The American Scene

An ongoing review of politics and culture


How A Racist Blended In

As I followed—and I confess, participated in—the mini-firestorm on Twitter over John Derbyshire’s vile Taki Magazine post last night, I started wondering what the point was. National Review is severing ties, but has anything been accomplished? Derbyshire is nearly 70 years old, and has apparently been a self-described racist for many years; I highly doubt one more public shaming is going to disabuse him of his views. I also doubt if it’s going to cause anyone in the conservative camp to do much soul-searching; in fact, for those who think Derbyshire-type thoughts, the episode only confirms the alternative-universe narrative that truth-telling white people are always victims of political correctness.

The temptation for liberals would seem to be to use this incident as an example of the deep-seated, thinly-veiled racism many of them believe are driving forces behind conservative politics. But Derbyshire’s racism is so outlandishly crude and bizarre as to be absolutely singular; it doesn’t automatically reveal much about what most conservatives or what most people at National Review think. Stretching it too far would be counterproductive, and the exact sort of thing that hardens certain “victimized” white right-wingers into the kind of ideology that at best tolerates, at worst sympathizes with racist views.

But I think we have to talk about the fact that, as John Podhoretz pointed out on Twitter today, Derbyshire has been writing stuff nearly this vile on The Corner for years, and other NRO writers have sometimes called him out in the same place while National Review’s leadership did nothing about it besides bray about how liberals complain too much about racism. Rich Lowry’s post announcing the separation admits that Derbyshire “has long danced around the line on these issues,” but as Elspeth Reeve helpfully catalogued, that’s putting it mildly. He referred to himself proudly as a mild, tolerant racist and homophobe. He bitched about what political correctness keeps science from “uncovering about human nature,” namely that white people are genetically superior. He joke-complained that Hollywood has indoctrinated kids into thinking God is black. He described post-1960s America as a pact with whites promising blacks handouts in exchange for not being violent criminals, which he dubbed the “slavery tax.” Perhaps worst of all, he wrote in 2006: “I can’t for the life of me see anything wrong, or even unpleasant, in wishing the country to have a certain ethnic mix, and not some other ethnic mix.” Helpfully, he added, “Goodness only knows what ‘racism’ means this week.”

These brazen episodes come in a context—namely National Review’s website—that is steeped in “contrarian” thinking about race that sheds a lot of light on Derbyshire’s long presence there. Just to be clear, I am not calling anyone else at National Review racist. Even if they do protest way too much, many of their observations about vapid media coverage of race are valid. But the kind of stuff you read there is frequently so racially charged, often in such a logically twisted way, that it can only be understood as a a partisan reaction to an issue on which the ‘enemy’ (liberals) is widely seen to have the moral high ground. The 2008 presidential campaign was a constant sideshow of bloggers on The Corner pouncing on anything Obama said that could somehow be twisted into a racial remark and using it to support the ludicrous D’Souza-esque meme that Obama holds white, middle-class America in contempt.

And then there’s Victor Davis Hanson, a one-man blizzard of bristling, line-toeing racial commentary. For example, this incomprehensible essay that accuses Barack Obama of “racial tribalism” and “race-based strategy” and Michelle Obama of being “race-obsessed.” Apparently Hanson is the one who is obsessed: he’s been on these themes for years now, touting the Obama campaign’s “racialist message,” contorting every offhand Obama remark into a statement smoldering with racial subtext and repeating the litany virtually every time he writes about race, which is constantly. He has also charmingly argued that Rev. Jeremiah Wright, Obama, and the Democratic Party “have done more to destroy racial relations than all the David Dukes in the world.”

Outside Hanson’s compulsive accusations of Obama racism, just browsing at random, we find Michelle Malkin hyping the New Black Panthers (a Fox News meme) and an unnamed “liberal writer” who called Herman Cain racist names. In an otherwise relatively sane column, Jonah Goldberg slams America’s “race industry” for its crime of keeping Jim Crow laws too fresh on its mind. Goldberg also writes about racism as consistently as the clock strikes twelve, almost always to mock it as mostly a liberal fantasy.

One more time: don’t read more into this than I’m saying. I am pointing out the type of dialogue that surrounds NRO. It can be described as consistently skeptical that white racism is relevant to contemporary politics despite its own evident fascination with the topic. It shows no reservation about caricaturing/over-interpreting a black president’s statements and policies to paint him as a racial aggressor. It consistently addresses the topic of racism in a glib, dismissive, or superior tone. I cannot recall—and could not find in several hours looking through the NRO archives—one substantial piece of writing that addressed racism in the U.S. as anything besides a minor, unimportant problem. With a big stretch of generosity, one could say National Review treats the subject casually. Even Lowry’s dismissal of Derbyshire had to be archly worded and sweetened with praise.

Keeping a racist on your masthead long after you know he’s a racist goes a long way toward undermining all that hypersensitivity about conservatives being called racist. I can’t really improve on Josh Barro’s line from last week: “Conservatives so often get unfairly pounded on race because, so often, conservatives get fairly pounded on race. And this is the Right’s own fault, because conservatives are not serious about draining the swamp.” NRO took this situation seriously, but only after years and years of not taking it seriously.

Christianity Isn’t the Only Thing in Crisis: A Reply to Andrew Sullivan

Andrew Sullivan has written a cover story for Newsweek (disclosure: where I also work) that I think deserves attention and scrutiny. It could not be more timely, and in many ways more needed. But even as it advances some crucial criticisms of the contemporary monstrosity that presents itself as Christianity, I think there is a lot more to be said. Specifically, I’m not sure Andrew’s political framework is up to the task of diagnosing the real crisis we face as inhabitants of Western democracy. If only things were as easy as putting a mutant political Christianity back in its cage.

I have read Andrew’s bracingly honest writing about his own faith enough to know that his Christianity is deeply considered and deeply sincere. In many ways, I sympathize with where he has ended up as a believer: a follower of Christ who wants his readers to understand the purity of Jesus’ life and moral teachings before the contaminations of worldy movements and interests, even those of Jesus’ own disciples and the early Christians who authored the New Testament. The strange, countercultural liberty of the “religion of unachievement,” is what I think moves Andrew so powerfully. Despite what I’m about to argue, I understand how this can be practiced and understood as apolitical, even anti-political.

Andrew describes Jesus’ ideas as “truly radical,” for example, “love your enemy and forgive those who harm you; give up all material wealth.” His project is to convince us that these “radical” ideas are also “apolitical,” that when salvaged from the tangle of theological and political movements that have distorted them, they are something pure, spiritual and otherworldly. Like a good liberal individualist, he reads all of these virtues as a kind of private interior experience, something I’m not sure Jesus ever intended them to mean. Jesus’ ideas are not anti-worldly in the sense that they help guard one’s inner peace against the chaos of the Internet, but in the sense that they challenge the way most human societies work. This is certainly why Jesus was executed, and why the spread of Christianity was met with bloody resistance: he claimed to have a kingdom, threatened to “destroy the temple and rebuild it in three days,” and preached a kind of forgiveness and self-sacrifice that upended and undermined established Jewish law. It is almost impossible to imagine Jesus “without politics,” as Andrew would have him, or that practicing his “pure” ideas would be anything less than an affront to an established political order—as they are invariably perceived wherever they manifest themselves.

Read the full article

You Don't Get to Keep The Sexual Revolution And Give Back the Sex

The Wall Street Journal recently ran a mini-symposium on whether or not the sexual revolution was good for women, a massive topic to be addressed in relatively brief op-eds. I think Hanna Rosin did a pretty good job with “yes” side, and was hoping for a thought-provoking view from someone more skeptical. I’ve never heard of Mary Eberstadt before this, but it’s difficult to imagine a “no” response that better evades the central question at play in the debate.

I’ll skip the first three myths Eberstadt lays out, even though I have plenty to argue with about those. (Her contentions, all of which are directed toward demonstrating that the “war on women” is a myth: All women aren’t liberals, lots of Christians besides the Catholic Church care about contraception, and social issues aren’t going away.) The real evasion comes in Myth #4: “The sexual revolution has made women happier.”

It’s possible that this is actually a myth propagated by people on the other side of the question from Eberstadt, but I’ve never heard it from any of the liberal women I read regularly on these issues. They would argue, as Rosin does in her piece, that women are on balance better off than they were before the sexual revolution. But Hanna explicitly wrestles with the fact that women do not seem to be happier now than they were before, and I’ve never heard a prominent feminist defend the sexual revolution on the shallow grounds that it made women happier. It gave them more of a say over their bodies and lives, and freed them to become, as they are now in certain demographics, more educated and higher earners than men. By making the question about “happiness,” Eberstadt has avoided the much more substantive, much more difficult question: overall, are women more free to lead lives they choose and find meaningful than they were before? Are they more able to do so without facing cultural disdain and male harassment? If the answer to those is yes, and it obviously is, I’m much less concerned about whether they are significantly more “happy.”

I don’t believe the happiness question is irrelevant, even if it is thorny. (What is happiness? Are conservative religious women more likely to delude themselves about their choices making them happy? Who says the most satisfying life is necessarily the most traditionally “happy?” Etc, etc.) But there is a reason anti-feminists, conservatives and other traditionalists always jump right away to happiness. Partly because the studies are in their favor, and partly because they don’t want to face the more telling question. Because it’s pretty self-evident that women are better off than they were in 1950. You’re free to think it’s better to have a society where women have less choice about what to do with their lives, less ability to support themselves without a man, and less ability to pursue the education and career opportunities they clearly excel at, but you’d be in a fractional minority of even conservative women.

The reason conservatives don’t want to admit this obvious reality in public is what is behind the profound change, the profound improvement, in women’s standing in such a short period of time: the breaking away from traditional ideas about gender roles and sexual morality. This is in large part thanks to the pill, but it’s much more than that. As Hanna puts it, it is all thanks to “the ability to have temporary, intimate relationships that don’t derail a career. Or to put it more simply, to have sex without getting married.” You cannot have one without the other: if you continue to protest women’s ability to have sex with who they want without getting married or to limit the size of their family so that they are able to do other things with their lives, you have to reject the relational, education, professional and economic benefits as well.

Obviously, the subject of marriage and childbearing is complicated, and there are many factors beyond mores that impact it. But the central question at play here, outside of the complex economic questions involved in the current state of marriage, is whether the gains that came from the decline of traditional gender roles were worth it. And what traditionalists must be pressed to admit is that the positive changes the sexual revolution wrought would not be possible in a world where women must marry the first man they want to have sex with or are at constant risk of becoming pregnant. In that sense, the people who want to keep the gains of the sexual revolution but roll back their conditions of possibility are rightly said to be waging a “war on women.”

The final word on French parenting

Just perfect.

Atlantic Roundup

My wonderful (for me at least) stint as a guest blogger for Megan is over. I’m glad to find out that one of the new bloggers is TAS alum Noah Millman.

In case you haven’t been following, here’s a rundown of some of my posts over there:

How we can fix the revolving door by paying officials vast sums of money. This seems to me to be a no-brainer. Singapore, which is widely understood to have the most efficiently-run government in the world, also has some of the highest-paid officials.

Some thoughts about the French parenting meme. I may write more as time goes on as this topic really exercises me.

How to fix the banking system through a return of the partnership model and massive deregulation. I’ve been thinking about this for a long while and sharpening it through Twitter arguments and I’m increasingly convinced that this is the right approach. We badly need deregulation of the financial system. We also badly need a framework that solves the agency and scale problems that have plagued the system. I’m looking for a good critique of my plan because I’m afraid I’ve missed something.

French and US healthcare: Twins separated at birth? I am again and again struck by the similarities between French and US healthcare, which are always held up as opposites. My then co-blogger Avik Roy has a great response here. I’ve been consistently awe-struck by Avik’s writing on healthcare and I outsource my thinking on this topic on which I know very little to him.

What Star Wars teaches us about innovation Innovation is not a lone-inventor process. It’s a collaborative process. This has many policy implications.

Sorry if you already read Megan’s blog and are already aware of these posts. And if you’re not—you should really start now. Megan’s assembling some amazing bloggers while she’s on book leave, and I love that she’s poaching from the TAS stable (#TASMafia). I’m a fan of all the new bloggers, not just Noah but also Julian Sanchez and Tim Lee.

Apple, China, and Free Debate

Not surprisingly, Evan Osnos nails the context and significance of Mike Daisey’s exaggerated portrait of life at a Foxconn factory, an Apple contractor, in Shenzhen, China:

“He thought that China was so exotic and far away that it was uncheckable; that it was okay to take “a few shortcuts in my passion to be heard,” as he put it in his follow-up interview. But China, it turns out, is not so far away. Daisey’s fiction was predicated on the notion that China is essentially unknowable, that reporters never go to factory gates, that highways exit to nowhere. And he might have gotten away with it twenty years ago. But these days, it’s no longer so far away at all. It’s close enough to make an iPhone today and have it on a U.S. store shelf next week. And it’s closer in another important way as well—in overestimating his own ability, Daisey underestimated a lot of other people.”

The brilliance of this entire episode is that there’s a growing diversity of credible and openly-shared perspectives on what’s happening in China. If you’re in the reality-making business, you’ve now got to contend with a lot of well-informed and credible voices. It’s harder than ever to get away with sloppy China journalism, whether in Chinese or English, and that’s a great thing for the world.

As I noted in an earlier post about Truth in China-journalism, in so far as Western journalists have more credibility as being more truthful, it’s because their ideas and perspectives must stand more on their own merits against unfettered public scrutiny. Remove the environment of debate and you destroy the means for determining credibility. As Richard Rorty put so nicely: take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself.

We should not be terribly concerned by people like Mike Daisey or Jason Russell who use lies (or bend the facts) to tell their version of the truth. What’s most worrisome is environments that permit singular perspectives to survive unchallenged by alternative descriptions. Hopefully both Mr. Russell and Mr. Daisey will now have the humility and pragmatism to welcome — and perhaps even embrace — their critics’ perspectives and open debate, and its ability to exponentially improve awareness and understanding of the critical issues they passionately seek to address.

Atlantic blogging

For the next two weeks I’ll be guest blogging for Megan McArdle over at The Atlantic. My first post is on how innovation happens. I’ll try to post once a day but make no promises as I also have one of them jorbs. I’ll post links here from time to time.

Thus, the longstanding project of Atlantic infiltration by TAS drones continues. MUAHAHAHA!

Mutiny on the NFL:Bounty

Revelations surrounding “bounty programs” in the NFL, where players and coaches provide teammates with financial incentives to make game-changing plays or injure opposing players, have elicited broad public disgust; at least for the intent-to-harm part of the equation.

Killing people aside, I typically love performance-based incentives – anything that provides real-time sticks and carrots to help govern decisions and encourage performance. My company generally does a good job of rewarding performance, fortunately, but some days it would be a nice stimulus if my boss would drop by and say, “Hey, I’ll give you fifty bucks if you send me that report by 3pm!”

DJ Gallo writing for ESPN makes an amusing – though not altogether unreasonable – argument that performance-based compensation should be encouraged broadly throughout the league: “Instead of punishing the Saints and opening up a can of worms that might force the NFL to punish every team in the sport, the league should instead embrace bounties.” He then outlines how the lines between real football and fantasy football are getting hazier by the weekend and suggests allowing fans to get in on the action, too.

It’s not difficult to imagine how these bounty programs can give birth to corruption and distorting forces that change the way the game is played. Ultimately, you start to have capital flows making on-the-field decisions, like whether to pass or run or even fumble. It’s like having an infinite number of bosses, each of which exercises control in proportion to the size of her wallet.

It wouldn’t take long before the emergence of negative incentives, such as side betting against positive incentives or as under-the-table payoffs for dives. In short, if officially expanded beyond the locker room, the system would go haywire in no time. Performance-based incentives are only effective if either a) there’s only one agent providing incentives; or b) everyone providing incentives generally agrees on the strategy and objectives. In such a plutocracy, the “coach” would quickly become just another engaged spectator, or a marginal investor, and his players could effectively mutiny. Capt. Bligh would not be pleased.

Wait a minute. Is this really so horrible? Isn’t there another spectator sport that already works this way? A game where hidden influencers provide players financial incentives to behave in certain ways, including attacking opponents, and the players must make decisions to ensure the largest possible return on investment for their shareholders?

We’re willing to permit capital flows — from anywhere and nowhere — to influence government and its players’ behaviors. Why not allow open-game on, you know, games?

Star Wars (cont)

Via Dan Drezner, comes news that Star Wars contrarianism isn’t extends beyond first trilogy, and that some people actually argue that Revenge of the Sith (?!?) is a better movie than Jedi. This is ludicrous, and Drezner does a fine job of dismantling that idea.

But while we’re on talking about Star Wars, I just want to gratuitously share some of the best material I’ve seen about the series.

If you have lots of time on your hands, want to laugh and also getting some good film criticism and insight, Red Letter Media’s amazing video takedowns of the prequel trilogy are a must-watch.

Even more intelligently, the Star Wars Origins site is simply one of the most precious artifacts on the internet. The author breaks down all of the influences of the Star Wars trilogy using the “Hero with a Thousand Faces” template that Lucas famously aped. In doing so, Star Wars Origins goes way beyond fanboyish analysis but provides simply the best deconstruction I’ve ever seen of mythical/epic storytelling. If you have any interest at all in storytelling broadly understood, you simply must read the site, and I guarantee you that even if you’re familiar with “Hero with a Thousand Faces” and many of the influences that shaped Star Wars (Flash Gordon, Kurosawa, Lancelot…) you will still learn many things.

Still Empire

Lest ye think that the Scene has become baby central, let’s talk about an equally important topic: Star Wars.

At Mother Jones, Kevin Drum has a great post arguing that (audible gasps in the audience) Return of the Jedi is actually the best movie in the original trilogy. (Via Scene alum Peter Suderman )

Drum lists all of the good things that there are in Jedi, and argues that the movie wasn’t ruined by the much-reviled Ewoks because they’re only incidental to the story and are only there for a couple scenes.

I actually agree with much of Drum’s praise for Jedi, which you should definitely read, but I still reach the same conclusion as most fans: Empire is still the best movie in the trilogy.

Before I explain why, I first need to settle some scores.

Firstly, I’ve never been that pissed off about the Ewoks. It’s probably because I watched the third movie as a kid, not a teenager. Sure, they’re manipulatively cute, and they’re there to sell action figures to kids, but should they really send people into fits of conniption? Everything in Star Wars is there to sell merch (that was Lucas’ business genius): lightsabers, X-wings, Vader’s helmet, yet we adore those iconic things. Disney’s business is based on merch, and that doesn’t mean The Lion King and Toy Story aren’t great movies.

The Ewoks are also there to provide comic relief, which annoys some people, but that’s also what R2 and 3PO do, and people seem to love those fine, too.

It should be noted that the Ewoks also serve as a powerful symbol: the idea that it’s the Hidden Forces in the universe that rise up to defeat the Empire. Those small, backward furballs are dismissed by the almighty empire, but the grain of sand in the gears stops the machines. That’s something to like.

Don’t get me wrong: I’m no fan of the Ewoks. But I don’t think they’re awful either.

Secondly, I’ve always been left cold by one of the most-mooted arguments for Empire: that it’s the “darkest” episode in the trilogy. Yes. So what? Does a movie have to be “dark” to be good? Since when is that a criterion? If you’re older than 16, that shouldn’t figure in your calculations.

Ok, with all that said, and with Drum’s praise for Jedi endorsed, why is Empire still the best movie?

It’s because it’s the movie where the characters are at their most raw, and where the characters undergo the most change.

At the end of the first movie, none of the characters is radically changed. Luke reaches a huge milestone, because uses the Force, but at the end of the movie he is still an idealistic boy who wants to be a fighter for Justice and the American Way like his father. Han leans to his good side but is still a mercenary rogue at heart. Leia is still a virginal princess who cares only about abstract principle. Vader is still a complete villain.

And during the third movie, with the crucial exception of Vader, every character knows what they have to do. Luke is a world-wise Jedi with scars, literal and otherwise—he has big doubts and big problems, but he is still fundamentally the same person at the beginning of the movie and the end. Han has gone through his transformation from fundamentally selfish to fundamentally selfless, through both his love for Leia and his dedication to a greater ideal. Leia, who was fundamentally a girl in the first movie—virginal and almost fanatically principled—has become a woman, fighting for love as well as abstract ideals.

During the course of Empire, though, every character is thrown through the wringer, salt poured through the still-live scars of their conscience. And as the result they are all fundamentally changed. Luke, obviously, wracked between loyalty to his friends and his desire to train as a Jedi, between the Light Side and the Dark Side. Han and Leia also have to rethink everything: they each have to overcome their fear of love and redefine their life. Even secondary characters: Lando confronts the consequences of his cowardice, and 3PO, who was only a bumbling comic-relief fool, gains a measure of agency.

Between the beginning and the end of Empire, each character has gone through that radical transformation, for the protagonists an entry to adulthood. Luke goes from teenager to man, scars and all. Leia goes from girl to woman. Han also definitively sheds what remained fundamentally a teenage outlook—self-centered, aimlessly rebellious. Even Vader is different at the end of the movie, the seeds of doubt sown by Luke’s stunning rejection.

It’s Screenwriting 101 to say that in your movie your protagonists much reach resolution and that a movie worth watching is one where the protagonist goes through some form of resolution and even redemption. While there are elements of that in each movie (Obi-Wan, Luke in the first; Vader, crucially, in the third, and also Luke), it is in Empire that each character is thrown into the starkest relief, made to confront the biggest choices (again, with the exception of Vader), and reach the most consequential resolution.

So while I agree with all the great things Drum has to say about Jedi, the strength of the character arcs, not “darkness” or Ewoks, is why Empire is still the best movie in the trilogy.

David Ryan On Moar Kids

Friend of The Scene (and the artist formerly known as Tony Comstock) David Ryan has a very thoughtful and touching post on our debate of the day at The League of Ordinary Gentlemen. David comes down on my side, though that’s not why his post is touching.

From a policy perspective, the meaty part is this:

What I realized is that whatever problems we face as a species, the answers are going to come out of someone’s head, and it’s very hard to know ahead of time which problem is going to emerge as the most pressing, or who is going to have the answer. And by March of 2005, and with no more stability and normalcy in our lives (less, actually) my wife was pregnant with our second child.

But you should really read the whole thing →

A Perfect Solution To The Contraception Mandate Problem That No One Will Adopt

Women’s groups (and other groups!) should raise the money to buy the contraception patents from pharmaceutical companies and release them into the public domain so that all forms of contraception become as cheap as condoms. (Some versions of the Pill are in the public domain, but not all of them and women have different needs/physiologies.)

No one is forced to buy anything. Religious groups have their conscience intact. Women have more access to contraception.

Next question!

The Case for Optimism

I suspect most will have grown tired of the kids/freedom debate so I will read my response to David’s post under the fold.

Read the full article

Kids Are Not the Best Thing in the Real World

Will Wilkinson, Reihan, PEG, and Noah are in the midst of an interesting policy debate about government subsidizing people’s decision to have children. I’m happy to stand back and watch that one, but in the meantime I want to co-opt it for my own purposes, namely to pick on PEG’s unqualified enthusiasm for having more people on the planet. Here’s his summary of his position:

But even more broadly, and this is something I should have written up sooner, my defense of moar kids from a freedom and human welfare perspective is this: stuff is people. Not just Soylent Green. Everything. Corporations are people, my friend. Not in the sense that they have human rights. But in the sense that they are a framework through which people collaborate. Likewise, cities are not a geographical location and building, they’re people. Even stuff is people. Your iPhone is people. It’s Steve Jobs, it’s Jony Ive and it’s plenty of Foxconn workers. An iPhone is not a thing, it is a few moments of thousands of people’s time. Culture is people. Books is people. Everything we cherish, everything that makes life worth living, is people. More people means more of everything.

More kids boosts freedom, because each person is an infinite amount of new choices to be made, and it obviously boosts welfare, because the world is people and more people makes the world richer.

I don’t dispute most of what he says above: most of the things we consider good as human beings—law, science, consumer products—are the result of human bodies at work, and, all things being equal, more people means more minds and more bodies to make more of this good stuff. PEG would say that there is no problem with a lack of space or resources on the planet, so there’s no reason why we should be pessimistic about having more people, even a lot more people. They build good things, so why the hell not?

On an extremely superficial level, I agree. But the problem is that this is not an argument—it’s just an abstract statement of fact from a particularly sanguine perspective. Apply it to almost any real-world context and it becomes absurd. Even if the planet has the resources to sustain an unlimited human population—a question I don’t know the answer to—it doesn’t automatically follow that more people will be an unqualified good. The world currently has enough resources to feed its starving population many times over, but that has consistently proved politically impossible. I am skeptical that it will ever be politically possible, no matter how advanced our civilizations and economies become—never mind that such advancement could not be taking place without a corresponding increase in barbarism.

Adding more people to the situation does not obviously improve it; in fact, it seems very likely to aggravate it. I won’t say it will in fact make things worse, because I’m not God. But it seems intuitive that in a situation of global political dysfunction—from the crumbling U.S. constitution to the unsolvable European debt crisis to the utter lack of governance in somewhere like Afghanistan to tribal war in Somalia—that increasing the population is at least as likely to make things worse as to improve them. Those extra bodies will not become lawyers, scientists and doctors if they cannot be fed, protected and educated—something already impossible for a huge number of the people currently alive. Just because a human life has the possibility of becoming “a good thing” in a geopolitical utilitarian sense does not mean that it is likely to do so. In fact, I would argue that the more people that are added to a global system already groaning under the strain of political dysfunction and violence, the less likely those new bodies will be able to escape poverty, oppression, or misery.

It’s in that context that I find PEG’s claim that more kids equals more freedom to be baffling. True, perhaps, in a world where they were all able to participate in “making the world richer,” and were magically saved from all the available opportunities to become miserable in, exploited by, or destructive to the human world. As none of us needs to be told, that world will not exist anytime soon. I may be presuming, but I have not yet encountered a single instance where PEG will not claim that more children equals more insert-good-thing-here. But to put it lightly, I find this a cruel insistence. How does having an eighth child for a starving Somalian woman increase anyone’s freedom—her own, that of her other children, that of the other mothers and children in her village who are also struggling to stay alive in the midst of tribal warfare and famine?

In light of that, continually asserting the “goodness” of limitless population seems at worst crazy and pernicious, and at best beside the point. I’m not against utopian thinking aimed at expanding the horizon of possibility, and this may be all PEG up to. But calling for more people—literally, right here right now—strikes me as another in a long line of religious arguments that are driven by their metaphysical commitments to ignore—or invent bizarre, convoluted reasoning to explain away—the practical misery for which they are responsible.

Yglesias on moar kids

Matt Yglesias chimes in on the moar kids debate. I endorse his post, both the general point about empirical evidence (which I actually interpret as an appeal to informed skepticism) and the point about how it does indeed make sense that having kids is costly and so if we want to encourage kids-having making it less costly would make it easier.

Yglesias writes in response to Kevin Drum whom you can read here, though I object to Drum’s take for the reasons Yglesias cites.

Yglesias doesn’t actually endorse natalist policies and I’d be curious to have more thoughts from him on the topic, but it’s nevertheless a good addition to the discussion.

Of Kids And Freedom (cont)

The discussion about kids and freedom continues.

This Noah guy is pretty smart. I think he should write for TAS. Noah Millman joins our conversation and kids and freedom. Read the whole thing.

Noah’s quarrel is mostly with Will, and in this regard I want to endorse everything he says about freedom, particularly this:

Should the state teach evolution or not? If you say yes, then you’re having the state “indoctrinate” a new generation in values that a very significant fraction of our society consider abominable. Not a rule that “more or less everyone can affirm from within their own moral perspective.” If you say no, or if you say, “teach the controversy” then, from the perspective of those who care about the integrity of science, you’re “indoctrinating” a new generation in values that they consider abominable. Not a rule that “more or less everyone can affirm from within their own moral perspective.”

And this:

Raising a child, going to college and keeping a boat are all extremely expensive propositions. For pretty much everyone I know, the decision whether or not to raise a child is life-defining. For most people I know for whom this was a choice, as opposed to a given, or who have thought about the choice at all, the decision whether or not to go to college was life-defining. Indeed, it’s not just that they are both profound choices in and of themselves; it’s that they are gateway choices. If you don’t have children, you can’t have any of the wide range of life experiences that flow from having children. If you don’t go to college, a host of options, economic and social, will be relatively unavailable to you thereafter. People who can’t afford a child experience, in a profound way, a lack of ability to take advantage of the choices life offers. Ditto those who can’t afford to go to college. People who can’t afford a boat, not so much.

So while I agree with 99% of most of Noah’s post, at the end of this post he comes to his critique of me, and (spoiler) I don’t agree. Noah writes:

As for PEG, I have to say, that perspective is historically un-French. France is notable within Europe for having a lower population density than its major neighbors (half as dense as Germany or the UK, for example). This disparity is not of recent vintage, and relates to a longstanding disparity in fertility rates. I don’t think I’m going out on a limb to say that the historically high quality of life in France relates in part to an appreciation precisely of that quality – and to an appreciation that, contra PEG’s contention, stuff is not people; rather, people appreciate stuff, but stuff has an independent existence, and if you have lots more people some kind of stuff will be harder to appreciate, or will even cease to exist. The historic French relationship with the land is in part a product of that relatively low population density. That relationship is very different from the American relationship – which is also related to historically low population density – but it’s also very different from the relationship in, say, the Netherlands.

I live in Brooklyn. I’ve obviously got no problem with living in a very dense space. And there is a unique kind of freedom that one experiences in a big city. But it is not the only kind of freedom. India is a less-free society with over a billion people than it would be if it had only three hundred million, even if per-capita income was the same – simply because there’s less room to stretch out, which is a very basic form of freedom from constraint.

My first instinct is to say that only a non-French person could have such a disarming perspective on what seems French or not.

To start with, I would actually attribute France’s lower population density to the denominator: France is the largest country in Europe (ex-Russia) by land area. It has roughly the same population as the UK and Italy and twice the land area, so obviously its density is going to be lower.

And I attribute France’s large land area to France’s military success over the centuries, which was itself the result of France being the most populous nation in Europe. Indeed, France’s demographic slide starts after the Napoleonic War and this is when France loses its status as the preeminent Western power, a status we’ve been trying to regain since. So the French relationship with population size/growth seems to go in the other way than Noah suggests. Conversely, at least one reason why Germany is a denser country than France is because in 1945 Stalin pushed Germany’s eastern border several hundred miles to the west and deported all the ethnic Germans on the eastern side to the western side. Is this indicative of a particular historic German relationship to density?

Noah seems to be saying that France has decided to privilege its quality of life over its birth rate by deciding to have a lower density. Given that France has one of the broadest and most generous natalist policies in the world (and has had it for over a century—and as someone who just had a child, I can say it is awesome) and today has the highest fertility rate in Western Europe that seems a strange notion. After having been immersed in French culture for 25 years, it’s the first time I’ve encountered the idea.

As to the “historic French relationship to the land”, I’m not sure what to say. Terroir is certainly a part of French identity, but then again in almost every country there is an irrational romantic attachment to notions of land, farmers, etc. (with often disastrous public policy consequences). I might argue that attachment to terroir means attachment to a particular type of land as opposed to attachment to land in general. To look at another metric, rates of homeownership are lower in France than e.g. in the UK, which seems like it wouldn’t be if there were a particular “historic French relationship to the land”.

(And finally, given that I write here and have explicitly affiliated myself in the previous post as someone who identifies politically/ideologically with the American conservative movement, one might suspect than many of my perspectives are un-French. I’d been led to believe up until now that my outspoken support for natalist policies was one of the few characteristically French aspects of my outlook.)

Moving on, Noah’s second point is that more kids leads to density, and density is bad for freedom, or at least some kinds of freedom, like the freedom to live in a space that’s less dense.

I mean, I guess that’s correct. But I guess I would just say it’s like Noah’s freedom to have a boat: kind of a good idea in theory, but not something we should care too much about.

I just vehemently deny this: “India is a less-free society with over a billion people than it would be if it had only three hundred million, even if per-capita income was the same”

India is a freer society because it has more people. First of all, it wouldn’t have the same per-capita income if it had three hundred million people. But even granting this, it would have less writers, less scientists, less monuments, less teachers, less movies (and thank God for Indian cinema!) which would be unavailable to experience. It would be poorer, in every meaningful sense of the word.

And I would argue that the billions of people clustering in cities are voting with their feet for my freedom to expand their opportunities against Noah’s freedom to stretch out.

As to the important freedom to “stretch out”, well, this is the enormous density problem the Earth faces:

That’s right, the world is packed so tight that if we were all to live as densely as Paris (a city that’s not dense at all on an absolute basis, with a grand total of one skyscraper), we would merely cover three American states. (We can argue about the resource question, but Noah is talking specifically about density here.)

Relative to land area, Earth is positively deserted. In this sense, saying that if we have more kids we might have less freedom to stretch out is sort of like saying that people shouldn’t breathe in too hard or we might run out of air.

Moar kids = moar freedom

Rick Santorum recently came out with a WSJ op-ed that tries to include pro-family and pro-kids policy as part of an “economic freedom” agenda.

Predictably and intelligently, Will Wilkinson denounced this gambit in The Economist as an attempt at social engineering and, therefore, incompatible with economic freedom.

At National Review, TAS Overlord Reihan responds that, while rewarding people for having kids might not be conducive to economic freedom per se, it might still be conducive to higher economic growth and therefore might be sensible policy. Having children can be viewed as making an investment in human capital. Almost every country tries to encourage investments in other kinds of capital through tax policy, but human capital is also important.

Later at Big Think, after drawing a distinction between economic freedom and maximizing GDP growth, Will Wilkinson pursues his line of argument further.

After drawing a distinction between economic growth and economic freedom, Will tries to submit the spend-on-kids-for-growth idea to a reductio ad absurdum: if the goal of rewarding people for having kids is to boost growth, then we should reward people even more for having high-IQ kids, and punish those who have low-IQ kids. But the pro-kids people would doubtlessly be squeamish at the implications of that. And so the economic growth argument is just a fig leaf for social engineering. And so any pro-kids policy must be rejected.

On Twitter, I made several arguments in response, and Will asked me to blog them, so here I go.

First of all, while Will is right that economic freedom and economic growth are not the same thing, Will argued eloquently elsewhere that the reason why economic growth is desirable in the first place is because it expands choices. And so while the two are not the same thing, they are interrelated. One leads to the other and vice versa.

Secondly, Will’s reductio is wobbly. It’s almost impossible to know whether a kid will be a successful adult, and thank God for that. For example, from studies I’ve seen, entrepreneurial success is uncorrelated with IQ above a certain level, so subsidizing little geniuses would not necessarily subsidize the Steve Jobses of the future. And really, it’s perfectly consistent to simultaneously believe we should be subsidizing kids because they’ll boost growth but believe that subsidizing only the high-IQ (or those who pass the Marshmallow Test or whatever) ones would be morally reprehensible, and if some of the money will be wasted, so be it.

More importantly, there are (to me) obvious ways in which a pro-kids and pro-family policy can boost not just economic growth, but economic freedom and social welfare.

An important thing to note is that a market economy is made possible not only by formal rules but by the underpinning of these formal rules by a set of social norms of trust and expected behavior etc., which cannot be mandated and mysteriously accrete in a society over many generations. If you give a society without these underlying norms the institutions of a modern liberal democracy, you get Russia in 1993 or Iraq in 2005.

With that in mind, most people tend to agree that reams of studies show that generally and on the whole, stable families have better odds of producing better-adjusted, happier folks who will integrate and perpetuate such social norms better. Policies that successfully reward producing more of these sorts of outcomes would, therefore, not just promote general welfare, but also promote economic freedom over the long run by strengthening the social norms that make it possible at all to begin with.

I say this in all sympathy with Will’s argument, because I do agree with him that too often social engineering is presented under economic/budgetary fig-leafs that are really masks for value judgements. I’ve argued so about so-called sin taxes.

But just because such fig-leafs exist sometimes doesn’t mean that being pro-kids isn’t being pro-freedom. About sin taxes, I argued that it’s fine if sin taxes don’t provide all the economic benefits that boosters allege, because it’s fine to say “We disapprove of this, and therefore we’ll tax it.”

As someone who identifies most closely with American conservatism (and as a libertarian fellow-traveller), I am a proud heir of an intellectual tradition that has taught me to be highly skeptical of social engineering. But being highly skeptical is not the same thing as being always and everywhere an opponent. As Reihan notes, it’s impossible for the tax code not to be a social engineering tool, as people’s behavior will be nudged in certain ways no matter what you end up deciding to tax. (Will disagrees, but doesn’t really say why.) And so I’m fine with supporting some kinds of social engineering. So when Will says “This isn’t about economic growth/freedom at all, therefore it’s social engineering, therefore it’s bad”, I’m unmoved. I say “It is about economic growth and freedom, and it is also social engineering, and that’s fine.”

But even more broadly, and this is something I should have written up sooner, my defense of moar kids from a freedom and human welfare perspective is this: stuff is people. Not just Soylent Green. Everything. Corporations are people, my friend. Not in the sense that they have human rights. But in the sense that they are a framework through which people collaborate. Likewise, cities are not a geographical location and building, they’re people. Even stuff is people. Your iPhone is people. It’s Steve Jobs, it’s Jony Ive and it’s plenty of Foxconn workers. An iPhone is not a thing, it is a few moments of thousands of people’s time. Culture is people. Books is people. Everything we cherish, everything that makes life worth living, is people. More people means more of everything.

More kids boosts freedom, because each person is an infinite amount of new choices to be made, and it obviously boosts welfare, because the world is people and more people makes the world richer.

EDIT: Reihan has his own rejoinder to Will, which is very much worth your time. I guess Reihan is slightly less pro-kids than me, which I guess is fair enough given that I find it hard to imagine how one could be more pro-kids than me.

The Future Of Jobs

On Twitter, I recently had a discussion with @keptsimple81 (the liberal writer of the funny @GingrichIdeas ) where we discussed the future of jobs in advanced economies where mass industrial employment is a think of the past (at least as a provider of 50s style “broad middle-class prosperity”) and office drone jobs are probably headed that way too.

The discussion afforded me the opportunity to list the articles and resources that inform my thinking on this important issue. I’m doing it here, as much for me as for you. Regular readers will be familiar with most of them, but perhaps not all of them, and even the ones we’re not familiar with deserve re-reading.

Here goes:

Matt Crawford, The New Atlantis, Shop Class as Soulcraft

Sara Horowitz, The Atlantic, The Freelance Surge is the Industrial Revolution of Our Time

Paul Graham, Hiring is Obsolete

Adam Davidson, New York Times, Don’t Mock the Artisanal Pickle-Makers

Chris Dixon, The internet is reshaping our economy from one of huge corporations with lots of jobs to huge platforms with lots of income streams

Left unwritten: why the shop-class, crafts, freelance, internet-fueled economy will be particularly good for women.

Uncertainty In The Wild

During the depths of the recession, a meme took hold among Republican politicians and a number of conservative wonks about “uncertainty.” The idea was that regulatory uncertainty—that the people who run businesses couldn’t tell which regulations and taxes they’d have to face in the future—was depressing business investment and therefore prolonging the recovery.

This idea was soundly and almost unanimously mocked on the Left. Aren’t our Galtian overlords supposed to be great risk-takers? Isn’t this how they derive the legitimacy of their wealth? Isn’t there always regulatory uncertainty? To many on the Left, the “uncertainty” meme was simply a whole-cloth fabrication.

At the time, I took a frustratingly middle-of-the-road view: on balance and all else being equal, I think, regulatory uncertainty can depress investment and therefore economic growth. That said, in a massive demand-driven recession like the one the US experienced, it’s highly unlikely that this is the main cause of the slough.

Now it’s Morning Again In America and so nobody’s arguing about “uncertainty” anymore. And the progress of the recovery seems to validate lefty arguments that the whole “uncertainty” thing is made up out of whole cloth.

Well, I found an example of uncertainty working as advertised in the wild.

I recently had dinner with a friend who’s an investment banker who often advises on LBOs—debt-fueled buyouts of companies by private equity funds—who tells me most if not all plans for LBOs in France have been frozen. Why? Because François Hollande, the Socialist Party’s presidential candidate and the favorite of the election, has promised a surtax on debt used to finance buyouts. So private equity funds have decided to sit on their hands until the election in May to see what exactly they’ll be socked with and plug it into their models so they can see if the deals they’re contemplating work under the new regime or not. (While presumably vigorously lobbying against any tax at all, I’m sure.)

Now this doesn’t really keep me up at night. From a business perspective, if you can’t make that deal you’re contemplating work without leverage, you probably shouldn’t do it. From a policy perspective, while the LBO boom has probably been a net positive for the economy, putting a brake on LBO activity isn’t the most damaging thing a socialist president could do. Let’s call it mostly-harmless populism. It is, of course, the wrong solution to the wrong problem: the overuse of debt by corporations is encouraged across the economy by the corporate income tax (because debt payments are deductible from the corporate tax) which should just be done away with, but that’s an idea that’s even more politically infeasible in France than it is in the US. (And, of course, one should note that Mr Hollande has an objective interest in depressing and deferring business investment until he becomes President, although I’m sure that doesn’t figure into his calculations. Really. The economy is doing crappily enough without him.)

Anyway: while this tax and the response to it aren’t going to keep me up at night, we do have here a real-life example of real regulatory uncertainty depressing real business activity and investment that would have occurred absent said uncertainty. So “uncertainty” can and does occur.

So there you go, kids: while it’s probably foolish to believe that Obama-led “uncertainty” is responsible for most of the economic morass we’ve experienced over the past few years, it’s equally foolish to dismiss out of hand the idea or the possibility of uncertainty depressing business investment.

This Is Your Head On Blog

At last! I’ve lost my Bloggingheads virginity. I want to thank Reason’s very gracious Matt Welch for doing it. And hopefully if the Bloggingheads people and/or viewers like it, I’ll be able to do more with more people.

In this one, we cover (mostly) the Eurocrisis and the US presidential election from a European perspective. Watch here.

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