Keeping America’s Edge, ctd. 2
In a series of exchanges that is presumably increasingly only of interest to our respective mothers, Jonathan Chait has replied to my most recent post. Mr. Chait says of me that I am trying to “reframe the argument about Western European social democracy into something other than the one [I] originally made”.
Mr. Chait says that
My problem with the essay is that Manzi does a terrible job of establishing his premise that social democracy (his label for President Obama’s agenda) destroys growth and innovation.
In his article, Manzi’s only attempt to prove this relied upon a comparison between the share of world economic output of Europe from 1973 to the present with the United States from 1980 to the present.
Mr. Chait then proceeds to reiterate several concerns he has previously raised concerning the geographic and time period definitions that I used to show that Europe has ceded very large amounts of global GDP share, while the U.S. has not. Further he reiterates the concern that I evaluated total GDP, when GDP per capita would be a better proxy for living standards.
Mr. Chait then writes that I’m trying to change my argument to really be about the fact that “Ultimately, absolute size of an economy matters because economic clout represents the latent capacity for military and cultural power.”
But, Mr. Chait says:
The problem is, that isn’t what Manzi was actually arguing in his essay. He was making a traditional right-wing argument that social democracy (and, by implication, the Obama agenda) inhibits economic growth.
…
Now that its been pointed out that Reagan’s policies did not cause higher per-person growth, Manzi is focusing on total growth, which is almost entirely the function of a more rapidly growing population. In other words, we can ignore all that rhetoric about the welfare state strangling innovation. His real argument is that the welfare state prevents rapid population growth.
Unfortunately, each of Mr. Chait’s claims is incorrect. Let me take them one by one.
1. I “do a terrible job establishing his premise that social democracy (his label for President Obama’s agenda) destroys growth and innovation.”.
I don’t “do this job” at all. As per an earlier post, the purpose of the article was not to provide an empirical demonstration that less regulated markets tend to provide faster economic growth under many conditions than more regulated markets. Nor did it ever claim to provide this. The purpose of the article was to describe why even though I (like many, many other people) accept the advantages that less regulated markets can provide, that this does not lead to the conclusion that we can or should continue on the deregulation-oriented path on which we find ourselves without considering the balancing consideration of social cohesion. Mr. Chait apparently wishes that I had written an article designed to convince people who don’t believe that less regulated markets tend to drive faster growth than more government-directed markets, but this is not the article that I was writing, and again, never claimed that it accomplished that purpose.
2. The statistical analysis that supports the conclusion that Europe lost massive global GDP share and the U.S. did not over the past several decades is flawed.
Again, as shown in detail in a prior post, my conclusion is supported by any interpretation of the data. Mr. Chait has now raised this objection several times. While exact magnitudes will vary slightly, I defy Mr. Chait, or any critic, to present any responsible analysis using any reasonable definition of Europe or any relevant time periods or any reputable data source that does not support this conclusion.
3. We now know that “Reagan’s policies did not cause higher per-person growth”.
Also as per a prior post, we know that per-person GDP growth was similar between Europe and the U.S. over the period in question. This does not address the counterfactual question of what growth would have been in the U.S. had different policies been followed. In the period between 1950 and 1980 Europe had, broadly speaking, been catching up to the U.S. in per capita GDP, and the expectation was that convergence would likely continue. Maintaining a lead in per capita GDP was an unexpected advantage for the U.S.
4. Most centrally, in the article, I “was making a traditional right-wing argument that social democracy (and, by implication, the Obama agenda) inhibits economic growth.”, but am now changing my tune in the face of criticism to say it was really about explaining that “Ultimately, absolute size of an economy matters, because economic clout represents the latent capacity for military and cultural power.”
Once again, I asserted (and also, once again, neither proved nor attempted to prove) that government direction of resources will tend to produce less economic growth and prosperity than freer markets under many conditions. There are therefore many quotes in the article that are, in part, predicated on this belief. I also argued that one of the most important pernicious implications of less growth is loss of global economic clout that will very likely be translated into loss of global power in the long-run. This is not an after-the-fact change. Mr. Chait has repeatedly focused on two sentences that describe changes in relative share of total GDP. Here are the sentences that immediately follow them in the article:
The economic rise of the Asian heartland is the central geopolitical fact of our era, and it is safe to assume that economic and strategic competition will only increase further over the next several decades.
It is common to think of the post-war global economy as a baseline of normalcy to which we wish to return. But it seems more accurate to see that era as an anomaly: the apogee of relative global economic dominance by the West, and by the United States within the Western coalition. The hard truth is that the economic world of 1955 is gone, and even if we wanted it back — short of emerging from another global war unscathed with the rest of the world a smoking heap of rubble — we could not have it.
Yet the strategy of giving up and opting out of this international economic competition in order to focus on quality of life is simply not feasible for the United States. Europeans can get away with it only because they benefit from the external military protection America provides; we, however, have no similar guardian to turn to. We do not live in a Kantian world of perpetual commercial peace. Were America to retreat from global competition, sooner or later those who oppose our values would become strong enough to take away our wealth and freedom.
I stand by these words, just as I stand by every other word in the article.
It took me a good long while to find the real fulcrum of disagreement between you, Chait, and The Economist and I think it’s here:
I think what they’re attacking, and what I think your defenses have failed to defend, is this idea that less regulated markets and less social welfare – less, in other words, of what I understand you to mean by “social democracy” or, at any rate, what Europe has more of – are advantageous, at least in terms of GDP per capita.
If I can do you the immense injustice of attempting to sum all this up in a sentence or two, it’s that you’re arguing for a balance between dangerously high levels of social democracy and dangerously low levels, which cause so much inequality that society falls apart. And I think what Chait/the Economist is saying is that the “dangerously high levels of social democracy”, at least as represented by the Europe that actually is a social democracy, really isn’t very dangerous, so, uh, I guess you should be a liberal, or something.
— Chet · Jan 8, 06:09 AM · #
But it’s outwardly dangerous, Chet, because you end up with less influence in the international arena. Manzi’s point, his main point, is that we know enough about internal management. and we know enough about external strategy, that an entirely new policy space opens up for us to explore, a space in which we might, with enough ‘bipartisanship’ or whatever, find an optimal core in which to conduct our business.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 8, 06:26 AM · #
For an incredibly inapt analogy, think about sports. One priority of team building, an internal priority, is chemistry. But the best chemistry in the world won’t beat the best teams, unless you also have talent. And talent is relative; you measure according to everyone else.
Progressives seem concerned with chemistry over talent. But again: you can’t win without talent.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 8, 06:32 AM · #
Damn it, here I am, back from dealing with the insufferable pomp of my ‘Bama friends while swallowing cereal bowl gulps of beer, and all I can think about is how my girlfriend will eventually have to change into her pajamas, and this whole issue of how to add to the discussion.
Re the latter, I think it would be helpful for everybody to think hard about how to koncipirovanie* the goalset we’re talking about and the frameset from which we can assume these goals are valuable. Once we have consensus — on the objectives and their relative mass — we can move on to the discussion about strategy and how to measure progress (which is what Jim’s data is all about). Think about the most general way to describe each goal, ways which are simple to articulate and deep with meaning, ways which, ideally, can have their factors reduced to function.
[*] From Bakhtin:
Peace, and go ‘Dores.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 8, 07:25 AM · #
How so? Just because Europe may have? Our influence is waning as well, these days, and it doesn’t seem to have anything to do with “social democracy”: Wall Street is still an unregulated casino and I haven’t gotten my cradle-to-the-grave health care. Waning international influence seems to have much, much more to do with a nation’s foreign policy than with whether or not its citizens get to die from diseases they’re too poor to treat.
Inapt I’ll grant you; the search for talent doesn’t necessarily impact chemistry. The search for the social cohesion of a robust safety net, as Manzi’s interlocutors have largely demonstrated, doesn’t necessarily impact an innovative marketplace. So, let’s be Europe, please?
— Chet · Jan 8, 07:53 AM · #
The purpose of the article was to describe why even though I (like many, many other people) accept the advantages that less regulated markets can provide, that this does not lead to the conclusion that we can or should continue on the deregulation-oriented path on which we find ourselves without considering the balancing consideration of social cohesion.
Your argument, then, is completely dependent on the bolded claim. If that claim is untrue, the rest of your argument is just writing in the sky.
If you argued, say, that once we accept that unicorn blood is delicious, we need to weigh the social utility of mass unicorn hunts in the Scottish highlands, no one would listen to the argument because its first premise was false.
Your first premise is not lunacy, but it needs to be shown to be correct for the rest of the argument to have any merit. You did, in the article, attempt to show that it had merit by talking about GDP growth and per-person growth in Reagan’s America. You implicitly accepted that this was something you needed to show, and Chait and DiA and the rest have shown this is insufficient evidence, and in fact that a fair reading of the evidence shows that GDP per person has been about equal when you compare the US to Western European social democracies.
Now there is the turn to arguing that population growth is inhibited by social democracy, as opposed to American-style economic policies. In this case, one needs to show how social democracy limits population growth – there needs to be a causal factor involved. It seems like a bizarre idea to me.
— DivGuy · Jan 8, 03:22 PM · #
We’ve come a long way from Kennedy’s inaugural.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 8, 06:19 PM · #
GDP per person has nothing to do with international clout.
Clout, clout, clout. Not living standards, not average utility, not happiness. Clout.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 8, 06:22 PM · #
Aggregate GDP also does not provide international clout unless it is produced by a cohesive population with shared goals and values (eg collapse of USSR, which may foreshadow China’s future – and hopefully not America’s)
Likewise, small populations with shared goals and values may choose to merge the power of their small GDP’s to gain clout (eg European Union, NATO)
— andrew · Jan 8, 07:33 PM · #
<blockquote> <p>But it’s outwardly dangerous, Chet, because you end up with less influence in the international arena.</p></blockquote>
The core issue then is does the amount of GDP we dedicate to our military preserve our influence and protect our freedoms. IF so can we accomplish the same while spending less on defense.
The disconnect I think is that conservatives do not question enough the specifics of our current defense structure. And they do not seem to be able to understand when other do.
Most of the money we spend on defense goes to conventional forces. Yet the performance of these forces has been sub-optimal since WW2. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, in all these wars the performance of our military diminished the US prestige. We ended up with less after the war than we had at the start.
I am not a pacifist, nor anti-military. I have a large number of retired and active duty military in my extended family, including people current deployed to combat zones. It is not about the quality or dedication of the troops. It is about the fact that we are doing this wrong. The construction and building of our forces is as corrupt as any government bidding operation can be. Conservatives see it in other government programs but are blind to this fact when it comes to military spending.
We are wasting large amounts of money on our military. Money we can no longer afford to waste. The mission has to be to protect our liberties, to defend the constitution. Really, look around, can you honestly say that we are getting our monies worth?
And if we dont need to spend so much on conventional forces then that does open up the possibility that we can run an economy more like the Europeans and still protect our liberties.
— lighthouse · Jan 8, 07:37 PM · #
No, I’m losing interest too.
— Ma · Jan 8, 07:56 PM · #
<i>“I stand by these words, just as I stand by every other word in the article.”</i>
Do you stand by every number in the article?
— LaFollette Progressive · Jan 8, 08:17 PM · #
GDP per person has nothing to do with international clout.
Clout, clout, clout. Not living standards, not average utility, not happiness. Clout.
It certainly is the case that “clout”, as measured by GDP, has grown at a faster rate in the US than among Western European social democracies over the past three decades.
However, the current discussion is about the trade-offs involved in running an American-style economy and social safety net compared to a Western European style social democracy. So, you would need to show that the “clout” differential is a function of these different systems in order for that to be a useful point.
Since the “clout” differential has been shown to be entirely a function of relative population growth, I don’t think you’re going to be able to find a plausible causative mechanism.
The classical argument of the eocnomic right is that innovation is spurred by less social democratic policies and the possibility of greater wealth in a more unequal system. This argument presumes that “clout” would increase not because of population growth, but because of increases in GDP per person. You would need to formulate entirely new arguments about social democracy in order to argue that they somehow inhibit population growth.
— DivGuy · Jan 8, 08:57 PM · #
You summarize Chait’s objection as follows:
“2. The statistical analysis that supports the conclusion that Europe lost massive global GDP share and the U.S. did not over the past several decades is flawed.”
But that’s not his argument at all!
The paragraph in which you offer the argument regarding “America’s share of global output” concludes the following:
“Opting for social democracy instead of innovative capitalism, Europe has ceded this share to China (predominantly), India, and the rest of the developing world. The economic rise of the Asian heartland is the central geopolitical fact of our era, and it is safe to assume that economic and strategic competition will only increase further over the next several decades.”
Though you don’t say it explicitly, you argue by implication that the US has managed to avoid “ceding share” to Asia because our economic practices are more like those of Asia.
Chait and The Economist are simply pointing out that your conclusion does not follow from your “statistical analysis”. That’s because (a) the Europe you used in your analysis can’t fairly be described as “social democratic”; (b) the time frames you selected for your analysis are inconsistent and tilt the result towards your argument. Furthermore, when your numbers are corrected for these two issues, the differences in GDP share can then be seen to be due to differences in the rate of population increase.
With all respect — you’ve not replied to that criticism in any of your responses.
And though your mothers may finally have lost interest in this, I have not! This is an excellent debate that can bear fruit, I think, if you will engage the criticism directly.
— AndyS · Jan 8, 09:50 PM · #
Here’s the rub, as I see it: Chait is right that Manzi has turned the essay into something it is not (by introducing new metrics for economic output); at the same time, Manzi is right that Chait has turned the essay into something it is not (by turning an aside into Manzi’s central claim). The essay, in short, has become something it is not.
Chait, rejecting the assumption that social cohesion and growth are necessarily at odds, is not prepared to accept — or, for that matter, even consider — the central claim of the essay, which is, as Manzi now explains, that “the advantages that less regulated markets can provide . . . does not lead to the conclusion that we can or should continue on the deregulation-oriented path on which we find ourselves without considering the balancing consideration of social cohesion.”
If the assumption that wealth distribution inhibits economic growth is wrong, the main claim of Manzi’s essay — social cohesion and innovation must be balanced — is essentially irrelevant. Chait is right about that much.
At the same time, Manzi never intended to provide an empirical demonstration that “less regulated markets tend to provide faster economic growth under many conditions than more regulated markets.” Chait turns an aside — Manzi’s comparison of the American and European economies — into the the essay’s central premise.
Chait’s critique of Manzi’s revisionism nevertheless holds true. Manzi may not have intended to establish his premise that wealth redistribution inhibits growth. Yet, if he is unable to making a convincing case for this position when challenged, the essay falls apart.
Here’s why: Manzi cannot his measurement of economic output from per capita GDP to the total size of an economy without, at the same time, shifting the question of values at stake. Liberals and conservatives alike agree that economic growth is necessary and desirable. But “latent capacity for cultural and military power” (as measured by the total size of an economy) is a different matter altogether. If that is the more significant measurement of economic output, the real challenge for America is not to balance social cohesion and economic growth; America’s challenge is, rather, to balance social cohesion and imperialism.
Is Manzi prepared to make that argument?
I have written about the values question (which everyone seems to be ignoring) in more detail at The Innocent Smith Journal:
http://innocentsmithjournal.wordpress.com/2010/01/07/jonathan-chait-victor/
— Innocent Smith · Jan 8, 10:07 PM · #
Dr. Manzi, I think divguy’s comment accurately characterizes where the debate stands as of today.
I can see yours and Chait’s energy for this debate flagging. Understandable, but too bad. It’s the most substantive, meaningful Internet back and forth I’ve seen, probably ever. If you’re done and ready to move on, then I’ll just say it’s been a pleasure to read and I’ll continue to digest it for a while.
— Troy · Jan 8, 10:09 PM · #
Jim,
Very stimulating article in NA!
I don’t know if government direction of resources is more or less efficient than the market. But in the final analysis what seems unarguable is this: holding the balance of trade constant, if the public wants to net save (financial assets) as a sector, the government has to run a deficit—right? I don’t see this as a question of who is better at allocating what. Or about European-style social democracy. It’s just a function of our monetary system. And the newly acquired desire of the American people to repair their balance sheets.
???
— vimothy · Jan 8, 11:04 PM · #
Furthermore, it seems to me that continuous substantial deficits (sufficient to ensure full-employment however defined and effectively managed) would have the following positive side-effects:
1, Effective wealth redistribution at low economic cost;
2, Facilitation of a decent non-government sector net financial asset position (i.e. the people can save more as an aggregate unit rather than just as individuals).
3, Economy at capacity and full-employment.
Or maybe I’m just confused. Feeling pretty confused at the moment. Now, you’re probably saying—“effectively managed”, that’ll be the day. But shouldn’t we at least aim for what we know we ought to do?
— vimothy · Jan 8, 11:19 PM · #
Hmm, reading the comments and the boiled-dry version of your essay, perhaps I’m just rambling irrelevant nonsense. Confused: yes, I may have mentioned. So it’s not regulation per se, but it relates to the “Europe” theme: there has to be a role for the government, doesn’t there, to solve this very basic problem? And, if these resources are indeed idle, government allocation cannot be said to be less efficient—can it?
— vimothy · Jan 8, 11:33 PM · #
A few people have said basically what Innocent Smith says above, namely:
If the assumption that wealth distribution inhibits economic growth is wrong, the main claim of Manzi’s essay — social cohesion and innovation must be balanced — is essentially irrelevant.
No it’s not! Even if the assumption is wrong, lots and lots and lots of people believe it is right – and you are not going to convince them otherwise. What Manzi does in this essay is to say that EVEN IF IT IS RIGHT, that STILL does not mean that you can ignore the importance of cohesion while you obsessively chase after deregulated growth. He is saying you must ACCEPT some impairment of growth because the nation needs both economic health and social cohesion to survive.
Honestly I don’t know why this seems to be so hard for people to absorb. He’s said it several times. If you continue to ignore that, it seems to say less about his argument than about the ideological blinders you are wearing that prohibit you from realizing you might have common ground with someone with whom you generally disagree.
If you go so far as to accuse him of intellectual dishonesty even while he puts his thoughts and analysis out there for everyone to examine and argue with, and even while he civilly and patiently engages with his audience, you must just harbor some sort of anger issues that you ought to resolve on a different blog.
— andrew · Jan 8, 11:39 PM · #
Andy S:
Glad you’re stiull interested (ma, not so much).
You say that:
Not precisely. I asserted that US policies were unlike europe’s in ways that I asserted were important for growth. I didn’t draw any comparisons with Asia.
And I am agreeing with them, and pointing out that such a demonstration was not the purpose of the piece, nor did the piece assert that it intended to do this.
— Jim Manzi · Jan 9, 12:01 AM · #
vimothy:
It all depends on the size of the deficit. At 2% of GDP, you can run it basically forever, ebcause even in a mature economy you can grow the economy and cover the tax burden it creates. Much past that, and you create a snowballing debt that eventually consumes the country.
— Jim Manzi · Jan 9, 12:09 AM · #
Innocent Smith:
Yes. It was outside the editorial scope of Yuvals’ magazine, but I agree that this is a crucial issue, and one that the current political proces is not dealing with. The foreign policy element of my recommendations is “Avoid Empire”. I intend to get into this much more in the book, and hopefully in an article before the book comes out.
— Jim Manzi · Jan 9, 12:12 AM · #
@ DivGuy, re population growth.
I’m inclined to agree. Education and high literacy rates also have something to do with it (see Japan). My point was narrower: that GDP per capita is meaningless when discussing geopolitical influence, and yet both Yglesias and Chait revert to it. In another discussion, that might be okay. In this one, though, the substitution of GDP per capita for global output share is inappropriate precisely because GDP per capita has no impact on clout.
Me, I’d be tickled to hear Yglesias and Chait say that clout — power, prestige, indispensability — should be one of our primary objectives.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 9, 12:22 AM · #
Troy / divguy:
(Longer version of this eaten by TAS comments editor)
I do not accept that this premise needs to be proven to be correct within this article for the piece to have merit (as per andrew’s comment).
I did not implicitly accept that it needed to be shown in this article, nor did I attempt to do it in this article, nor did the article claim to do this.
I don not accept that roguhly equal GDP epr capita growht between wetsern Europe and the US demonstrates that US policies did not cause greater growth in the US than would have occured had the US implemented more social market policies. We do not know the counterfactual – European per capita GDP gorwth was, for example, broadly higher than that of the US from 1950 – 1980.
— Jim Manzi · Jan 9, 12:36 AM · #
Here’s one place where I might disagree with Jim (out of a few). I think growth will happen anyway, regardless of the governing philosophy of those in power. Or rather, growth will happen anyway in the long term; in the short term, sure, philosophies might determine slope and inflection points. But just as sure as the sun will rise tomorrow, when this happens — when the growth becomes negative and our global shadow shrinks — the American people will be chomping at the bit to line up at the polls and throw the bums out. Add in The Logic of Political Survival, and I’m pretty sure everything’s going to be okay: we’ll random walk our asses to success in a more or less cohesive state, unless something really and awfully human happens to us or the world.
Now, I agree with Jim when he says it’d be nice to find a nice smooth function to indefinite growth, rather than suffer through the brute-force search algorithm we’re using now. Finding an elegant rule set to accomplish this should be high on everyone’s list.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jan 9, 12:46 AM · #
Jim,
Thanks for responding.
It all depends on the size of the deficit. At 2% of GDP, you can run it basically forever, because even in a mature economy you can grow the economy and cover the tax burden it creates. Much past that, and you create a snowballing debt that eventually consumes the country.
Remembering of course that the deficit is a flow and not a stock (like the national debt), I thought that the size of the deficit depends on the size of the private sector surplus, and that is determined by the private sector’s desire to net save (financial assets). So that if the two aren’t equal (holding the foreign sector constant for simplicity), there isn’t sufficient aggregate demand to meet aggregate supply at current prices and the economy is below capacity and labour underutilised.
If this is correct, what the deficit really depends on then is the desire of the public sector not to spend all of its income, if we don’t want output to fall and resources to be idle. Furthermore, since attempts to increase savings on aggregate are recessionary, the attempt itself draws down savings and takes the public further from their desired savings rates. This has negative feed-back or self-reinforcing effects in the economy.
So assuming that you could do this reasonably successfully—running deficits when the public net saves and surpluses when it net spends such that the economy was at generally at capacity with full employment—the only real reason not to do so, given the positive social implications of full employment and the fact that the resources are idle anyway, is the national debt. Is that correct?
Sorry—I’m aware that this is probably slightly tangential to the rest of the discussion on the thread…
— vimothy · Jan 9, 01:22 AM · #
Mr Manzi continues to ask for every part of the commonwealth to make sacrifice except for the bloated, corrupt, and financially outrageous (by worldwide standards) budget of the Dept of Defense. If efficiency and common sense are required by all other elements of society, let’s start with closing bases in Japan and Germany. I think we won that war in 1945! Having and sensibly controlling a military budget in line with our resources is long overdue. Even that peacenik Ike Eisenhower thought so.
— theod · Jan 9, 01:33 AM · #
Jim, thanks for the reply! I look forward to reading your article and book.
— Innocent Smith · Jan 9, 04:33 AM · #
“it is safe to assume that economic and strategic competition will only increase further over the next several decades”
how would you respond to tyler cowen then, who sez:
— glory · Jan 9, 07:03 AM · #
glory:
As per the quote from the article in this post, Tyler’s economist’s view of the world neglects the idea that societies are capable of organized violence. As an illustration, change “china” in that quote to “Nazi Germany” (NOT that I am in any way comparing China to Nazi Germany, but I am using an extreme example to illustrate that we can not assume that every country will play by the rules of commerical competition as we want to define them).
— Jim Manzi · Jan 9, 09:23 AM · #
um, so it’s not safe to assume that “strategic competition will only increase further over the next several decades,” and, i would argue, as does cowen, that ‘economic competition’ is not worth getting too exercised over and, indeed, that it should be encouraged…
— glory · Jan 9, 03:25 PM · #
“As per the quote from the article in this post, Tyler’s economist’s view of the world neglects the idea that societies are capable of organized violence”
This is just all to vauge. Why would and how could China, for instance, use it’s military against us? I don’t think you are suggesting invasion, and nuclear war is out, so what are talking about? Pretend in the future China has a bigger military than we do, so how are they going to use it to hurt us? Embargo, blockade, proxy war…? And to what point?
— cw · Jan 10, 04:42 AM · #
You called the article “Keeping America’s Edge.” If there is no edge, then what the hell could the article possibly be about?
Krugman has your number on this, I think. It’s pretty obvious that you’re not prepared to examine this claim with anything but immediate and unquestioning faith. Thirty comments later and you’re playing incomprehensible word-substitution games instead of addressing a matter of fact on which you based your entire article (the title, even!).
— Chet · Jan 10, 05:45 AM · #