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1. Reihan: I change my mind about as often as I tie my shoes.

   A loafers man, are you?

   — Steve Casburn · May 18, 08:54 PM · #

2. But while withdrawal might be conditions based, it also appears, for Obama at least, that staying is conditions based—that political progress must be made for us to stay there. If that’s not rhetoric, (it might be but I hope not) that seems like a huge policy difference from both McCain and the status quo.

   There’s also the issue of whether we negotiate with the other regional powers. Obama’s much more sane on that point.

   — Consumatopia · May 18, 09:55 PM · #

3. I’m not convinced that Obama and McCain aren’t substantively different on Iraq. Sure, McCain says he wants most troops out of Iraq by 2013, but he’s said a lot of things about Iraq (100 years, e.g.), many of which contradict each other. I’m not sure what to think, other than that he’s trying to be all things to all people—he’s a hawk’s hawk to the base by saying he’s not going to leave until we “win” but he’s pro-withdrawal to the middle by emphasizing that under some conceivable circumstances we just might leave. I don’t see any evidence of a commitment to withdraw troops on McCain’s part, because his 2013 speech doesn’t really do much to make one—it just outlines one possible scenario in which he might do so.

   I will grant John McCain this: he’s very talented at putting a moderate face on what is fundamentally the same Bush policies. Everyone’s talking about McCain more or less setting a timetable even though he’s done no such thing, and has in fact left the barn door wide open to keep the troops in Iraq for a full 4-8 years of a prospective McCain Administration. And considering McCain’s media admiration it just might work.

   — Lev · May 18, 09:58 PM · #

4. I think you’re right that there’s some potential narrowing of the positions when you look into the fine print.

   However, I think that just means that the substance of the argument about drawing down troops rests on the history of how the two candidates have evaluated conditions on the ground. There’s a real charge that McCain has been suckered by the entire “Friedman units” phenomenon, so that we can’t trust that his judgment will be based on an objective assessment of conditions on the ground.

   Obama’s emphasis can be read not only as saying what is popular, but reflecting the view that the long-term situation in Iraq is unlikely to be improved by the presence of US troops. Similarly, McCain’s rhetoric seems to be premised on ignoring the real possibility that we’re only prolonging the conflict by staying in Iraq, and that any plan involves a serious period of instability when US troops are reduced or leave.

   A further point: it’s not entirely true to say that Obama is taking all the popular rhetorical stands: obviously the stand that we will never give up, that we will see our obligations through, and so on, has popular appeal. What the American people really want is someone who will convince them that we can have both peace and victory. That’s what McCain’s 2013 speech promised, even if it wasn’t convincing. If I can engage in a little self-promotion, I’ve just not written something about the nasty rhetorical spot the 2013 speech may have put the Democrats in.

   — Justin · May 18, 10:06 PM · #

5. Reihan, I can’t begin to understand you here. OK, Obama and McCain both want to get all the troops out, dependent upon conditions on the ground. But it’s goofy to say that makes their positions the same or even similar.

   “Conditions on the ground” in Iraq are in some sense the same today as two years ago as two years from now: a clusterf*ck. Aspects and details of those conditions have changed — in, as you point out, hopeful ways of late. But basically the whole thing is screwy enough that how you choose to read those “conditions,” and to whose assessments you give the most weight, is going to matter loads.

   And on that point, Obama and McCain differ substantially: they’re looking at the same situation but seeing different things and therefore prescribing substantially different courses of action. McCain’s been clear he sees a lot of hope and progress in Iraq’s current “conditions,” and as such thinks the situation right now supports keeping a strong troop commitment. Obama’s been clear that he thinks the gains in Iraq, such as they are, are not on the appropriate fronts to be indicative of “success” and so the current “conditions” support cutting our losses by beginning troop withdrawl. Samantha Power’s statement, even if it still holds force in the campaign, doesn’t contradict that.

   So big deal: both men’s Iraq policy is dictated by what actually is happening over there. Let’s grant that within a certain extreme of possible events over there, such would be true of Dennis Kucinich as well. But it’s pretty clear that both men read the significance of what’s happening differently and listen to advisors who read the significance of what’s happening differently, so it’s just plain wrong to say that their policies “converge” except in extreme circumstances.

   — Sanjay · May 19, 02:25 PM · #

6. “Conditions on the ground” in Iraq are in some sense the same today as two years ago as two years from now: a clusterf*ck.

   That is just not true. Large-scale structure in Iraq has yet to solidify — perhaps — but we’ve won the microcosmos, and we’ve won it definitively.

   — JA · May 19, 03:50 PM · #

7. This is just silliness. McCain believes the U.S. can somehow settle Iraq’s civil war, and if we can’t that just means we ought to stay to keep it from getting it out of hand. Obama knows better. To conflate their positions is sophistry.

   — Kevin B. O'Reilly · May 19, 04:15 PM · #

8. Obama at least, that staying is conditions based—that political progress must be made for us to stay there.

   I agree. This simple thought makes Obama’s strategy fundamentally different from McCain’s. As political message, this is sensible; it speaks to the “to hell with them” high-hawks and the “moral fig leaf” ditching-doves at the same time. It also relies on a certain amount of definitional vagueness, which is good for Obama the aspiring leader because it reserves acres of pivot-space and nuance should he gain office and actually have to deal with the Problem of the Real. I understand all this and don’t expect anything less from a Presidential candidate.

   The problem I have is…

   1. As a Strategy for the Real, conditioning the continuation of American efforts at “winning in Iraq” on a deus ex machina in which we’ve already won — well, this doesn’t strike me as the right way to go. In fact, it doesn’t really make a lot of sense. Political reconciliation should be a goal, not a condition of playing the game.

   2. Therefore, I have to be cynical about Obama the politician to justify voting for him. I have to believe his “strategy” is informed by his current predicament as the Democratic candidate, and that it will change as soon as he gets into office and has to conduct affairs with an eye to getting reelected in 2012. Only if Obama is truly the savvy political animal I hope he is will he modify his current strategy upon gaining office to avoid making large, disruptive, theoretical moves in Iraq and thereby incurring responsibility for any catastrophes that might result.

   The problem with the “we’ll leave unless they get their act together” is that in a security vacuum the people who get their act together are the ones with all the guns. If we leave before the political superstructure anneals, instead of a large-selectorate large-winning-coalition democracy with close ties to the US right in the heart of oil-rich Islamdom (see Logic of Political Survival for why this is significant, and why it is immanently possible), it’s a safe bet we’ll get another small selectorate, religiously extreme police-state if not an all out civil war, either one of which will result in an Iraq foreign policy forthright in its hostility to America. In other words, not good.

   We’ve crossed, not the Rubicon, but several significant streams since 2006, and we are in an altogether different phase in Iraq. For the first time, we are looking at positive momentum toward a steady-state. Seriously.

   — JA · May 19, 04:55 PM · #

9. @JA:
   What? What the hell is the “microcosmos” — I’m thinking of a movie about bugses — and what have we won “definitively?” Look, I’m one of the guys who think we should maintain a commitment to Iraq — but part of the case for that commitment is that everything we’ve won is tenuous and fragile.
   If you think otherwise by all means flesh out your comment. But it seems to me that it’s unclear who’s going to wield political influence in Iraq over the next couple years, who’s going to be the military power on the ground in various places, and with which factions we (or for that matter Iran) will be most comfortable allying ourselves.
   Acknowledging that the situation is chaotic doesn’t make you one of those people who refuse to recognize that some progress has been made in the past couple of years and that it’s become more possible to envision a stable, satifying endtate which is not a human rights nightmare. But pretending we’ve “won the microcosmos definitively,” whatever that means — that’s just fairyland, man.

   — Sanjay · May 19, 05:03 PM · #

10. While I don’t support him, I enjoyed the clearer picture of the origins McCain’s foreign policy and war strategies provided here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/magazine/18mccain-t.html?ref=magazine

    — Suzanne Labadie · May 19, 08:29 PM · #

11. Sanjay, I wrote a long response elaborating my comment; unfortunately, it disappeared into the all-consuming Nothing from which there’s no appeal.

    So, here’s the shorter version. Schelling, micromotives and macrobehaviour, microcosmos as the bottom, elemental level of a complex system. In society, “microcosmos” connotes the percepts and behaviors of individuals and small highly-intraconnective groups (families, tribes, congregations, etc).

    From what I hear, what we’ve won in the percepts and behaviors of the Iraqi microcosmos is not “tenuous and fragile” at all (unless our current strategy suffers a massive disruption). In fact, it is a cornerstone around which everything else can be built, given enough patience.

    Simply, the plan to build from the bottom-up has reached a watershed — i.e., we won the bottom (it’s ours to lose). We, or more accurately the American military, won the core battle of perception and expectation: if we are patient, the self-organizing forces of (political and existential) self-interest will move localities, and eventually the political superstructures of the whole country, into a large-selectorate large-winning-coalition steady-state government which can function at a reasonable level.

    I’m optimistic that this is attainable because our recent gains are so sturdily primal. We can still lose it all, of course, but we’re now dealing with the robust reality of reflectively-reinforced reification. The Iraqis finally believe us.

    They don’t like us, but they believe us. Even if they have to hold their noses to do it, it looks like they’re finally willing to follow us to the other side. Sorry folks, but that’s huge.

    — JA · May 19, 09:35 PM · #

12. And if it’s not clear, I’ve swallowed Bueno de Mesquita’s “cynic’s case for democracy” hook, line, and sinker.

    — JA · May 19, 09:52 PM · #

13. Political reconciliation should be a goal, not a condition of playing the game.

    I think it’s the reverse—politics is a tool for obtaining security. If we could have security without the annoyance of politics, surely we would dispense with politics and just watch sports instead (it’s about the same thing).

    Since we’re paying the Sunni militias and tribes to not make a fuss, they don’t have any incentive to reconcile with the central government. Since we’re promised to never leave, the central government has no incentive to reconcile with them. The current lull in fighting proves that we have some modest leverage, some capacity to play one faction against another. Currently, we’re using it all for short term security gains, because without short term security the American people would want out, and staying in Iraq is a goal in and of itself. We need to start using that leverage for politics.

    All that said, I’m not actually sure Obama ever said that staying should be conditional on political benchmarks, though many Democrats including me do.

    — Consumatopia · May 19, 11:14 PM · #

14. JA, that makes my point about Obama, McCain, and the “conditions on the ground.” Because from what I hear — and, hell, I hear, daily, from the 82nd and XVIII Airborne, but I’m also thinking of Petraeus’ testimony — the idea that we’ve somehow won the hearts and minds war — that the bulk of Iraqis are by and large trusting of our motives — is just plain wrong. But the difference between your position and mine is, polling backs me up — the Iraqis want us gone. Certain factions in Iraq sure as hell want us gone, and some that don’t seem to have, well, gone back and forth on the issue. Some that want us there — like the Sunni Kurds of Northern Iraq — might be irrelevant to much of the rest of the country and might be pursuing ends different from ours (and indeed polling again suggests that they are). Is there — and I’m seriously asking, here — any justification for “we’ve definitively won the microcosmos” (and note I think the lingo here is goofy) — like a recent poll, or something — or is it just something you’re “hearing”?

    — Sanjay · May 20, 12:47 AM · #

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