Not Your Father's (Relative) Decline
I’ve been meaning to write something about this topic for some time, a follow-up to something I wrote a year and a half ago, about Obama’s (and America’s) tricky role at a moment of national retrenchment:
The Obama Administration’s situation may be compared with that of the Nixon Administration. Both Presidents were trying to manage a period of retrenchment in foreign affairs, dealing with a situation in which American influence and leverage had significantly contracted, and facing the prospect of further contraction that needed to be carefully managed. They were also both dealing with a period of traumatic economic change (accelerating inflation in Nixon’s case, a near-depression in Obama’s); with foreign wars that they did not initiate but had committed to winning and, in some manner, escalating in order to win (Vietnam, Afghanistan); and with a radical change in the global currency regime (in Nixon’s case, the demise of the gold standard; in Obama’s, the coming demise of the dollar as global reserve currency) – all of which provides some context for why each period was a period of retrenchment.
We should expect that there are going to be a lot of “concessions to reality and common sense” in the next few years, and the frustrating part is that we’re not going to get anything obvious for these concessions. Russia, for example, is going to keep pursuing its interests – and the aggressiveness with which they pursue them will probably mostly relate to their internal political situation rather than their perception of either American “will” to oppose them or American “goodwill” towards them. That’s going to make it very easy for the administration’s political opponents to make the argument that “if you give ‘em an inch, they’ll take the yard” even if no actual yards are literally taken.
It will be interesting to see how President Obama handles the tricky domestic politics of the tricky international situation he finds himself in.
I stand by that analysis, but I wanted to point out that the larger context of “relative decline” talk today is quite different from the superficially similar talk from the 1970s, and it’s worth highlighting that difference.
Declinist talk in the 1970s (which continued well into the 1980s) took place in the context of three trends that raised questions among serious people about whether the American system was “winning the future” as you might put it. Those three trends were: the apparently robust expansion of the Soviet bloc through the 1970s, culminating with the Nicaraguan revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the rise of OPEC and the huge spikes in the price of oil in 1973 and 1979; and the rise of Japanese manufacturing prowess (American electronics manufacturers began to collapse in the face of Japanese competition in the 1970s). All three trends raised the specter of real pessimism about America’s prospects. Communism was antithetical to the American way of life; if Communism was on the march, then that implied real deficiencies in our own system. America had been blessed with abundant natural resources, oil being one of the most crucial; if we were now reliant on imported oil, what did that mean for the viability of the American system? Particularly when the Japanese, who had few natural resources of their own, appeared to be eating our lunch following an apparently mercantilist economic model. (To these trends, one might add arguably the most important social trend of the 1970s, the enormous rise in urban crime.)
Projection of American decline, then, was pessimistic; a prediction that our way was failing, and that foreign ways were (increasingly) more successful.
But that is only peripherally the case for declinist talk today. Rather, today’s projections of relative decline are based on optimistic projections – specifically, projections that other major parts of the world will achieve economic and political success by copying us. China has not only abandoned Communist economic policies, but to a very considerable extent its economic success reflects a shift to a very familiar economic model (heavy government involvement in infrastructure development and education, coupled with a very entrepreneurial culture and an openness to foreign investment and integration into global manufacturing chains) – a much more familiar model than Japan’s, by the way. India has followed a different path, but their huge jump in growth has followed a liberalizing turn that was very much inspired by American economic advice. And in the political sphere, Europe has followed both American advice and the American model, evolving fitfully towards something resembling a United States of Europe. They may not get there – indeed, most people would say the odds are they won’t get there – but the point is that those same people would probably acknowledge that if they do get there, a truly united Europe would swing a whole lot more weight in global affairs.
For America to remain the global hegemon that it tries to be today, all these trend lines would have to go dramatically negative. China’s and India’s economic advances would have to stall out, leaving most of their two and a half billion people permanently mired in poverty. And Europe’s political project would have to collapse in failure as well. And such developments would represent not only failure for the human race, but failure for America inasmuch as the positive developments we’ve already seen on these fronts represent (in part) attempts to follow the American example and American advice. (Not to mention that they would represent a worse absolute result for American citizens than the alternative – we would have benefited from higher Chinese and Indian productivity much more than we would from their poverty, and a strong and united Europe would be a much more useful ally than a fractious and divided one, even if more independent-minded.)
A refusal to prepare for relative (not absolute) decline, then, represents some combination of a willful failure of imagination and a kind of jealous pessimism. America, in this way of thinking, isn’t an example and an inspiration to the world. Rather, America has some distinctive grace that the rest of the world lacks – and will always lack, no matter what they do.
That might, in fact, be what partisans of “American exceptionalism” mean when they use that phrase. But it’s a pretty ugly idea when you think about it.
I think that political polarization and mistrust are also feeding declinism. Right now, a solid third of the country believes that we are led by an anti-American usurper who is in the process of turning us into some cross between 1970s Romania and Haight-Ashbury. They simply do not accept that Democrats in general are motivated by the desire to see the country prosper.
Then there is another solid third of the country that looks to Congress and the states and see a political movement hellbent on turning those in the middle class who have seen a decrease in stability and workplace rights against those who still have some degree of it. The “ground zero” mosque and Oklahoma’s quivering fear of sharia makes them despair. They think the country will turn into a cross between a Christian Saudi Arabia and Czarist Russia.
With all that fear directed to enemies within our borders, China doesn’t stand a chance.
— rj · May 3, 04:21 PM · #
Really well said, Noah. We should consider it a privilege and great opportunity to influence and participate in China/India’s development and modernization. Not only do we want these ‘competing’ projects to succeed, but we want them to succeed in a way that creates opportunities for future generations of Americans and other humans to participate and flourish. It’s time for us to get invested. Hopefully we too will be able to take pride in what these projects become, in the same way that many people around the world take pride and admire the U.S. experiment. What greater compliment or success than to see our better graces deeply infused in powerful social/economic projects around the world? Who knows, maybe we might learn something, too.
— Walker Frost · May 3, 08:04 PM · #
Noah:
Just a few random thoughts:
1. Let me get this straight. Our decline is not real; it’s relative. The other folks are catching us, maybe have caught us and we are no longer the big dog. And your advice to us is to accept it graciously—to prepare for this relative decline.
Thanks for the advice.
2. The other folks are catching us because they are following the American model. Which model would that be? The one where we have the economic freedom to set up a business without stifling taxes and government regulations, or the one that sets aside funds for the cowboy poetry festival. Because whichever model those other countries are following and thereby weakening us, maybe we should double down on THAT model.
3. Madeleine Albright has said that it’s not good for one country to be a global hegemon. It’s not good for the US to be the lone superpower. It was better when the Soviets were still around. US decline is good as far as she is concerned. I’m pretty sure Obama has said similar things. It’s not unusual thinking among leftists in this country.
4. Your second to last paragraph was not clear to me. Maybe it’s just me, but could you clarify it? Do you mean to say that American exceptionalism is pretty ugly, or just what some people mean by the term? Do you really think that the people who understand and believe in American Exceptionalism really think that America has some distinctive grace that the rest of the world lacks – and will always lack, no matter what they do.?
— jd · May 3, 08:11 PM · #
From 1974-1979, we were in decline at playing the Game of Empire relative to the Soviet Union, which had 53,000 tanks pointed at Western Europe. That was worrisome.
Now, what exactly are we worried about? That if we cut the $113.7 billion budgeted for war in Afghanistan in 2012, our access to Afghanistan’s strategically crucial resources of gravel and goats might be imperiled?
— Steve Sailer · May 3, 11:51 PM · #
“China’s and India’s economic advances would have to stall out . . . .”
Interestingly, Europe’s economic advance did stall out. (Not that they got poorer, but that they ceased to gain ground on—and even lost a little ground to—the U.S.) I know it is difficult for young people like Mr. Millman to appreciate how stunningly different, in this respect, the past 30 years have been from the expectations of every thinking person in 1980. We should consider what it will mean if India and China follow the path of Europe, and achieve a per capita GDP that is 75% of ours, and stop there.
In short, you say “not your father’s relative decline”; I say “the four most dangerous words in investing are . . . .”
— y81 · May 4, 02:39 AM · #
I hate to quibble, but I think Paul Kennedy’s declinist thesis actually holds up pretty well. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers was all about imperial and financial over-extenstion and the rise of peer competitors – basically the same factors we’re still talking about today. Some specific predictions haven’t held up as well – Japan is obviously not the United States’ hegemonic successor – but the general thrust of the book is pretty relevant.
— Will · May 4, 05:07 AM · #
jd: I think that political polarization and mistrust are also feeding declinism.
In the days of the election of 1800, as well as before and after, there was political polarization and mistrust on the same order as you describe for us now. And in general, the worst fears the Federalists had about the Republicans were justified, as were the worst fears the Republicans had of the Federalists. As is the case now, each side was right to fear the motivations and end result that the other would bring about if allowed to have its way.
There was great polarization and mistrust, but it was not a period of decline like we have now.
— The Reticulator · May 4, 12:12 PM · #
reticulator:
Please don’t attribute that ridiculous quote to me. It was rj.
— jd · May 4, 12:28 PM · #
Oops. Sorry about that, jd. That was careless of me.
(Note to Mike Bunge: See, it isn’t so hard to apologize when you get something wrong.)
— The Reticulator · May 4, 04:28 PM · #
I don’t think what I wrote was “ridiculous” because of some vaguely parallel situation 211 years ago. Most Americans, left and right, think that “the other” is in total control and that they do not have America’s best interests in mind.
— rj · May 4, 06:57 PM · #
What’s ridiculous is that there is any connection between what Americans think and America’s decline.
— jd · May 4, 10:26 PM · #
I don’t think what I wrote was “ridiculous” because of some vaguely parallel situation 211 years ago. Most Americans, left and right, think that “the other” is in total control and that they do not have America’s best interests in mind.
It’s more than vaguely parallel. The opposing camps aren’t lined up on the issues quite the same way now as then, but a lot of the issues back then are issues we’re still fighting about now. Now as then, both sides have entirely legitimate concerns about what the other side is up to. As long as that state of tension and distrust is maintained, and there is no clear winner, we’ll probably be OK. (I don’t think either side thinks the other is in total control now. Each side fears what would happen if the other side was in total control, though, and they are right to do so.)
— The Reticulator · May 5, 12:42 AM · #
And another thing
The more I think about this post, the more it frustrates me. According to Noah for America to remain the global hegemon that it tries to be today, all these trend lines would have to go dramatically negative.
There’s just nothing we can do about it. Please have mercy on us, China.
Since I can’t decipher exactly what Noah thinks about american exceptionalism, I’m going to assume that he thinks it’s “pretty ugly.” So…why the hell should any country aspire to be like us? We have nothing to offer as a way forward. Why would it be a good thing for us to offer our expertise and guidance, if all it brings them is a country in decline?
I think Noah needs to ask himself the same question that most leftists refuse to ask: Why and how has the US become the big dog? Was there something unique about us? If so, what was it? How is it possible for a country to have changed the world so much in so short a time?
I think many of us, including Noah and Walker Frost (judging by his comment), act as if America is exceptional, while denying that it’s true. I’m sorry, Walker, but your comment smells like paternalism. If you think that we are in decline relative to other countries, why would you think they should take our advice? As Anton Shigurh said: “If your plan brought you to here, what good is your plan?”
— jd · May 5, 12:42 PM · #
jd, because being a great country doesn’t require being the unrivaled hegemon. Our relative decline (in aggregate strength) is largely a function of demographics. That doesn’t make us worse, just smaller. The only way it doesn’t happen is if per capita GDP in China remains at 25% of that in the U.S, which is not really good for anyone.
There’s a lot China/India can learn from the U.S. (free media, rule of law), and my point is that we should hope they do. And we should strive to become invested in their economic/political success, perhaps like a father would with a son, if you want to use that metaphor. But we shouldn’t be arrogant about ‘being better.’ I think there’s also a lot the U.S. can learn from China/India, and I hope they become more invested in our economic success.
— Walker Frost · May 5, 02:18 PM · #
I think many of us, including Noah and Walker Frost (judging by his comment), act as if America is exceptional, while denying that it’s true. I’m sorry, Walker, but your comment smells like paternalism. If you think that we are in decline relative to other countries, why would you think they should take our advice?
— DCCTV · May 6, 07:53 AM · #
As usual, an extremely intelligent question from DCCTV. Walker Frost and I wouldn’t have said it like that, but DCCTV is obviously not from around here.
Actually, Walker, I agree with everything in your comment. But I still think it’s paternalistic. I also think that all the wonderful, magnanimous back and forth between countries has been going on for many years through the private sector, and much more effectively than any public policy initiative could ever accomplish. I think other countries will tell us to pound sand if we come to them as fathers. But if we come to them—as we have been—as job creators and markets for their products, they will continue to “increase the decline.”
Wait a minute, this whole post and comment thread seems to be saying that a rising tide lifts all boats. That can’t be right. That doesn’t happen at the American Scene.
OK, now I get it; a rising tide lifts all boats except the one boat that’s too big to float.
— jd · May 6, 12:59 PM · #
jd, agree the private sector has done more to build those bridges, despite public sector roadblocks. I think the key is to design our boat so that as the new tide comes in we float. It’s not (just) rocket science where the new job opportunities are. The U.S. has a lot of experience and competitive advantages in a lot of increasingly important industries, but US$15 per hour manufacturing jobs are not going to make us strong or wealthy. Neither will burning more oil than everyone else.
— Walker Frost · May 7, 02:40 PM · #
I’m not exactly clear on your thinking here. Is our advantage in brain power? Or are you suggesting we need to pay our manufacturing force more?
When you say we need to “design” our boat, do you mean that a bunch of smart need to get together to do that? Because I believe it’s the smart folks thinking they can design something as complex as the US economy (to say nothing of international trade) that brought us this place.
— jd · May 7, 10:09 PM · #
“jd, agree the private sector has done more to build those bridges, despite public sector roadblocks.”
How many bridges would have ever been built in this country without the public sector?
Mike
— MBunge · May 10, 02:40 PM · #
“I think Noah needs to ask himself the same question that most leftists refuse to ask: Why and how has the US become the big dog? Was there something unique about us? If so, what was it? How is it possible for a country to have changed the world so much in so short a time?”
Uh…is there anyone who doesn’t already know pretty good answers to every one of those questions?
1. The U.S. became the Big Dog because we were the only modern industrial power not smashed absolutely flat by World War I and World War II.
2. What was unique about the U.S. is that when we were handed the reigns of empire, we mostly gave them back. Why so many conservatives want to try and grab them back is a better question.
3. World War I, World War II and technological revolutions that magnified the advantages that flowed to being the dominant world power.
What? You think there’s some sort of fairy godmother looking out for America?
Mike
— MBunge · May 10, 02:46 PM · #
How many bridges would have ever been built in this country without the public sector?
How exact does the number have to be?
— The Reticulator · May 10, 04:07 PM · #
“How exact does the number have to be?”
I’m no stickler for details. According to the Google, there are just over 594 thousand highway bridges in the U.S. That’s not counting railroad spans. How many of those do you think would have been built without public sector involvement?
Mike
— MBunge · May 10, 04:43 PM · #
Without public sector funding, I’d say more than zero bridges would have been built, and less than 594,000 of them. Is that close enough?
The biggest bridge I know of that is privately funded and operated is the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor.
In early Michigan history, due to bad experience with politically-driven construction of railroads and canals with public funds, Michigan and some other states that had also got burned got out of the road building business for a while. Roads were built with private money, and I presume bridges, too, but it didn’t work out particularly well. But it did happen, after a fashion.
Some of what I learned about this I got from an academic historian who is a rightwing ideologue, and whose every conclusion needs further examination in order to get the whole story, which I haven’t done much of in this case.
Yes, it’s true. Academics who are blinded by their own ideology do not exist only on the left.
— The Reticulator · May 11, 05:15 AM · #
Now, see, this is why I call you a crank. You can be a perfectly reasonable, rational person as long as your preoccupations don’t run away with you.
Mike
— MBunge · May 11, 02:34 PM · #
Oh, great. The person who was spewing logical fallacies by the bushel says I’m reasonable and rational.
Let’s see. Maybe President Obama could commend me for my lack of hubris. Hugo Chavez could praise my faith in democracy. Fidel Castro could speak highly of my opposition to torture and waterboarding. Matoko Chan could acknowledge me for my forbearance.
Yeah, now that it’s started I think I need to collect the complete set.
— The Reticulator · May 12, 12:43 PM · #