talent positively and in egoism negatively.
— PEG · Aug 29, 05:10 AM · #
Ah, PEG, but I hope you recognize that the neocons make the headway and stitch together the tattered rhetorical cloth that men like Putin use to justify their aggression. (Not that Putin needs it.) This is the irony: as I’ve said before, Putin is a neocon’s dream president. Both in terms of justification and execution, the Russian incursion into Georgia was the absolute model of a neoconservative’s way of war. You justify the action through appeals to democracy and stability. You enter without any consideration for the international community. You engage with overwhelming and merciless force.
Now, in America, that doesn’t matter much, because in America any inconsistency in foreign policy justification can be dismissed due to the fact that they’re them and we’re us. Nor do I think it will be that important in pragmatic terms; the diplomatic community is more interested in real politik than in the airy concerns of foreign policy philosophy. I think the effects of American neoconservatism will be more subtle, farther ranging and harder to discern at first. I don’t think they will be positive ones for America or the world. But you guys knew that.
— Freddie · Aug 29, 05:40 AM · #
But Russia isn’t just miffed about being humiliated. They’re not looking for a pat on the head.
But that’s what was smart about Yglesias’s analysis that you seemed to have missed—it does NOT assume that humiliation is driving the Russians. What part of “deal” don’t you understand? The Russians have interests, we have interests. Maybe we can make an agreement.
The key point here is that we don’t lose much if the Russians either don’t want a deal or make a deal then renege on it (assuming the deal is intelligently crafted). In fact, if we offer a deal, but Russians turn us down, that could be a huge benefit for us. That would demonstrate to our potential allies that Russia is a threat that we need to take seriously.
The strawman view you make of Sullivan and Yglesias might explain why you think they live in different worlds. Neither of them is arguing that we should unconditionally be more accomodating to Russia. What they’re saying is that we should make clear to Russia that if they do certain things, we will do certain things.
Similarly, Russia is willing to cooperate on some issues that directly impact their own security interests.
What’s so smart about Matt’s post is it explains what’s wrong with that thinking. You can make deals across issues—do what I want on issue X and I’ll do what you want on issue Y.
— Consumatopia · Aug 29, 07:25 PM · #
umm..oh yes Palin the Creationist cheerleader vs Putin, a seasoned Demonlord of consummate evil.
Stepford Barbie versus Megatron, Reihan.
dumb.
— matoko_chan · Aug 30, 12:37 AM · #
I don’t understand what the West gains by insisting that Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain part of Georgia. As an independent state, Georgia has never controlled more than a fraction of those regions. As plenty of people have pointed out, they were added to the Georgian SSR by Stalin to cause precisely these sort of problems. Georgia has no more of a legitimate claim to them than Russia does, so we might as well let the Russians keep them. Why can’t we reach some sort of deal that gives international recognition to their new status in exchange for Russia leaving the rest of Georgia alone? But then we would probably have to throw in some sort of concession on the missile defense systems…. What was that offer Putin made involving Azerbaijan? Too late now, I suppose, especially since the Poles signed the deal. Only the missile defense contractors are benefiting from this situation now, not the national security of the US or Russia.
— Keith Petersen · Aug 30, 06:47 PM · #