Rulers, Masses, and Elites
Reihan says in his latest column for The Daily Beast: “The great danger of Obama’s response to the street protests in Iran has been that he’d choose Iran’s thuggish ruling class over Iran’s masses on the grounds that Serious People don’t fret about human rights when grand strategy is at stake.”
“Choosing Iran’s masses” sounds to me just as bad as tacitly supporting the “thuggish ruling class.” Our solidarity with the Iranian protesters is, necessarily, a snub to “Iran’s masses,” many of whom make up the basiji milita and Ahmadinejad’s constituency. If Reihan wants Obama to support a particular Iranian faction and their goals of liberalization and reform, he’s welcome to argue so, but he ought not demand that the US president become the advocate for an imagined Iranian polity.
We like and we admire the minority of relatively liberal, cosmopolitan Iranians protesting against their odious president and his supporters. To deserve our sympathy and support, the protesters need not be disenfranchised stewards of the Iranian popular will; our affinities need not extend to the broader Iranian population, a large portion of which probably relishes the spectacle of protesters being beaten by basiji. On the other hand, we don’t need to make some considered judgment as to the relative merits of Mousavi before expressing solidarity with the protesters. It should be enough to say, “here is a group of people with whom I share political and cultural sensibilities, and regardless of the poor choices available to them at the ballot box, I’d like to see them prevail against their cruel political rivals.” There’s no shame in choosing a team — especially an underdog — and rooting for it.
The great danger of Obama’s response is not, as Reihan suggests, that he would express too much support for an illegitimate clique of rulers. It’s that he would, like Reihan does, transfer our sympathy for the protesters onto an imagined version of Iran, one in which the population suffers together beneath an oppressive “ruling class.”
There has never been an issue that has more cemented my belief in non-interventionism than the last few weeks in Iran. I can’t imagine an American response that could possibly work in a way that made sense, was moral, and moved deftly through the incredible tangle of Iranian politics and society. And why should we be able to craft such a response? Iran is not our country, it’s vastly complicated internal politics are its own, and no amount of well-wishing is going to make us capable of maneuvering effectively within it.
The ethical argument— the pro-democracy argument— against monkeying with other countries continues to be my primary justification for non-interventionism. But it becomes almost irrelevant in the face of the practical argument, the simple recognition that we lack anything approaching the wisdom or deftness necessary to impose our will on other countries.
— Freddie · Jun 24, 02:21 PM · #
Freddie,
This seems like an argument for non-interventionism that proves too much. Sure, other countries are complex, there is a risk of unintended consequences, etc. Here are two concerns at a theoretical level. 1) unintended consequences applies to all government actions, what is the principled argument that foreign policy is so different from domestic policy? 2) Not all countries are non-interventionist, and thus non-interventionism runs the danger of giving the world over as prey to the wicked (as Machiavelli complained about Christians). Let us imagine that there is credible evidence that autocracy X is funding insurgents to destabilize struggling democracy Y. Is the principled non-interventionist response to do nothing?
Moving from the theoretical to the concrete, I wonder if there are elements of ‘monkeying’ you do support, for example, do/did you think wise:
a) the world boycott of South Africa in the 80s
b) the EU pressuring Israel to end settlements
c) the UK invading Sierra Leone and quashing Foday Sankoh
d) any of the NATO Balkan interventions in the 90s
— Ben A · Jun 24, 02:37 PM · #
As a member of the American polity, I’m not perfectly knowledgeable or even close to it, when it comes to internal domestic disputes; but I’m a lot closer to understanding them than I am to understanding political situations in countries where I don’t speak the language and can have at best a rudimentary understanding of their culture and political history. More to the point, I have a responsibility, as a member of a democratic state, to inform myself about internal political disputes, to attempt to come to some sort of informed opinion, and to express that opinion when appropriate and necessary. I have no such obligation to Iran, and as I believe that self-determination is a necessary prerequisite for democracy (while admitting it isn’t democracy in and of itself), in my estimation, my duty as someone who supports democracy is to leave Iran alone.
As far as interventions I support, it depends. I don’t want to get too self-centered on this, but I support foreign military intervention when a) there is a clear, present and immediate threat that can’t be solved through diplomatic means, or b) when there is a humanitarian crisis that the international community has agreed is so contrary to basic human rights that it requires armed response. I understand that this is all provisional, subjective and necessarily vague, but that’s the best I can do. I muddle along like everybody else. It’s crucial, though, that any kind of doctrine for intervention recognizes that when it’s necessary to get out is as important of a question as when it’s necessary to go in. As much as I disagree with American policy when it comes to when to invade (or manipulate with our intelligence services), we’re certainly better at doing that than knowing when to get out. To me, as soon as the conditions that prompted invasion in the first place end, a basic respect for self-determination compels us to leave.
Boycotts and other economic sanctions, as they can often be carried out entirely domestically, I support in a far wider range of situations than I do armed intervention. I don’t extend that to blockades, which are far more aggressive. As far as EU pressure on Israel, it depends— if it means threatening to cut off aid or suspend arms deals or similar, that’s internal, and I can support it. If it amounts to force or threats of same against Israel, I can’t. I’m not educated enough about the invasion of Sierra Leone to comment. Had I been politically conscious at the time of the US intervention in Bosnia, I would have been opposed to it, and am opposed to it in retrospect. Like I said, a lot of it’s a muddle. But the American consensus is bent towards intervention to a degree that I just find totally contrary to both democratic principles and prudence.
— Freddie · Jun 24, 03:19 PM · #
Ben A, the U.S. track record with interventionism — see Guatemala, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, China, Indonesia, Iraq (?) — should be enough to at least inspire caution in these situations. All of the “success stories” you listed are fairly multilateral responses to fairly powerless regimes.
Matt, I think you nailed it. They can be a minority and we can still love them. And siding with a political system has clear advantages to siding with a specific polity. There is no question as to where Obama’s personal loyalties lie. However, I think U.S. interests — and maybe those of the liberal minority in Iran, as well — are better served if he keeps those sentiments private.
— wfrost · Jun 24, 03:30 PM · #
Freddie, no one is arguing that we should invade Iran. The question seems to be whether we should strongly criticize Iran, with Obama starting out in the “no” camp and reluctantly moving into the “maybe” camp.
I don’t know what policy, if any, we should pursue. My guess is that the Iranian government will successfully crush the uprising. At that point, the best outcome is if (1) a minimum number of the protestors are jailed or killed and (2) the protests enter the public memory as a symbol of what’s wrong with Iran, like Tienanmin Square or Chechoslovakia, so that the current government of Iran loses any remaining pretense to the moral high ground and hopefully, it becomes easier to form coalitions to pressure Iran into positive change.
I have no idea how to achieve that, though.
— J Mann · Jun 24, 04:24 PM · #
Matt, I think that there is a fundamental composition fallacy in your post: Just because members of “the masses” are part of Ahmadinejad’s constituency does not mean that siding with the protestors is against “The Masses” properly understood as a whole. By which I mean, if “the masses” means anything in this case, it means a hefty democratic majority. It seems that Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent victory wronged such a majority, so siding with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei is indeed siding against the masses.
The reason to side with the protestors is not because Mousavi is such a great alternative to Ahmadinejad, but because the election fraud makes obvious that democracy in Iran is a hoodwink, as it has always been. So even if the regime crushes the upheaval, the exposure could be such that the international community is less likely to coddle Iran than it has been, sort of what J Mann above hopes for. Though such exposure is unlikely to impress Russia or China, who I understand are the biggest roadblocks in efforts to impose international anti-nuclear sanctions against Iran.
— Blar · Jun 24, 04:58 PM · #
I think Reihan has gone utterly mad. This is like when he tried to write something nice supporting McCain after that awful embarassing racist campaign ad linking blacks and welfare.
Fortunately Obama understands what is actually happening in Iran….even if Reihan doesn’t.
Here’s sumthin I wrote at Hilzoys—
Musavi and the other candidates protests are based on a violation of Islamic law in an Islamic republic. The Iranians live under a rule of law in a republic, just like us. It is just islamic law and an Islamic republic. And it is definitely a reform movement.
tant pis for the neocons, the Islamic republic of Iran will survive, but perhaps with changes.
Sayeed Ali al Sistani is the titular leader of Shi’ia Islam. But when the holiest site of the Shi’ia was controlled by Iraq, an enemy of Iran, Iranians established the holy city of Qom where shi’ia muslims could fulfill their obligation to hajj. So Qom does not actually owe subservience to Karbala, or take direction from Sayeed Sistani….they are more parallel, and authority flows from both holy cities independently.
The Assembly of Experts has the constitutional power to remove the Supreme Leader. What would happen if the Leader became corrupt, insane, or too ill to perform his service to the people?
It is being said that Khameni is ill and old and wishes to ensure his son Mojtaba will succeed him, and that Mojtaba made a shaitan bargain with Nejad. There has been noise calling Khameni “the Ali of the Age”, implying he could hand down his position to his son like Imam Ali handed his to his son.
Both genetics and scholarship figure prominantly in succession in Shi’ia islam.
Remember the 1979 revolution took about a year. Every action the regime takes against its people de-legitimizes it more in the eyes of Qom, the true source of authority. It is the greatest sin for a muslim to kill another muslim.
This is actually much more a culture war between two versions of al-Islam. Nejad’s fundies are rural, poor, older, ostentatiously pious, less educated, socially conservative and….outnumbered. Much like conservatives in this country they are frightened and angered by the loss of power that demographics is dealing them. 70% of Iranians are under 30.
I would expect a large protest at 40 days out from Neda Soltani’s martyrdom. If Rafsanjani has consolidated his coalition in Qom, he will make his move then.
The brutal crackdown today I think is a mistake, but it is truly the only option left to Khameni and Mojtaba to secure the succession. If they cannot brutalize the population into submission before the 40 day event they will fail. I do not think the regime can achieve a sufficient quantity of brutality to destroy the dissident movement, and they can only force it underground for a time. It may take a year, like it did with the Shah, but the Shi’ia will never accept a dictator. The Shi’ia are very good at non-violent protest and resistance. That is how they survived the Umayydd Caliphate, and how they overthrew the tyrant Shah.
I would place my bet on the Sea of Green.
— matoko_chan · Jun 24, 06:12 PM · #
Excellent riposte, Mr. Frost. If anything, a more robust diplomatic presence in Iran could have been extremely useful – or perhaps stronger trade ties. Alas! We are too stubborn for such pragmatism – no, instead we need vague condemnations and the threat of war to supplant the wholly organic Iranian movement. C’est la vie.
— E.D. Kain · Jun 24, 06:17 PM · #
Also….Obama IS making a strong statement of support for the Sea of Green…..he just is making it directly to THEM.
I think at some point you have to accept that neoconservatism is simply utterly discreditted, and toss it out with trash.
— matoko_chan · Jun 24, 06:20 PM · #
Surprise Ben A!
Here is my list of a few reasons we CANNOT do that in IRAN.
1) Operation Ajax
2) the tyrant Shah
3) teh Epic Fail of the Manifest Destiny of Judeoxian Democracy in MENA aka “the Bush Doctrine”
— matoko_chan · Jun 24, 06:42 PM · #
Freddie,
Thanks for the response and clarification. I think I read this from you first post “I can’t imagine an American response that could possibly work in a way that made sense, was moral, and moved deftly through the incredible tangle of Iranian politics and society” very broadly. I took it to imply that we should not try to gin up a sanctions regime against Iran, should not think about a trade embargo, should not sponsor a UN resolution, etc. These may all specifically be bad ideas. I don’t mean to endorse any one of them. But you seemed to be taking a principled position that would rule them out. Again, I think that proves too much. I think it even proves too much for a case of military support. I don’t need to know everything about Columbia to conclude that it would be in the US interest to support the current government against FARC. Certainly Hugo Chavez doesn’t think he needs to know everything there is to know about Columbia to support FARC against the current government.
wfrost,
Heaven forbid that we should try to weigh the global pros and cons of US interventionism in a comments thread! And I would agree it seems right to bias one’s thinking towards caution, multilateralism, and overwhelming material advantage. As you brought up Korea, however, let me note that Korea War is a great “hard case” of interventionism. Horrible for US soldiers, horrible for civilians, a war that the US came very near to losing, but maybe a better option than a Juche tyranny over the whole peninsula.
— Ben A · Jun 24, 09:22 PM · #
JMann hits an important point:we’re not invading Iran. We’re not even if W. magically becomes President again because most Americans think it’s insane.
This fact is a key reason for Obama to stay the hell out of it. Regardless of whether the President should support this side or that, he probably ought to avoid giving contentless symbolic support on substantive matters (and if he does he’ll get beaten about the head with that). Say Obama full-throatedly supports Musavi. What the hell does that mean? What I think it means is a bunch of Nedas go much much further thinking they have Western backing and we watch them get eaten, and do nothing. I saw that in Iraq in ’91 among the Kurds and Shia, and I don’t really want to see it again, thanks very much.
Which is why makoto_chan better be wrong, too. I damn well hope Obama isn’t speaking directly to the protesters, and if he is, then that’s dumb. Message to protesters: we feel for you, man. Sucks. But you’re on your own.
— Sanjay · Jun 25, 02:18 AM · #
Oh, sweet mother of God, I see Robert Kaplan is trying to fire up my imagination about the awesomeness of a democratic Iran in the Post.
— Sanjay · Jun 25, 02:38 AM · #
I think I’m right Sanjay. Twice Obama has referenced MLK and the arc of justice.
This is what you better hope I am not right about.
Qompromise.
The Caliphate of the Shi’ia.
lol
— matoko_chan · Jun 28, 01:27 PM · #