The Trouble with 'Modest Expectations'
I’m very, very worried about where the conversation is going on Afghanistan. Andrew Sullivan is characterizing Christian Brose as a voice of the neoconservative right for the following:
What I heard again and again is that we may have to settle for a counterterrorism-focused mission, but that should be an unfortunate option of last resort, not our going-in policy. Furthermore, we should not allow resources to determine strategy, as this study suggests, which was one interpretation I heard for the administration’s recent statements walking back U.S. goals: The economy’s bad, and we have to do what we can. This gets it backwards. We should determine the optimal outcome we are confident we can accomplish, and then pay for it. After all, we still have a GDP of, what, $12 trillion? If our conception of strategic success is achievable, let’s not hide behind tightening budgets.
If I recall correctly, this was, until very recently, a consensus view held by people on the center-left and the center-right, not a maximalist view embraced only by a right-wing fringe. And I’m pretty sure this remains a widely held view. The Obama Administration has made a miscalculation, albeit a minor one for now: the tentative thought, it seems, is that lowering expectations will help us deliver an acceptable outcome. I think the opposite is actually true. Expectations are already extremely low. No one expects Afghanistan to become Switzerland. To achieve some kind of decent outcome, we really do need to ramp up our engagement in Afghanistan, up to and including offering long-term security guarantees that can alleviate anxieties in India and Pakistan regarding a security vacuum. As Chris suggests, building some kind of broadly representative government is an important part of this process, not out of messianic zeal but rather out of a recognition that a government effective enough to police its borders — and you need to do that if you want to stamp out terrorist training camps — has to be seen as basically legitimate.
Right now, we’re not helping matters. Steve Coll has explained how an overreliance on air strikes in particular and a failure to provide population security has undermined support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and for Karzai’s government.
Apart from the security issue, the first big push against this center of gravity will be the presidential election to be held later this year. The international community is poised to invest several hundred million dollars to stage this election in what will be, at best, difficult security conditions. The idea is to invest either a reƫlected Karzai or an opposition candidate with legitimacy, so that as Afghan security forces such as the Afghan National Army are built up, they will be linked to a viable national leadership.
What is the gravest threat? As Coll explains, it is that the Taliban will be able to change the composition of the electorate enough to fatally undermine the legitimacy of the Kabul government. To avoid this scenario, we need to ramp up efforts to secure Afghanistan’s civilian population — which is to say, now is exactly the wrong time to lower expectations.
Think about it: if we try and succeed, we’ve shifted Afghanistan to a new, more stable equilibrium that will make it more likely that the country will help improve the strategic landscape in South Asia. If we try and fail, we can downshift to using space-based lasers to zap “Terrorist Training Camps” — which will be visible from space, because they will be centered around enormous concrete “T“s. Actually, no, they won’t be — zapping terrorist training camps will require a great deal of intelligence work, which will require a significant presence on the ground and supply lines, a serious problem at the moment. Which is to say, even the lightweight, Rumsfeldian approach that some are proposing would be pretty costly. By not investing now in a more favorable political environment, we are raising the longer term costs of engagement.
Senator Lieberman gave an excellent, sober speech&& on Afghanistan that offers measured praise for President Obama’s approach thus far. The core of the speech is that a military surge isn’t enough — Afghanistan also requires a civilian surge, which he outlines. To launch a civilian surge, we actually need to create a sense of urgency about the situation, which is to say we need to raise expectations for what we can achieve in the medium term.
I learned a lot from from Frederick Kagan’s NR survey, which I strongly recommend. When Andrew calls Afghanistan an ungovernable wasteland, I have to say, I don’t fully get it. Even the Soviets, for all their brutality and incompetence, came very close to making a deal with Massoud in the latter days of their occupation. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was not inevitable — that’s why they made a movie about Charlie Wilson’s War. And we happen to be in a far more favorable position than the Soviets for any number of reasons, not least that a majority, albeit a dwindling majority, of Afghans supports our presence.
This really, really isn’t a left-right issue. I don’t agree with Robert Kagan on everything. For one thing, I come down differently on the tradeoffs involved in sharply increasing military spending. But I think he’s on the side of the angels here, as he was on changing our political-military strategy in Iraq.
I think the biggest problem with Brose’s analysis is that it’s detached from any sort of cost-benefit calculation. Yes, we have the resources to indefinitely occupy Afghanistan. It doesn’t necessarily follow that this is a good idea.
— Will · Feb 11, 06:14 PM · #
Yes, but there can be options besides buttressing the central government too. For example the military mission has recently shifted a lot of focus from the Afghan Army to the Afghan Police and a lot of the cracking down on Karzai hs to do with corruption in provincial governors that he appoints, who can play hell with (for example) military and foreign medical aid, each extracting their little douceur. So Kagan talks a lot there about US support for the central government but I think you guys are miscasting it as a battle between “strong cntral government” / “fuck it, this is ungovernable” when in fact there’s actually complex question of what kind of federalism to support and whether too much support for the central government is actually destabilizing, no?
— Sanjay · Feb 11, 06:31 PM · #
I totally buy that — I really was reacting to the latter position you identify.
— Reihan · Feb 11, 09:19 PM · #
Why don’t we just leave?
— Steve Sailer · Feb 12, 03:56 AM · #
Afghanistan would probably be best off with a feudal system of government. It’s cheap and works well where difficulties of transportation make centralization too expensive. The various warlords would become hereditary dukes and viscounts, with their sons in line to take over the domain, giving them a stake in the long term welfare of their holdings.
— Steve Sailer · Feb 12, 05:06 AM · #
I’ve never actually been in Afghanistan although I have been in the Pakistani border country. It’s basically some of the best guerilla country in the world….a bit like Jugoslavia. During WW 2 the Germans had at varying times 11 to 2O divisions in that country and were able to commit atrocities on a large scale. Nevertheless they never succeeded in defeating Tito’s partisans. Clear from your minds the idea that a majority of the Afghans want Americans or any foreigners in the country. Would we like the Chinese garrisoning the US. Every time we drop a bomb on a group of civilians it enrages them further. The afghans are primarily village dwellers unlike the Iraqis who principally are urban. In other words tough and hardy mountain men with a deep belief in Islam and and a hatred for interlopers of any kind. Personally, I don’t believe we have the remotest chance of turning this situation around without a huge, and I mean huge, committment from the US and even then it would be a gamble. That committment is going to involve several hundred thousand troops, forget the Europeans they are not going to shed any blood for Afghanistan. It will take at least a generation or around 20 years. There will also need to be a huge reconstruction effort costing probably a trillion dollars. So are we willing to place a bet this large which is also going to hamper our efforts elsewhere in order to achieve a semi democratic, stable, terrorist free Afghan society that is basically pro American. I doubt it. And therefore we need to turn our mind to the alternative of an exit strategy that doesn’t leave too much egg on our face.
— John · Feb 12, 06:51 PM · #
Eight years of war should be enough to satisfy honor.
Let’s go home.
— Steve Sailer · Feb 12, 11:39 PM · #
Agree with Sailer 110%.
Out now.
The most greivous incalculable harm we have done there is the demonization of al-Islam.
Total empowerment and validation of the fundamentalists.
That actually became an industry in the US, pace Robert Spencer.
Evo theory of culture dictates that a war on al-Islam will be an Epic Fail.
Graceful degradation of service is our only exit strat.
— matoko_chan · Feb 13, 03:57 PM · #