Illiberal Liberalism
This deserves more than a one-legged response, and I hate to choose between friends, but I think Ross Douthat rather gets the better of Damon Linker here.
Linker’s whole project – “the liberal bargain” – rests on the proposition that absent a neutral arbiter without metaphysical commitments you inevitably get social conflict. I pretty much disagree with that proposition whole-hog – I don’t think liberalism is (or can be) a wholly neutral arbiter without metaphysical commitments (indeed, I think this partly because I agree with some of liberalism’s metaphysical commitments); I don’t think such an arbiter would enable you to avoid social conflict (what would compel the loser to abide by the verdict?); and, for that matter, I think you can have devastating social conflict without any real disagreement about metaphysical commitments (those metaphysical commitments themselves may in many cases be “superstructure” rather than “substructure”).
Myself, I would like to see a liberalism that is both more confident and more humble about its own truths. More confident: don’t defend the sexual revolution by saying, “why not?” but by saying, “here is what we have gained – here is the positive good, here are the virtues of the life we now lead.” Don’t attack creationism by saying, “that’s smuggling sectarian religion into the public square” but by saying, “science is a magnificent human achievement that you are defacing, and science matters too much to me to stand idly by while you do that.”
And, by the same token, more humble: recognize that communities with illiberal commitments are bound to continue to exist (and spring up) within liberal societies, and that liberals need these communities as a check on themselves, and cherish them, because they (liberals) are only human, as fallible as any other humans, and as prone to dogmatic certitude. Cultivation of skepticism and doubt will never be enough; you’ll need actual alternative certitudes to push against to be sure that you actually know anything. And, if you’re really a liberal, you have to leave open the possibility of being convinced that one of your liberal truths is actually, well, false.
Blah, Blah, Blah. Seriously.
— Andrew · Feb 13, 08:56 PM · #
A fine couple of posts, Noah. You improved my Friday.
You write:
As I’m sure you know, Rawls confronted this “fact of pluralism” in his later writings by posing a new standard, decency. Does that mean that decency is prior to justice, or is this merely a consequentialist compromise to protect the flanks of deontological polities? I don’t know!
What I do know: all of this can be avoided by importing into the original position the perspective of an equally-enfranchised Selfish Society. Linker’s right that there must be a bargain, he’s just wrong about who the parties are, and what it must be.
— JA · Feb 13, 10:32 PM · #
I know that I’d certainly be far more comfortable with a liberalism that was comfortable making those statements, but I think they miss a lot of what makes liberalism appealing: the extent to which it strips humans down to their barest potential, and then rebuilds them only as much as it needs to for them to survive in the real world. The removal of barriers gets seen as an intrinsic good for moving us closer to potential (which depending on how you look at it is either a teleology or a divine origin).
This too is a metaphysical claim, but it’s one that doesn’t play well with others. Which might be why even those liberals who admit to metaphysical beliefs aren’t comfortable deploying them within any particular discussion.
— Dara Lind · Feb 14, 04:33 AM · #
Dara, you write: the extent to which it strips humans down to their barest potential, and then rebuilds them only as much as it needs to for them to survive in the real world.
Can you draw this out? It sounds to me like you’re conflating two different things: before the comma you accurately characterize the Rawlsian bulls-eye between the radically situated human (Humean?) and the radically removed noumenon (Kant), but after the comma you change into a consequentialist. Or am I missing something?
— JA · Feb 14, 05:25 AM · #
JA:
Rawlsianism and consequentialism do seem to go hand in hand for most of the practicing liberals I’ve come across. They have a basic commitment to Rawlsian metaphysics, but are generally quite eager to demonstrate that they are nuanced and sensible thinkers to the core. (I suspect that in many cases this is less out of a natural liberal wonkishness is to distinguish themselves from the libertarians, who don’t have the same need to dress their positions up in circumstance.)
This could also be due to the fact that my school’s course in introductory political philosophy doesn’t really deal with Rawls beyond the invisible veil (which in isolation seems pretty consequentialist), and he’s hardly the most pleasant philosopher to tackle on one’s own. So maybe my sample favors ill-informed Rawlsians disproportionately. But if you think the two are naturally opposed, I’d like to hear why.
— Dara Lind · Feb 14, 11:33 AM · #
Noah, there are many liberals who speak like that. They (we? I have a mixed record on this) are almost always dismissed as “preachy” and excessively moralistic by other liberals, or as God-hating bullies by conservatives.
— joseph · Feb 16, 07:42 AM · #