Uncertainty In The Wild
During the depths of the recession, a meme took hold among Republican politicians and a number of conservative wonks about “uncertainty.” The idea was that regulatory uncertainty—that the people who run businesses couldn’t tell which regulations and taxes they’d have to face in the future—was depressing business investment and therefore prolonging the recovery.
This idea was soundly and almost unanimously mocked on the Left. Aren’t our Galtian overlords supposed to be great risk-takers? Isn’t this how they derive the legitimacy of their wealth? Isn’t there always regulatory uncertainty? To many on the Left, the “uncertainty” meme was simply a whole-cloth fabrication.
At the time, I took a frustratingly middle-of-the-road view: on balance and all else being equal, I think, regulatory uncertainty can depress investment and therefore economic growth. That said, in a massive demand-driven recession like the one the US experienced, it’s highly unlikely that this is the main cause of the slough.
Now it’s Morning Again In America and so nobody’s arguing about “uncertainty” anymore. And the progress of the recovery seems to validate lefty arguments that the whole “uncertainty” thing is made up out of whole cloth.
Well, I found an example of uncertainty working as advertised in the wild.
I recently had dinner with a friend who’s an investment banker who often advises on LBOs—debt-fueled buyouts of companies by private equity funds—who tells me most if not all plans for LBOs in France have been frozen. Why? Because François Hollande, the Socialist Party’s presidential candidate and the favorite of the election, has promised a surtax on debt used to finance buyouts. So private equity funds have decided to sit on their hands until the election in May to see what exactly they’ll be socked with and plug it into their models so they can see if the deals they’re contemplating work under the new regime or not. (While presumably vigorously lobbying against any tax at all, I’m sure.)
Now this doesn’t really keep me up at night. From a business perspective, if you can’t make that deal you’re contemplating work without leverage, you probably shouldn’t do it. From a policy perspective, while the LBO boom has probably been a net positive for the economy, putting a brake on LBO activity isn’t the most damaging thing a socialist president could do. Let’s call it mostly-harmless populism. It is, of course, the wrong solution to the wrong problem: the overuse of debt by corporations is encouraged across the economy by the corporate income tax (because debt payments are deductible from the corporate tax) which should just be done away with, but that’s an idea that’s even more politically infeasible in France than it is in the US. (And, of course, one should note that Mr Hollande has an objective interest in depressing and deferring business investment until he becomes President, although I’m sure that doesn’t figure into his calculations. Really. The economy is doing crappily enough without him.)
Anyway: while this tax and the response to it aren’t going to keep me up at night, we do have here a real-life example of real regulatory uncertainty depressing real business activity and investment that would have occurred absent said uncertainty. So “uncertainty” can and does occur.
So there you go, kids: while it’s probably foolish to believe that Obama-led “uncertainty” is responsible for most of the economic morass we’ve experienced over the past few years, it’s equally foolish to dismiss out of hand the idea or the possibility of uncertainty depressing business investment.
“From a business perspective, if you can’t make that deal you’re contemplating work without leverage, you probably shouldn’t do it.”
What a remarkably silly statement. One of the most important things that a large incorporated firm does is to finance business activities. That is – to mobilize capital efficiently to support the needs of ongoing operations. The key word being “efficiently,” as a sub-optimal capital structure imposes just as much of a drag on business performance as would a lackluster R&D capability, an ill-conceived marketing strategy, an unmotivated and under-trained workforce or poor strategic decision making at the top about where to play and how to compete.
When an LBO firm buys a company with significant leverage and makes money on the deal its an implicit indication that the company’s capital structure pre-deal was simply wrong. That the firm would have been more efficiently and effectively capitalized with a larger ratio of debt to equity, but that for whatever reason (likely principal-agent problems stemming from the irrationally high risk-aversion of management) the firm didn’t have enough debt and thus was leaving money on the table that its equity owners should have rightfully been able to capture.
The kinds of businesses that LBO funds buy with leverage tend to be the kinds with stable, predictable cash flows and a little bit of believable upside from improvements to strategy or operations. In other words – businesses that OUGHT to be financed with a lot of debt because debt capital is cheaper than equity capital and the stable cash flows of the business can be used to service a lot of debt safely.
In the political firestorms around the Mitt Romney campaign opponents of the candidate have surfaced a handful of examples where it appears that Mr. Romney’s firm (or other LBO firms) bought companies with a little bit too much debt which then placed undue stress on the relevant businesses. In other words – they got the debt/equity ratio wrong. But what doesn’t get reported in these debates (because its a much less sexy story for journalists to write about) is that for the literally dozens of others businesses that Bain Capital bought with leverage while Mitt Romney was running the firm the outside world almost certainly was getting the debt/equity ratio wrong before the LBO transaction. If not, there wouldn’t have been money to be made in levering up the businesses.
I like your writing a lot. But you’re out of your depth here. The difference between a business journalist and a businessman is math. The numbers always matter. Saying “if you couldn’t do X without the benefit provided by Y then you shouldn’t do it” betrays a deeply un-quantitative mindset.
— sd · Feb 27, 11:10 AM · #
Well, let’s move from the realm of thought experiment and anecdote to see what’s happening in the real world.
Economist Lawrence Mishel: “I presented evidence that trends in investment, private-sector job growth, unemployment, and work hours were not inferior in this recovery compared to other recent job-challenged recoveries. That is, I noted that this recovery fares well relative to the recoveries under George W. Bush and George H. W. Bush. If you look at what employers are doing rather than what trade associations are saying, you would see that uncertainty about regulations and taxation has not impeded job growth. What we are seeing is what you expect given the slow growth in GDP.”
Economist Bruce Bartlett: “Republicans favor tax cuts for the wealthy and corporations, but these had no stimulative effect during the George W. Bush administration and there is no reason to believe that more of them will have any today. And the Republicans’ oft-stated concern for the deficit makes tax cuts a hard sell. These constraints have led Republicans to embrace the idea that government regulation is the principal factor holding back employment. They assert that Barack Obama has unleashed a tidal wave of new regulations, which has created uncertainty among businesses and prevents them from investing and hiring. No hard evidence is offered for this claim; it is simply asserted as self-evident and repeated endlessly throughout the conservative echo chamber. … regulatory uncertainty is a canard invented by Republicans that allows them to use current economic problems to pursue an agenda supported by the business community year in and year out. In other words, it is a simple case of political opportunism, not a serious effort to deal with high unemployment.”
Dr. Jan Eberly: “If regulatory uncertainty was a major impediment to hiring right now, we would expect to see indications of this in one or more of the following: business profits; trends in the workforce, capacity utilization, and business investment; differences between industries undergoing significant regulatory changes and those that are not; differences between the United States and other countries that are not undergoing the same changes; or surveys of business owners and economists. … none of these data support the claim that regulatory uncertainty is holding back hiring.”
There is zero data in support of the assertion that “regulatory uncertainty” is one of the top 500 problems facing American companies.
— reflectionephemeral · Feb 27, 01:27 PM · #
Calling the cause of the reduction in LBO activity “uncertainty” is vague and somewhat misleading. It sounds like the reduction in debt-fueld buyouts is caused by higher expected taxes on buyout-related debt. Raising the tax rate on buyout debt would decrease the number of leveraged buyouts. Since the higher tax will apply to the debt from buyouts which took place before the law was passed, the large chance that the law will be passed in a few months also decreases the number of leveraged buyouts happening now. But this is more accurately described as an issue of expectations, not uncertainty: Hollande’s proposal has increased the expected future tax rate on buyout debt.
Expectations do influence investment (especially expectations of future demand, and also expectations of future taxes and expectations of future regulation). But the effect of proposing a new law is smaller than the effect of actually living under that new law – the presence of higher tax rates reduces investment more than the threat of higher future taxes. Uncertainty over whether the new law will pass does not reduce activity beyond where it would be if it was certain that the new law would pass – that’s why “expectations” is a more accurate label than “uncertainty”.
It is possible for uncertainty (separate from expectations) to discourage investment, but that’s rarer. The way that would look from the firm’s point of view is: under Law A we’d want our investment to be structured this way, under Law B we’d want our investment to be structured that way, we’re uncertain of whether Law A or Law B will be in place so let’s wait to see what happens before we make our investment so that we know whether to structure it this way or that way. As far as I can tell that isn’t happening in this case of French LBOs, and the Republicans never even attempted to make this precise of an argument when their theme was “uncertainty.”
— Brad · Feb 27, 01:40 PM · #
Uh, do we? Wouldn’t “regulatory uncertainty” involve regulations? This seems like a case of tax uncertainty. And is an LBO actually an “investment”? Job-creating? GDP-increasing? Seems more like garbage collection.
But, point taken – you found a single anecdote, which naturally confirms all aspects of the conservative worldview. Well done!
— Chet · Feb 27, 03:51 PM · #