The Multiverse, Intelligent Design and Science: Much Ado about Nothing
Ross Douthat and John Schwenkler have recently pointed to an article on the “multiverse”. There was similar attention devoted an earlier (and more interesting, in my view) article in the popular science magazine Discover last fall. The basic issue at play in multiverse theory is what is often called “fine tuning” or the Anthropic Principle: the assertion that if any of a very large number of constants in fundamental physical laws were even slightly different, then intelligent life would be impossible in our universe. One philosophical solution to this is that “God made the universe”. Another is the idea of the multiverse: more or less that are there are many universes beyond the one apparent to us, and that we happen to see this universe because it’s the one we’re in, and it’s the one we’re in because it’s the one that happens to have the values for these constants that allow intelligent life to evolve. It’s “monkeys on typewriters” on a (super-)cosmic scale. This sounds like a scientific theory; but if we take “universe” to equal “all physical reality that is observable in principle by human beings”, then I’ll argue that it is not scientific at all, but pure metaphysics.
One starting point is the observation that this basic concept is not a new idea. In 1934, Sir Karl Popper published The Logic of Scientific Discovery, generally considered to be one of the two most significant works on the philosophy of science in the past hundred years. Here his is in Part 67 of that book:
[S]ince probability estimates are not falsifiable; it must always be possible in this way to ‘explain’ by probability estimates, any regularity we please. Take, for example, the law of gravity. We may contrive hypothetical probability estimates to ‘explain’ this law in the following way. We select events of some kind to serve as elementary or atomic events; for instance the movement of a small particle. We then assume that these events show a chance-like distribution. Finally we calculate the probability that all the particles within a certain finite spatial region, and during a certain finite period of time – a certain ‘cosmic period’ – will with a specified accuracy move, accidentally, in the way required by the law of gravity. The probability calculated will, of course, be very small; negligibly small, in fact, but still not equal to zero. Thus we can raise the question of how long an n-segment of the sequence would have to be, or in other words, how long a duration must be assumed for the whole process, in order that we may expect with a probability close to 1 (or deviating from 1 by not more than an arbitrarily small value) the occurrence of one such cosmic period in which, as the result of an accumulation of accidents, our observations will agree with the law of gravity. For any value as close to 1 as we chose, we obtain a definite, though extremely large, finite number. We can then say: if we assume that the segment of this sequence has this very great length – or in other words that the ‘world’ lasts long enough – then our assumption of randomness entitles us to expect that the occurrence of a cosmic period in which the laws of gravity will seem to hold good, though ‘in reality’ nothing ever occurs but random scattering. This type of ‘explanation’ by means of the assumption of randomness is applicable to any regularity we choose. In fact we can in this way ‘explain’ our whole world, with all its observed regularities, as a phase in a random chaos – as an accumulation of purely accidental coincidences. [Italics in original]
As he says in the final sentence of this paragraph, we could theoretically explain the whole ‘world’ (i.e., all that can be observed, even in principle; the universe) this way. Modern cosmologists have to speak of ‘alternative unobservable universes’, because it is so widely accepted that our observable universe was created recently enough (about 14 billion years ago) that we don’t have nearly enough time for the simpler (and more obviously non-scientific) statement that we are just in a long enough random sequence in an almost infinitely long-lived universe. Multiverse theory is simply a modern incarnation of the same argument that Popper described 70 years ago.
So what? This doesn’t mean it’s not true. Lots of things that seem really weird to us have been shown to be scientifically true.
Here’s Popper’s next paragraph:
It seems to me that speculations of this kind are ‘metaphysical’, and that they are without any significance for science. And it seems equally clear that this fact is connected with their nonfalsifiability – with the fact that we can always and in all circumstances indulge in them.
In a much later edition, published decades later, Popper begins a wry footnote to these paragraphs with the following lines:
When writing this, I thought that speculations of the kind described would be easily recognized as useless, just because of their unlimited applicability. But they seem to more tempting than I imagined.
It sure has. But even if the idea of non-observable universes is, well, non-observable, there is of course the argument that we can theorize that some phenomenon X should be apparent in our observable universe if there really is a multiverse, and that if X is apparent then this can be used to show that the multiverse exists. Here is a section from the Discover article:
When I ask Linde whether physicists will ever be able to prove that the multiverse is real, he has a simple answer. “Nothing else fits the data,” he tells me. “We don’t have any alternative explanation for the dark energy; we don’t have any alternative explanation for the smallness of the mass of the electron; we don’t have any alternative explanation for many properties of particles.
“What I am saying is, look at it with open eyes. These are experimental facts, and these facts fit one theory: the multiverse theory. They do not fit any other theory so far. I’m not saying these properties necessarily imply the multiverse theory is right, but you asked me if there is any experimental evidence, and the answer is yes. It was Arthur Conan Doyle who said, ‘When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’?”
We can’t explain it any other way, so my hypothesized metaphysical agent, which by definition escapes human observation, must be the cause. After all, this is only potential cause that has not been disproven.
But, of course, this is precisely the form of the argument for Intelligent Design (ID). Maybe we should call it a “multiverse of the gaps” argument.
Now the counter argument is that we actually do have good scientific explanations for many of the phenomena that were claimed to be unexplainable without an intelligent designer. But scientific knowledge is never absolute, so there are always gaps, and therefore always space for such an argument. The problem with both ID and multiverse theory is the same: neither is true and neither is false in a scientific sense; they are metaphysical frameworks with the scientific task of inspiring testable hypotheses, but are not themselves scientific theories capable of testing through scientific means.
It’s tempting to see ID and multiverse theory as mirror images – one looking desperately to prove scientifically that humans are special, and the other desperately seeking to avoid this conclusion. This is almost, but not quite, appropriate in my view. The proper question to ask about both multiverse theory and ID is whether they are fruitful. Ultimately, either each framework will help scientists develop physical theories in the form of predictive rules that can be tested through observation, or it will not. It’s very hard to see how ID can do this, but I guess that anything’s possible. Multiverse theory is more likely to do so, if only because it is a point of view that embeds a metaphysic that is far more congenial to so many more smart scientists.
But to look to science to answer a metaphysical questions like “Did God create us?” or “Are there completely unobservable aspects of reality?” is a category error of the first order.
True, but if we take “grandma” to mean “wooden cart with wheels”, we can instantly turn her into a wagon. Taking words to mean something other than what the people you’re talking about take them to mean isn’t an especially impressive form of argument.
— Chet · Apr 5, 09:02 PM · #
Wow, Chet, this has caused me to reconsider the entire argument.
Hope that attitude works out for you.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 5, 09:17 PM · #
Looks like Chet favors fishing with dynamite.
— Tony Comstock · Apr 5, 09:24 PM · #
Typically, when one has premised an entire argument on something that turns out not to be true, one does reconsider the entire argument. I know that wouldn’t get you the blog-inches, though, but the fact that you consider that critique worthy of nothing more than sarcastic derision makes me hope that attitude works out for you.
I guess it probably will, among conservative circles.
— Chet · Apr 5, 09:25 PM · #
I’m actually very impressed, Jim. A cognizant understanding of the limits of scientific theory isn’t something of come to expect from the blogs in my RSS reader, never mind one willing so smack down these dumb popsci article that get so much hype/attention. While there are few points we agree on politically, it’s very heartening to see science hasn’t become so political, as to fail to bridge the gaps.
— Mike Douglas · Apr 5, 09:28 PM · #
Jim,
How do you think that the case of multiverse theory is importantly different from, say, theories that posit unobservable particles like quarks? Do you want to insist that such particles are “in principle” observable? Because if so, then the other universes seem to be observable in principle, too: i.e., we’d be able to observe them if we were in them. But quarks, if there are any such things, are patently parts of the universe, right?
— John Schwenkler · Apr 5, 09:37 PM · #
Jim, I agree with you completely that the Anthropic Principle is a useless tautology—a clever little conceit that’s interesting to ponder for a moment, but of no value or import except as a tool for ontological sophistry.
But that doesn’t mean that the Multiverse Theory is.
The multiverse theory doesn’t hypothesize a metaphysical agent. (That hypothetical agent is generally called “God.”)
The theory hypothsizes a reality that is—absent positive evidence—necessarily metaphysical, because we can’t explain its physical mechanism. (Yet?)
You point out quite clearly why that theory is not a mirror image for ID:
I would replace “many” with “most” or “almost all.”
For the multiverse theory, we really and truly don’t have any alternative explanations—except “God,” of course, which doesn’t really get us anywhere, explanation- or prediction-wise.
The Anthropic Principle is actually far more similar to the God Theory. If there is such an entity worthy of the moniker, it is somewhere between several and several trillion dimensions too complex for humans to comprehend or interact with. As such, it is “without any significance for science.” And, I would add, for any other human pursuit, including epistemology, ontology, and ethics.
“I thought that speculations of the kind described would be easily recognized as useless…. But they seem to be more tempting than I imagined.”
* Dawkins already coined a better name: “The argument from personal incredulity.” But that leads us to muddy epistemological waters that I choose not to wade in here.
Thanks,
Steve
http://asymptosis.com
— Steve Roth · Apr 5, 10:04 PM · #
Mike:
Thanks.
John:
Yes, I want to insist on exactly that.
I’ll note, as a starting point, that “observable” is a very tricky concept to define formally (as I’m sure you know). Popper punted on this, by the way, in the book I’ve cited, and deterined to treat it as a “primitive concept” that he was happy to elucidate by example, but that was not usuefully definable. I’m not going to attempt it.
I could make a much, much longer reply, but I think the gist of it is that if we treat observable in this way, it’s straightforward to think of quarks as observable in principle. That is, first, accepting that we often, at some moment in time, fail to have technical means of observation that we might have at later date. Second, for any scientific statement of an “observation” we can have disagreement among scientists about whether such an observation has occured. They can, collectively, dig deeper and deeper into it (What are alternative explanations for what we believe was a trail in that gas cloud? Maybe the equipment was mis-calibrated? maybe there was another cause for the trail? Maybe, it wasn’t a gas cloud at all? and so on). This can go on idefinitely, and there is no absolute stopping point. At some point enough scientists agree to accept this as an observation, and science proceeds. How does this work for the multiverse? We can’t dg deeper and eeeper into it. All we can do, as per the scientist quoted in the Disocver article, is to eliminate other potential causes within the observable universe.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 5, 10:07 PM · #
But what is there that can rule out the possibility that a similar set of expansions in our available means of observation might allow us similarly to “observe” what’s going on in other universes? (Or, for that matter, what is there that rules out the possibility that we might at some point – say, after our deaths (or would that not count?) – be able to observe how things are with God?) It’s hard not to feel like it’s the intuitions about metaphysics that are driving the intuitions about observability, rather than the other way around … though in any case there are at least some philosophers (like, say Bas van Fraassen) who argue on exactly these sorts of grounds that quarks and similar particles aren’t observable, and so that they count as theoretical posits in just the same way as God or the multiverse would. So I certainly wouldn’t say that the kind of view you want to hold about quarks is “straightforward”.
— John Schwenkler · Apr 5, 10:40 PM · #
Umm…I think you are confusing cosmic landscape with multiverse theory Dr. Manzi.
Tegmark has categorized four types of parallel universes:
Level I universes include identical copies of our world physically separated from our observable universe by cosmic inflation. Tegmark muses that there is an “identical copy of you about ten raised to the power of ten to the power of twenty-nine meters away.”
The Level II universes involve parallel worlds with different laws of physics existing on a landscape of possible vacuums, as has become popular in string theory.
Level III parallel worlds are implied by taking the unitary mathematics of quantum theory seriously, but as Tegmark comments, they “add nothing qualitatively new” to the predictions of the other levels.
The most extreme interpretation produces Level IV universes, where alternative mathematical structures produce universes with different laws of physics.
Cosmic lanscape theory is represented by Level IV universes.
I recommend this book, Dr, Manzi.
It is quite habinar.
;)
— matoko_chan · Apr 5, 11:06 PM · #
And n/e ways….what does it matter if the universe does turn out to be made of math?
It doesn’t mean that god doesn’t exist.
Just that gods form is unknown and unknowable.
Or it could be this.
;)
— matoko_chan · Apr 6, 12:08 AM · #
John:
You ask:
But what is there that can rule out the possibility that a similar set of expansions in our available means of observation might allow us similarly to “observe” what’s going on in other universes?
Nothing, in principle. At that point, it would be part of the observable universe, and this critique would no longer apply.
You then ask:
(Or, for that matter, what is there that rules out the possibility that we might at some point – say, after our deaths (or would that not count?) – be able to observe how things are with God?)
Again, nothing in principle.
You then say:
It’s hard not to feel like it’s the intuitions about metaphysics that are driving the intuitions about observability, rather than the other way around …
Well, I’m obviously not the best judge since this is a question about my conceptual biases, but I don’t think so.
Finally:
So I certainly wouldn’t say that the kind of view you want to hold about quarks is “straightforward”.
Fair enough. what I was trying to say was that it is operationally straightforward, given that I entirely punted on a formal definition of observable.
Thanks for pushing on the thinking here.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 6, 01:02 AM · #
As far as “observable universe” goes, there’s a de facto limit:
Outside of that, nada. The only knowledge we’ll ever have about the parts of the Universe outside our original volume is the stuff our theories imply or reject.
— JA · Apr 6, 01:16 AM · #
Well I’m always happy to push, Jim … but I’m still not satisfied. The problem is that when you admit that there is “[n]othing, in principle” preventing other universes from being observable in the relevant sense (and JA: your comment only seems to me to draw the lines of what is practically observable; the notion of observability in principle is supposed to encompass more than this, I think), then you’ve given up too much, haven’t you? I mean, isn’t this exactly what you were denying in the original post? The question isn’t whether we can in fact (i.e., right now and with the tools and theories we’ve presently got) “observe” other universes, but whether this is the sort of thing we could do if some in-principle-achievable advances in technology and scientific theory were made. And it’s exactly this that’s supposed to distinguish multiverse theory from ID: the former makes testable predictions, while the latter does not, and while it’s of course true that the predictive value of multiverse theory doesn’t absolutely demonstrate its truth, the fact that it makes claims that subject it to disproof in this way is exactly what makes it an empirical hypothesis, rather than a metaphysical one like that of the existence of God. It seems to me that it’s possible to reject this last move and hold that the multiverse hypothesis is indeed metaphysical, but it’s very hard to do that in a way that doesn’t commit you to reaching the same conclusion about quarks.
— John Schwenkler · Apr 6, 02:09 AM · #
As far as observable-down, it’s limited by the kinds of information we can acquire. This leads to “ontological relativity”, since what we observe at suboptical levels are signatures rather than forms.
— JA · Apr 6, 02:13 AM · #
To answer your question, John:
The limits are imposed by 1) speed of light, which is (theoretically) the fastest speed that information may propogate, including gravity (though there is the strange phenomenon of quantum entanglement), and 2) the kinds of information we are able anticipate and collect. In principle, a separate universe, or a separate part of our universe further away than 14 billion years, doesn’t communicate with us. There are no signatures, no events, which would be distinguishable from the regular order of business in our observable universe (distinguishability equals information).
Of course, that’s if you reject things like revelation and clairvoyance.
— JA · Apr 6, 02:26 AM · #
I guess I could have been more responsive?
The observational boundaries set by our physical “principles” are informational: speed of light, force, event, etc. In principle, there is no communication, no causation, outside the light-cone.
In principle, this is the boundary between physics and metaphysics, which is another way to say that Jim is right about the metaphysical nature of speculation about multiple universe (though there might be a way to demonstrate that our physical constants really are contingent).
— JA · Apr 6, 02:53 AM · #
JA,
Is the information in my head part of the universe?
— cw · Apr 6, 03:15 AM · #
JA: Thanks. But don’t we all have different light cones? And if so, doesn’t that suggest that the criterion you’re suggesting is, well, too epistemological to underwrite such a metaphysical verdict? If Jim means to be appealing to that sort of criterion, then that’s fine, I guess, but the Popperian notion of nonfalsifiability seems to me to involve something quite different from this.
— John Schwenkler · Apr 6, 03:16 AM · #
CW, of course! And your signature is badass.
John, yeah, I’m too much of a pantywaist pragmatist to take on the a priori. For me, almost all of these things get boiled down to naturalized epistemology, a foible which coughs up firmity at the expense of imagination.
— JA · Apr 6, 03:32 AM · #
I like your handle too. Le’ts call them handles like in the cb radio days.
About the thoughts, that has always bee something I brooded over. We have these electrochemical processes in our brains which are physical, and these physical events create and encode information, which is not physical. Although it has to have a physical encoding in a brain or a book or a picture or on a hard drive to exist. Once the encoding is destroyed the information ceases to exist. When I die all kinds of unique information will cease to exist (then you’ll all be sorry). But the infromation is not the picture or the electrochemical event. That is just the carrier. So you have to say that information exists but that it is not part of the physical universe. It is not matter or a natural force, or a dimension like time (don’t even get me started on time). And it seems to be solely a property of living brains. Weird werid werid. To me at least, to have this other, very recently create element in the universe, or at least in this part of the universe.
— cw · Apr 6, 04:55 AM · #
Philosopher Robert C. Koons notes, “Originally, atheists prided themselves on being no-nonsense empiricists, who limited their beliefs to what could be seen and measured. Now, we find ourselves in a situation in which the only alternative to belief in God is belief in an infinite number of unobservable parallel universes! You’ve come along way, baby!”
— Steve Sailer · Apr 6, 08:03 AM · #
John:
You say:
Well I’m always happy to push, Jim … but I’m still not satisfied.
Sorry, I didn’t mean to imply that I thought the discussion was closed.
The problem is that when you admit that there is “[n]othing, in principle” preventing other universes from being observable in the relevant sense …, then you’ve given up too much, haven’t you? I mean, isn’t this exactly what you were denying in the original post? The question isn’t whether we can in fact (i.e., right now and with the tools and theories we’ve presently got) “observe” other universes, but whether this is the sort of thing we could do if some in-principle-achievable advances in technology and scientific theory were made.
I don’t think so. If we someday develop technology (or simply develop a re-interpretation of data we already have due to an improved understanding) that lets us observe the multiverse, then it would simply become obvious to us that it was part of the universe (= anything, in principle observable). We would then realize that to the extent we had previously considered it unobservable in principle, we were mistaken.
Imagine you have gone back in time to a hypothetical period of more limited technology and scientific theory. Group 1 says that the universe extends only to Pluto, so what we think of as the solar system is the universe and God makes us see what look like little points of light in the sky; group 2 says that the universe extends only to Pluto, but there is some non-observable in prinicple realm called the multiverse that has the physical manifestation of what we see as litle points of liught; group 3 says that they have a theory that there is observable reality beyond Pluto, and that these points of light are really other stars like our sun that we could, in principle, go out and observe. As we proceed out from the solar system and observe ever-more distant objects, group 1’s response is “yes, but everything past this is an illusion created by God, group 2 says “yes, but everything past this is a phenomenon created by the unobservable multiverse, and group 3 says “so far so good, let’s continue to behave as if all that is not yet explainable through physical models can, in principle, be explained this way.
Who are the scientists here? (Note that I’m not syaing that group 3 is always right, just that they’re the scientists).
— Jim Manzi · Apr 6, 12:44 PM · #
Jim and John,
I think whether or not the multiverse has the same status as ID depends on how you operationalize each concept. Consider the statements drawn from the discover article that Jim quotes:
“Nothing else fits the data,” he tells me. “We don’t have any alternative explanation for the dark energy; we don’t have any alternative explanation for the smallness of the mass of the electron; we don’t have any alternative explanation for many properties of particles.
This statement seems hard to distinguish from “God of the Gaps” thinking, which I think we would all agree is non-scientific. To the extent that multiverse theory currently relies on such thinking, it seems to occupy the same status as ID.
John, when you use the term “in principle observable”, I take you to mean “if the laws of physics are actually other than we currently believe them to be, and/or our methods of observation advance by leaps and bounds, the multiverse could be observed.” Under this conception of “observable,” I think one can make ID scientific too: I will simply posit characteristics of the designer that cannot be observed under the current laws of physics and technology of observation, but could “in principle” be observed under other conditions.
I think the status of quarks is quite different. It is true that we cannot observe them. But, unless I am mistaken, we can observe their effects—the existence of quarks implies several unique (not predicted by any other theory), certain (must be true if the theory is to be true), and novel (we did not know them before) facts about the universe we can observe. And we do indeed observe these facts.
I am not an expert on the science here, but consider this thought experiment. Suppose we had an inflation like theory created to explain certain facts about our own universe that very strongly implied a multiverse. Then suppose that this theory also made several unique, certain, and novel predictions about THIS universe that turned out to be true. This would, I think, constitute (some) scientific grounds for affirming the existence of a multiverse, even if we cannot observe it. My understanding of multiverse theories is that in their current formulation they make no such predictions about this universe—they have not generated any novel facts.
the upshot of all this is that I think I agree with Jim—practically, there is little difference between multiverse theory and ID. I think the real difference is that we would expect the proponents of a multiverse to give it up if it ever made predictions about this universe that we falsified, whereas we would simply expect the proponents of ID to amend their theory to death. That is, “in principle” scientists will let their theory be falsified and non-scientists will not. But these are characteristics of the people rather than the theories.
— brendan · Apr 6, 01:01 PM · #
brendan:
Thanks for the comment. when you say:
I think the real difference is that we would expect the proponents of a multiverse to give it up if it ever made predictions about this universe that we falsified, whereas we would simply expect the proponents of ID to amend their theory to death. That is, “in principle” scientists will let their theory be falsified and non-scientists will not. But these are characteristics of the people rather than the theories.
This is petty much what I was trying to get at in the penultimate paragraph:
It’s tempting to see ID and multiverse theory as mirror images – one looking desperately to prove scientifically that humans are special, and the other desperately seeking to avoid this conclusion. This is almost, but not quite, appropriate in my view. The proper question to ask about both multiverse theory and ID is whether they are fruitful. Ultimately, either each framework will help scientists develop physical theories in the form of predictive rules that can be tested through observation, or it will not. It’s very hard to see how ID can do this, but I guess that anything’s possible. Multiverse theory is more likely to do so, if only because it is a point of view that embeds a metaphysic that is far more congenial to so many more smart scientists.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 6, 01:27 PM · #
Jim,
The idea of “mirror-image” is appropriate: ID and Multiverse resemble each other as metaphysical theories, but their aims are orthogonal to each other. As you say.
You couch your claim with “if only”, so I’m not sure how much weight you give to the “congenial to smart scientists” stuff. Can you unpack that a little bit? To me, it seems like you have it backwards: Multiverse is not science-like because scientists are drawn to it, scientists are drawn to Multiverse because it is science-like (i.e., it assumes extensionality).
— JA · Apr 6, 02:41 PM · #
JA:
Some of both, IMHO. It is (intutively to me, at least) more science-like in that it seems that it much more easily inspires testable theories than ID. I also believe that science as a methodology proceeds as if material reductionsim is all there is, therefore, good scientists will tend to be more attracted to a category error that employs science to try to show this is true than to a category error that trie to use science to show that it is not true.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 6, 03:26 PM · #
JA, it is not appropriate.
Because multiverse models are based on mathematics they can be simulated, first with thought experiments and theoretical mathematical models, next with virtualized computer simulations. For example, black holes. IDT postulates a designer , by definition a nonmathematical point of origin, intransigent under simulation, lacking a formal mathematical description.
Until you can postulate a formal “mathematics of god” the mirror is crack’d.
— matoko_chan · Apr 6, 03:28 PM · #
>ID and multiverse theory as mirror images
I really think this metaphor is inapt.
Imagine this image of ID: a person (representing a [metaphysical] belief system), with a mountain behind him (representing the evidence contradicting that belief system).
In a mirror image, the multiverse would show the same image. But in fact, the mountain is missing.
That doesn’t mean the multiverse belief system is true—just that there’s no contradictory evidence.
I also think the following inaccurately represents the situation:
Multiversalists are not trying—desperately or otherwise—to deny humans’ “specialness.” (Though that conclusion may follow from their speculations.)
They’re simply trying to figure out what the universe(s) is (are) like.
Thanks,
Steve
— Steve Roth · Apr 6, 04:28 PM · #
All this, of course, to solve a problem that may not even be one – we have no idea how the physical constants the Anthropic principle claims to explain are actually allowed to vary, or between what values, or if in fact they’re not all simply derivative values from a lesser number of hidden constants.
— Chet · Apr 6, 04:44 PM · #
Mirror images, in the narrow sense that each is a super-scientific theory of origins, and mirror images in the sense that, as paradigms, they face in opposite directions: ID writes God in, Multiverse pushes God further out.
That’s because, even if we somehow demonstrate the contingency of physical constants, there’s nothing we can do to distinguish between 1) “yes, they’re variable, but there’s only one Universe — i.e., we’re just really, really lucky the constants settled on those particular values”; and 2) “yes variable, yes Multiverse — i.e., fine-tuning is explained by some version of the Anthropic Principle.” The problem is the inability to distinguish between alternative hypotheses, even if variability is treated as a given.
— JA · Apr 6, 05:10 PM · #
“Mirror images, in the narrow sense that each is a super-scientific theory of origins, and mirror images in the sense that, as paradigms, they face in opposite directions: ID writes God in, Multiverse pushes God further out.”
Fine.
But they are not isomorphic, or of equal weight and value, as Manzi implies.
Aren’t you tired of conservatives assuming the field mouse position, JA?
— matoko_chan · Apr 6, 06:23 PM · #
Also Manzi can only draw his analogy between Type IV multiverse and IDT, as we stand a good chance of proving swaths of 11-dimensional String Theory at CERN, and supporting Type II multiverse.
— matoko_chan · Apr 6, 06:32 PM · #
Good article Mr. Manzi, but I would point out that the same work by Popper to which you refer also contains another interesting nugget. He points out that any premise that entails contradiction can’t be a valid premise. This is so because a world in which a valid premise could entail contradiction would be a world in which it would be possible to prove all propositions true. Since we take this world to be a world in which some propositions are not true (for instance it is not true that my name is Jim Manzi), this world is one in which a valid premise may not entail a contradiction.
This can be the lever point upon which distinctions may be drawn between notions like ID and the multiverse. Does one premise entail contradiction where the other does not? I’m not saying I have an answer to this question, I’m just saying that this point potentially permits a principled distinction between premises you seem to be saying admit of no principled distinction.
— sewells · Apr 6, 06:33 PM · #
Actually, Susskind and others have proposed ways of probing our ‘ancestor’ universes (this is from the stringy-landscape model of inflation from vacua) in terms of gravitational waves (with experiments like LIGO) and looking at certain tensor moments of the CMB. So, its not all that far out, assuming a certain model of ancestor/child universe inflation.
Let’s see intelligent design propose a similar way of analyzing their propositions!
— jackal · Apr 6, 06:49 PM · #
“Are there completely unobservable aspects of reality?”
That depends what the meaning of the word “are” is. :)
— mark · Apr 6, 06:55 PM · #
Chet: “All this, of course, to solve a problem that may not even be one – we have no idea how the physical constants the Anthropic principle claims to explain are actually allowed to vary, or between what values, or if in fact they’re not all simply derivative values from a lesser number of hidden constants”
I wholeheartedly agree: the anthropic principle is a cute conceit, but only inasmuch as it’s the logical equivalent of a snake biting its own tail. And I think Jim agrees as well; hence “Much Ado About Nothing.”
For me, a good mirror image for the anthropic principle is the central tenet of poststructuralist semioticians (and their assorted heirs): that words are nothing but “arbitrary signifiers.”
Like the anthropic theory, I find this statement to be both stunningly obvious (Steve Martin: “Those French people, they have a different word for everything!”) and patently false (Can’t remember who: “A poststructuralist is the professor who denies any inherent meaning for language just before calling his wife to ask her to order his favorite pizza for dinner.”)
Like the poststructuralists, anthropicists attempt to spin this paltry priniciple out into a logical support for something else entirely: PSes for various political positions that they think (wrongly) require relativistic thinking, APers for the existence of God (and ultimately in the most extreme form, absolutist thinking).
In each case the principle, the logic, and the conclusion are all easily refuted by a clever 13-year-old.
Multiverse theories are something else entirely. Rather like the atomic theories of Leucippus, Democritus, et. al., they are attempts to explain what constitutes the universe(s).
And like those theories, it may be 2,000-odd years before humans have the ability to judge those theories’ merits based on real evidence.
If MVers are like me, the question of humans’ “specialness” is simply of no interest or import. If this is true, their approach to inquiry is not (or is less) polluted by considerations of personal/speciesistic ego and self-regard—a necessary (though of course not sufficient) condition to objectivity.
— Steve Roth · Apr 6, 08:02 PM · #
More than 2,000 years ago, Lucretius took a view very similar to the one that Popper ridiculed. He said that everything is random and chaotic except that once in a while, just by chance, there are little pockets of order, and we happen to inhabit one of them. Ludwig Boltzmann appealed to the same idea to explain how order in the universe is consistent with the second law of thermodynamics. What’s interesting is that we can see about a million times further into the universe than Lucretius could and at least tens of thousands of times further than Boltzman could, and we have come across nothing but order, all governed by the same laws of physics that govern life on Earth. So, to that extent at least this conjecture has already been falsified many times over. However, that does not seem to prevent people from advancing it over and over again.
— bill lane · Apr 6, 08:39 PM · #
1) ID is perhaps not ultimately falsifiable, but there has been a debate at least since Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in terms of the definition of science as consisting in falsifiability (negative) vs. best-fit to observations (positive). ID is not based merely on the idea that unintelligent processes cannot adequately explain evidence, but also on the claim that design in particular is suggested by observable evidence.
2) There are attempts to make predictions and technological applications based on intelligent design, though whether they will be fruitful is too early to judge. For example see here:
http://www.idthefuture.com/2009/04/predictions_from_an_intelligen_1.html
— shua · Apr 7, 04:22 AM · #
Mr. Linde would do well to remember that Arthur Conan Doyle believed in fairies.
— Brar · Apr 7, 11:43 AM · #
the other desperately seeking to avoid this conclusion.
I strongly object to this statement Dr. Manzi.
That is in no way what Multiverse theory is about.
The field mice are desperate, true enough….the wheat patch is smaller every day.
But multiverse theorists are not desperate.
Every day of discovery and wonder brings us closer to the Pythagorean ideal.
Number is the ruler of forms and thought and the cause of gods and demons.
— matoko_chan · Apr 7, 02:51 PM · #
As a concerned layman observer of the ID movement, I am clearly much less qualified than the learned participants in this message board to comment on whether the multiverse thesis is essentially empirical or metaphysical—though I’m inclined toward the former—or whether it is equally plausible to the notion of a “fine tuner” of the universe, but I think myself within my bounds as a layman to note that Dr. Manzi’s characterization of ID involves a bit of sleight of hand. IDers don’t stop at the concept of a “fine tuner,” which would do no better than imply a “deist” conception of god, who set the universe in motion, established universal physical laws, and left it to fend for itself. IDers in general are much more ambitious and go on to posit things, such as irreducible complexity, the argument from design, and—well that’s pretty much all they have—that contradict known and observable scientific facts about our world and our universe. As such, while we can debate whether multiverse theory belongs in the science or philosophy classroom, there can be no doubt where ID, as it is conventionally understood and advanced by its proponents, belongs.
— Shawn B. · Apr 7, 02:59 PM · #
Matoko:
In the sentence that you quote, I say that it is tempting to draw this conclusion, and in the next sentecne I say that it is not quite right.
Shawn B:
I have kind of the same kind of reaction. I think that the penultimate paragraph makes the point that while there are similarities between the two, that ID is much less likely to ever be scientifically useful.
— Jim Manzi · Apr 7, 03:47 PM · #
I object to the symmetric modifier “desperately” and point to the fact that these are the sentences that Andrew quotes.
You are just giving the poor field mice more pander-fodder to allow them to continue in their moronic magical thinking that science is just another type of religion.
— matoko_chan · Apr 7, 05:49 PM · #
And ekshually….that is what this whole piece reeks of…..the ongoing scurrilous attempt to make religious thought a peer of scientific thought.
It’s all about teh Respect isn’t it?
Here’s the meme…..you are just as smart as those snobby elitist high IQ scientists….you are just smart in a different way…..a better way!
godsmart.
— matoko_chan · Apr 7, 05:55 PM · #
Jim,
I suppose that my biggest beef with your analysis, or perhaps better put, your manner of exposition, is the way you seem to juxtapose ID and the multiverse thesis as if they are alternatives, when in fact I believe your intent is simply to use ID as an analogy in order to undercut the validity of multiverse thesis as a scientific approach. But ID is not an alternative to the multiverse thesis—deism is (and of course, those two alternatives cannot be considered exhaustive.) The claims of the ID movement, while they may begin with the notion of “fine-tuning,” go far beyond it. It is clear from your post that you don’t believe in ID, but it does seem in places to reduce ID to the “fine-tuning” argument, which clearly doesn’t serve your purposes.
— Shawn B. · Apr 7, 06:39 PM · #