I Admit
First I cave, then I admit.
Andrew writes,
Reihan admits “victory”, whatever that means, is not yet at hand:
and he then links to a short item I wrote on the parlous state of Iraqi security, which, by the way, totally ignored Kirkuk, potentially the most explosive issue on the Iraqi political scene.
I don’t think I ever used the word “victory” in the piece, and while I actually do think there is such a thing as “victory” in the context of U.S. goals in Iraq, it’s certainly not the kind of language I normally use. And I have to wonder: why would I be admitting anything? Taking the crudest view of my motivations, it’s hardly an admission if I am arguing that we need to keep a large U.S. force in Iraq because, as a neocon or neocon fellow-traveler, it’s hardly surprising that I think we should keep a large U.S. force in Iraq, right? If anything, we neocons can never admit that victory is at hand, as that would undermine our central claim to power, namely that there is a never-ending national security emergency that requires the existence of a garrison state — here I’m channeling Andrew Bacevich and other smart critics of the national security state broadly and neoconservatives in particular.
Wouldn’t it be more of an admission if, say, I admitted that we ought to have embraced Andrew’s chosen strategy of leaving Iraq and allowing Sunni and Shia Iraqis to settle their dispute through force of arms? That, at least, is my understanding of Andrew’s realist stance on Iraq, an argument he often made before the surge strategy changed U.S. perceptions of the security situation in Iraq.
But of course I haven’t admitted that we ought to embrace that strategy because, based on my reading of the evidence, I think that would be a very bad idea. I don’t think advancing Andrew’s Luttwakian argument is evil, but I also don’t think that McCain’s endorsement of George W. Bush over John Kerry in 2004 was evil.
Is there, by the way, a coherent case that advocating that the United States absolve itself of responsibility for the charnel house that Iraq threatened to become during the darkest days of Iraq’s civil war was in fact an evil position to take? I certainly wouldn’t go that far. Plenty of serious people believed that a cold-eyed Bismarckian approach was the only appropriate response, and this view was rooted in an “ethical realism” — making this difficult decision was ultimately the most moral thing to do. My sense is that events have overtaken this argument, and my sense is also that this style of realist argument has a self-justifying quality. But I recognize that these are open, difficult questions, and I’ve been all over the map on Kosovo, Iraq, etc.
Pushing back against the hypothetical moral argument in your last paragraph, there’s reason to withdraw from Iraq, even in the dark days, without resort to realism. Namely the popular will of the Iraqi people. Pre-surge a majority wanted us to leave, although a different majority did want us to provide some measure of security first. (I’d argue that our achievements with the Sons of Iraq and the Sadr ceasefire, key factors in reducing violence, would have been easier, let alone possible in the context of a phased withdrawal. However, that’s a separate point).
At the time, the government of Iraq didn’t reflect that view because it was dependent on US presence to survive and those most opposed to US presence had largely boycotted the elections. (Side question, has boycotting elections ever helped anyone?)
Moving on from debating the past, now the situation is much more clear cut. Some measure of security has been achieved and the government now directly reflects popular sentiments and is asking for a time table.
I quite agree with your assessment of the volatility in Iraq and that the PM may choose to play the strongman and fail to integrate Sunni forces and further stall elections. However, while we certainly have a responsibility to Iraq, that responsibility does not automatically give us the legitimacy to sort out these issues. Looking at it from the other direction, a majority of Iraqis may well be willing to have us stay longer under stringent conditions including putting the U.S. military under Iraqi law, a circumstance we are almost certainly unwilling to accept.
In short, taking an exclusively liberal, non-realist, approach still leaves the question of what do we have the right to do not just what do we think will be the best outcome for the Iraqis.
— Greg Sanders · Sep 12, 04:01 PM · #
“Pushing back against the hypothetical moral argument in your last paragraph, there’s reason to withdraw from Iraq, even in the dark days, without resort to realism. Namely the popular will of the Iraqi people.”
An important point by Greg, which is really the fundamental question on Iraq. Gates and Patreus have created the exact sort of security situation we need to extricate our forces from the country, in a measured and pragmatic way. The Iraqi people want us out. The American people want us out. What gives?
It’s an admission of neoconservatism that victory is not yet at hand, because in the theoretical sense, “victory” was never what the Iraq invasion was about. As you allude to, the neocon position is about establishing a permanent American military proxy in the heart of the Arab world, both to protect oil sources and to hedge against the risk Iran poses there (to both Israel and the greater region). While I’m sure your rationale for caution is justified, it’s the underlying risk that you are focusing on which is a major flaw of neoconservatism – the risk that if we ever completely leave, something incredibly bad WILL happen.
Andrew raises important points in this regard, namely: what the eff is “victory” in Iraq if it is not a) disposing of Saddam, b) answering the question on the presense of WMD, c) creating a quasi-democratic Arab government, d) defeating the last remnants of Al Qaeda? Isn’t that what we set out to accomplish there? For the most part, is this not complete?
Combine that with the point that Greg brings up, that it is politically popular to end the Iraq war, and you have the perfect scenario to end it. So why not say we won and leave?
— mattc · Sep 12, 05:29 PM · #