Designing a defense budget
Our own Graeme Wood shared this blog post by Spencer Ackerman on the defense budget. After pointing out that the biggest (and growing) item is combat aircraft, Mr Ackerman calls this “insane”:
It’s only a slight exaggeration to say we don’t use combat aircraft in the wars we’re fighting. You have to come up with a baroque set of Michael Bey-esque geopolitical calculations by which we would use combat aircraft in any conceivable war. The U.S.’s area of combat-aircraft dominance is called Planet Earth. No Air Force is going to challenge ours. No actual U.S. adversary has an air force, and the list of real-potential U.S. adversaries that do starts with Iran and ends with North Korea, neither of which are remotely stupid enough to test us in the air. The most likely scenario for using combat aircraft in a U.S. war is an alien invasion.
He goes on to write:
What is relevant to the wars we fight are (a) remotely-piloted aircraft like drones, (b) surveillance aircraft like drones, © helicopters, and (d) especially airlift, to get our ground troops from Point A to Point B. And as you can see from the chart, we don’t spend nearly on that stuff what we spend on combat aircraft.
While I certainly agree that given America’s counterinsurgencies require a different set of kit than a Cold War military, and I absolutely agree with the general proposition that defense spending is irrational, riven by political-bureaucratic infighting rather than strategic investing (I agreed with nixing the F-22 program), I think calling high spending on aircraft simply “insane” is a little bit short-sighted.
If there is one lesson to draw from both recent and ancient military history, it is the tendency to fight “the last war”. Certainly this was the problem with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were at first basically fought like the first Gulf War. That war, meanwhile, was such a stunning success because the one fighting the last war was Saddam Hussein, entrenching his large cavalry in the desert, expecting a repeat of the Iran-Iraq war instead of the air-dominated, high tech war that the US had been perfecting.
The point is that while the US is fighting counterinsurgencies now, there’s no sure way to tell what wars it will fight tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. My friends who know about this stuff tell me that China’s military spending is geared toward an overwhelming amount of mid-range missile and naval warfare, which is designed to accomplish a fait accompli whereby China has so much overwhelming force in range of Taiwan that the US can no longer defend it. I think letting that happen would suck. (I also think antagonizing China would be very bad, but also that the best way to be friends with everyone in this big bad world is to have the biggest stick in the room.)
I’m not saying the US should orient its military spending toward preventing or matching China’s rise. I’m saying that whatever the big security challenge will be twenty years from now, we don’t know what it will be. Certainly 10 years ago you couldn’t have anticipated the situation we’re in today. In this context, for a country with the scale and power that the US has, with this extent of security engagements, the best way to respond to this radical uncertainty is to hedge against every possibility (after all, especially on a Reihan-edited site, we can’t dismiss an alien invasion completely out of hand), and maintain heads-and-shoulders dominance over every area.
The reason why today the US air force has no rival, not even China or Russia, is because those guys don’t even try to match the Air Force’s capacity, because the Air Force is so far ahead of them. If the strategy becomes “let’s only be slightly bigger than those guys” there’s a good chance those guys will all of a sudden buy a lot of fighter planes and launch a bunch of military satellites.
As far as fighting counter-insurgency wars, Ackerman is right that the US should buy a whole bunch of drones and transport aircraft (a first step would be to get over the astounding protectionism regarding the EADS A400M, which is superior to every alternative). But the US should also invest a lot more in strategic space commands, it should also prepare for the rise of a belligerent China (even as American foreign policy works hard to prevent such belligerence), it should prepare for a collapse of North Korea (for which Haiti is a priceless opportunity for a dress rehearsal, by the way), it should prepare for an alien invasion, it should prepare for (successful) Battle of Mogadishu-style interventions in places like Yemen, it should prepare to pummel Iran. It should prepare for a lot of those things at the same time.
The point isn’t to bring back the F-22. The point isn’t even that spending so much on fighter aircraft is smart — it may very well be dumb.
The point is that it’s not self-evidently “insane” to spend a lot of money on fighter planes for the sole reason that we’re not using them right now.
P.S. I also feel compelled to point out this absolutely extraordinary talk by Thomas Barnett regarding the kind of counterinsurgency strategy the US should support.
I don’t know that your “last war” lessons quite jibe with events. As the initial military invasions went, both Iraq campaigns were pretty successful. Perceptions of the second campaign’s failure have everything to do with the aftermath. Had we attempted the same long-term occupation during the first Gulf War, it too would have stumbled through a messy counterinsurgency.
At any rate, I’m skeptical that excessive, anticipatory spending on one area of military hardware— the issue Ackerman cites— would go far to solve the problem of protracted, irregular warfare. Isn’t it that the point of guerilla tactics— to resist the very military advantage that the US maintains with huge sums of money?
Even if we take your assumptions at face value, Ackerman is saying that combat aircraft, specifically, are a vestige of the very “last war” mentality that you claim such aircraft might avoid. We haven’t made war in the air in several generations, and by now we must have a lead of several generations on our nearest rival. Building on that lead, especially right now, is excessive. At some point, continuing to pour huge sums into total air domination brings diminishing returns. To do so when the economy is hitting on all pistons may be merely unwise. To do so right now is pretty “insane.”
— turnbuckle · Jan 27, 03:44 PM · #
It’s a quibble, but the EADS A400M is not yet an operational aircraft and may never be. In any case, when the topic is illogical military spending, it’s worth noting that the Hercules transport craft, first flown more than 50 years ago, is still in production and continues to serve in huge numbers; and that the last B-52, still by far the U.S.‘s main strategic bomber, rolled off the assembly line in 1962. Obviously they cannot be used against sophisticated enemies until combat aircraft and cruise missiles have ensured U.S. air superiority — but, as it’s been established here, we will be able to do so without difficulty, using our existing technology, for at least another generation if not two.
— Tim · Jan 27, 04:20 PM · #
The point is that it’s not self-evidently “insane” to spend a lot of money on fighter planes for the sole reason that we’re not using them right now.
But that’s not the argument, PEG, and this is what makes your writing so frustrating. A little bit of research on your part would have made this post very different. The point isn’t just that we aren’t fighting air or naval battles now. They point is that our advantage is so absurdly dominant that there is no plausible scenario where any collection of other nations’ navies or air forces could possibly defeat us.
I was at a speech by a retired rear admiral a couple of years ago, and he said, quote, “conservatively speaking, the United States navy could defeat the combined navies of every other nation on earth with relative ease.” He went on in that speech to say that he was quite certain just our submarine force could defeat any combination of enemies that could plausibly attack us, and not with great difficulty. You can make the argument that American naval superiority represents the greatest comparative strategic advantage in the history of warfare.
It’s a similar situation with the air force. Our air force isn’t just better than everyone else’s; it’s dominantly better. There is absolutely no plausible scenario where this country will be challenged in air combat in the next several decades. China? China? The Chinese air force is so pathetic I’m tempted to call it the “Chinese air force”. Not only is there no remotely possible situation where China could even contest our air superiority now, I can’t imagine a plausible situation where that changes in the next several decades.
This is the thing about our advantage, PEG. It isn’t just that we have the best military technology and a dominant advantage in air and sea warfare. It’s that our advantage in those areas may be literally unprecedented in the history of warfare.
That’s not exactly privileged information, and if you consult even conservative analyses of American military power, you’d see that.
— Freddie · Jan 27, 04:24 PM · #
PEG,
I disagree with you about the F-22 for the reasons detailed in this excellent Mark Bowden article:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903/air-force
But Bowden also speaks to the issue that Ackerman and “turnbuckle” raise, which is whether or not it is wise to spend so much money to maintain conventional military superiority when there is a question of whether or not that will just drive our opponents to adopt guerilla tactics (or whether or not we will simply need to wage more guerilla wars in the future)? The answer is that there are plenty of rising powers who have no intention of waging a guerilla war to achieve their strategic goals (e.g. an invasion of Taiwan or Ukraine) and so we shouldn’t give up our desire to maintain our strategic superiority unless we want to give up our position of world leadership.
— Arminius · Jan 27, 04:35 PM · #
Tim: Point taken about the A400M; I’m aware of its troubles. Part of its troubles is that its US future is murky at best, and the reason for that is wanton protectionism.
Freddie: You’re absolutely correct that the US is the world’s dominant military power. I acknowledge this in my post since I say that the US air force should remain as it is, ie dominant, because if it scales down to being simply superior, that might give Russia and China the temptation to try to catch up, which they’re not even trying right now.
Given that Europe has neither the will nor the capacity to become the world’s dominant military power, and given the other alternatives, I would like for the US to remain that force for the foreseeable future, despite their litany of screwups.
— PEG · Jan 27, 04:53 PM · #
that might give Russia and China the temptation to try to catch up, which they’re not even trying right now.
They are so far behind, PEG, that would could shave percentage points off of our defense budget and it would still be functionally impossible for them to challenge us.
— Freddie · Jan 27, 05:26 PM · #
If Ackerman had claimed that defense spending across the board was insane, Gobry’s post would sort out, but Ackerman doesn’t recommend we freeze spending on the entire Air Force. Instead, he’s arguing that keeping the budgetary pedal to the floor in one category of military technology is insane, given present day circumstances.
Gobry points to possible future circumstances, but as Freddie suggests, we’ve built up such a significant edge in air combat, we can afford to ease off the pedal. In fact, we should feel obliged to. We are indeed insane to not recognize the low priority fighter jets take in the current climate.
— turnbuckle · Jan 27, 05:50 PM · #
As PEG says, defense strategy is immunological, spreading across a potential infinity of logic-domains. It’s in our interest to maintain entry barriers within the most dangerous domains and thereby limit the alternatives — structure the incentives and canalize the activities — of our actual and potential enemies.
Immunological systems are inherently wasteful; have to be to be successful. Everybody knows that. Plus, advanced weapons are way cool.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 27, 05:58 PM · #
In other words, I have no problem with attending to my survivorship function, so that at any arbitrary time-t, the probability of my survival is asymptotically close to 1. Any proposal that, ceteris paribus, gets me closer to 1, even if it’s just theoretical, will always get my support over one that tends to move in the other direction (unless we’re talking quality of life, i.e., how I rationalize meat and alcohol).
Thus, I’m all for the public good of common defense. The more the merrier, as much weaponry as you can support and keep clean.
Don’t feel the same way about the butter-slide opportunity cost of defense spending. I can feed, clothe and shelter myself, thank you very much. I can’t shoot down a MiG without some serious help.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 27, 06:29 PM · #
Inefficient thought the process may be, active immunization still attempts to zero in. Ackerman suggests that the combat aircraft zeros in on a bygone threat. It immunizes us against an agent we have no realistic reason to fear. So, while the entire system may require inefficiency, it remains beneficial to massage or redirect certain parts.
Anyway, he leaves lots of champagne room for the development of nasty advanced weapons: unmanned androgynous drones, 3-way helicopters and the underrated but titillating realm of airlift.
— turnbuckle · Jan 27, 06:33 PM · #
“Inefficient thought the process may be, active immunization still attempts to zero in. Ackerman suggests that the combat aircraft zeros in on a bygone threat. It immunizes us against an agent we have no realistic reason to fear.”
So, you support the destruction of the last remaining batches of smallpox in labs because we’ve erradicated the disease?
Mike
— MBunge · Jan 27, 07:43 PM · #
Destroy the smallpox with an AMRAAM from an F22, yes.
— turnbuckle · Jan 27, 08:13 PM · #
At the risk of slapping the immunology analogy unconscious, MBunge’s question about smallpox would only be relevant to Ackerman’s post— or my sympathies with it— if Ackerman were recommending the equivalent of destroying smallpox vaccine. But he’s not. In fact, he’s merely recommending that the state department not overspend in areas that address unlikely threats. In other words, the military should budget their priorities in exactly the way you would hope the department of health and human services budgets vaccinations. Don’t destroy the smallpox, of course, but don’t fund disproportionately against a future calamity that is highly unlikely, either.
— turnbuckle · Jan 27, 09:15 PM · #
Chinese and Russina aircraft are more than capable of defeating US aircraft. The latest generation of Sukhoi produced fighters are superior to the 30 year old F-15s and F-16s that make up the bulk of our Air Force. Read about the Cope Indi exercise a few years back to see what happened to the US F-15s fighting simulated dogfights against Indian Su-27s.
I struggle to understand the mindset that is willing to concede both military and economic supremacy to the Chinese without firing a shot. Either literally or figuratively.
At some point, when competition for limited resources brings us into conflict with China I’ll be glad that we can run up the score so to speak and bring their national esteem back to where it was after the Opium Wars.
— BrianF · Jan 27, 09:22 PM · #
Am I the only one who wants to see the return of the Avro Arrow?
— Jonathan · Jan 27, 10:17 PM · #
The problem with trying to pursue a strategy of dominance is that you can’t dominate all areas. Potential adversaries won’t simply completely give up, they’ll pursue asymmetrical strategies to make the areas we’re dominant in obsolete. Classic choices for this are insurgency and acquisition of nukes.
Beyond that, a dominance strategy still doesn’t justify unlimited spending. There is a huge difference between being slightly ahead of the other guys and our current position. It’s not possible to meaningfully make trade-offs if you can’t figure out where the point of diminishing returns is and merely ignoring the fact that there are trade-offs to be made doesn’t make them go away.
So are we past that point of diminshing returns? I’d say so given that F-22 defenders do things like say “[w]e can stock the Air Force with the expensive, cutting-edge F‑22—maintaining our technological superiority at great expense to our Treasury. Or we can go back to a time when the cost of air supremacy was paid in the blood of men like Rodriguez.” So we need to spend to the point where casualties are largely unheard of? Tell that to the Army or the Marines.
(This relates somewhat to my work, but I’m entirely speaking for myself. This should not be mistaken for a claim of expertise.)
— Greg Sanders · Jan 27, 10:31 PM · #
Unlimited spending, no, not justified. But (with the fighter planes) we’re talking about, at most, .5% of the national budget in return for hard military assets and capability. Without analyzing all the possible alternative ways to spend the money, that seems an acceptable utility to cost ratio even if we have no near-term competitors in the air. Air dominion is kinda important.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 27, 11:22 PM · #
But in what fantasyland are we not going to have air dominion?
China has no force projection ability at all. Zero overseas bases, a tiny navy, little amphibious capability, perhaps a dozen air refueling tankers and no aircraft carriers. So, how are they possibly going to threaten air dominion over the North American continent?
If you’re supposing that we need to be able to maintain air dominion over the Chinese homeland… well, that’s suggesting that we need to be able to invade China, which is of course silly.
— Travis Mason-Bushman · Jan 28, 01:02 AM · #
Able and willing are two separate things. If the choice is between able and unable, I’ll take able every time.
Ability across distinct domains. Only when ability in one arena takes away from ability in a more important arena will I start complaining about defense appropriations. Can’t say that we’re there yet.
Fine-grained tuning of counterinsurgency ability is significant only insofar as we continue to invade and occupy ass-backward countries. I’m kinda again’ that right now, thinkin’ we should protect our rock and fuck everybody else. Plus, in my neck of the woods we get a kick out of having the best of the best vehicle-wise. Jet fighters? Hell yeah.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 28, 04:23 AM · #
Oh, and go Vandy.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 28, 05:19 AM · #
Jeez Louise,
A little bit of research on your part would have made this post very different.
A little bit of research would yield some information concerning the S-300 air defense system. There’s even a Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300_(missile)
No, the F-22 and the JSF aren’t about winning dogfights with comparable combat aircraft. They are about achieving air superiority — eliminating sophisticated air defenses during the initial phases of an air campaign so that cheaper, less sophisticated aircraft can then degrade infrastructure through bombing, etc.
This is not dispositive — it could be that we shouldn’t bother trying to coerce the countries likely to deploy S-300 and more sophisticated air defense systems. I actually think there is a decent case for this position, and I was pretty sympathetic to killing the F-22. In general, I think that we need more spending restraint across the board, in defense as well as in other domains.
But a little bit of research would demonstrate that bright, well-informed people disagree about the F-22 and next generation combat aircraft more broadly.
— Reihan · Jan 29, 05:36 AM · #
No, the F-22 and the JSF aren’t about winning dogfights with comparable combat aircraft.
Well, they’re actually about both. Small nit.
I need to read better. I thought everybody here understood the whole F vs. F/A thing. You know, SEAD and all. Surely Freddie knew that?
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 29, 06:26 AM · #
The problem, Kristoffer, is that every one of those “.5 percent” things you claim we just desperately can’t live without, ends up adding up to a military budget that is well over half of total federal discretionary spending.
We cannot spend infinitely on our military. It is not possible to buy every single whiz-bang gee-gaw weapon or tank or ship or plane the military might possibly want. We have to prioritize.
We could afford to build 5,000+ F-4 Phantoms because the unit cost was $2.5 million apiece. The unit cost of an F-22 Raptor? $142 million. We simply can’t afford to build planes that cost that much in the numbers we built previous fighters. You want the highest of high-tech? It’s going to be ludicrously expensive.
So, if you want to argue that we should keep buying more of the F-22, what do you suggest should we cut from the military budget in order to buy more?
I’d suggest that the standing army in Europe and the Marine Corps division in Japan are hugely wasteful Cold War relics that could be redeployed home immediately, saving billions of dollars in overseas basing costs and bringing that spending back into the domestic economy. Do that, and maybe I’ll grant that we can afford to procure another wing of F-22s.
— Travis Mason-Bushman · Jan 29, 09:15 AM · #
It seems to me that we are probably entering the last generation or two of human-piloted fighter/bomber aircraft. Without the need to keep a pilot in the plane alive, per-unit costs drop dramatically, among other things. And the planes can be piloted remotely (presumably subject to jamming in such cases, but there’s nothing to say this can’t be dealt with with counter-jammers in other automated aircraft), or semi-autonomously. The capability is clearly within reach (on the order of a decade or two) where even the current advantage human fighter pilots in advanced aircraft have in maintaining air superiority is surpassed by cheaper, remote/semi-autonomous aircraft.
I have no doubt more out-of-the-box air force planners are already conceiving us-china scenarios with such aircraft, much to the consternation of significant blocks of the rest of the air force.
— jackal · Jan 30, 12:14 AM · #