War As Culture War
I think Daniel Larison’s reflections on Dan Drezner’s despair of the condition of foreign policy debate within the GOP need to be understood in the light of Thomas Edsall’s reporting that the Obama campaign is basically resigned to the fact that they will be running against a party following some version of the Sailer Strategy, and is accordingly planning a campaign based on the demographic groups left out of a Sailer Strategy coalition.
That is to say: foreign policy, at least on the GOP side, is now basically a branch of the culture war: a way of convincing the white working class to support a party that is not pursuing their economic interests by flattering them with the implication that, in the memorable words of Edward Wilson, they’ve got he United States of America. The rest of you are just visiting.
Before World War II, foreign policy divisions frequently obtained intra-party as much or more than between the parties, and real divisions in economic interests: between slave states and free; between predominantly industrial and predominantly agricultural states; between groups heavily exposed to international trade and finance and groups less exposed. That’s not to say that ethnic politics – the aversion of Irish immigrants and their descendents for alliance with Britain; the aversion of German immigrants and their descendents for war with Germany – or ideological currents had no bearing on foreign policy debate by any means. But there was foreign policy debate – and it was to a considerable extent based on different conceptions of interest.
Larison says that foreign policy was particularly important to Cold War elections, and that therefore this period was abnormal, but that view should be qualified because with the advent of the Cold War, big-picture foreign policy debate largely ceased. There was an overwhelming bi-partisan ideological consensus in favor of the basic architecture of containment. No major party candidate ever fundamentally repudiated it, and the two major party candidates who deviated most meaningfully from that consensus – Goldwater and McGovern – suffered the most lopsided defeats of the period. In virtually every election, voters either punished manifest incompetence (1968, 1980) or opted for responsible stewardship of the consensus (1952, 1956, 1964, 1972, 1984, 1988). The two exceptions were both close elections, where the question of responsible stewardship was at least somewhat muddled, and only in one of those (1960) was the plainly more bellicose candidate preferred.
I’m not suggesting that during the Cold War foreign policy actually drove elections. I don’t think it did anything of the kind. I’m also not suggesting there was no debate at all – particularly intra-party debate – about which direction to nudge that consensus. Certainly, 1968 and 1972 on the Democratic side, 1976 and 1980 on the Republican side, represented, among other things, intra-party debate about just such a push. But that’s what we’re talking about: a nudge, moving the consensus a bit this way or that, not a repudiation of that consensus. And in the general election, Cold War politics did not feature debate but rather imposed a one-dimensional “fitness test” on candidates with respect to foreign policy. And all this represents a significant change from the pre-war terms of foreign policy debate – a narrowing thereof.
Foreign policy was largely irrelevant to the elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000. No longer was a “fitness test” for stewardship imposed, but neither was there any meaningful debate over the direction of foreign policy, either between or within the parties.
It’s in the last two elections that the trend of foreign policy being treated as part of the culture war – at least by the GOP – has become dominant. Mitt Romney is the exemplar in this regard; his entire foreign policy argument consists of saying that he knows America is exceptional and President Obama does not, and that Obama has been making too many concessions to America’s enemies (without any clear explanation of what those concessions might be). Obama has been a somewhat more belligerent steward of America’s existing posture than I anticipated (I fully expected the escalation in Afghanistan and the tough line on Pakistan, since he ran on both, but the Libyan war came as a modest surprise), but otherwise he’s been pretty much exactly what I expected him to be: a competent and fairly successful steward of America’s position as he inherited it. America has suffered no meaningful foreign policy setbacks during his tenure, and has had some notable successes. The contrast to the economic situation could not be more stark. Why on earth would anyone on the other side spend their time demagoguing on foreign policy? Why would anyone on the other side respond to such demagoguery? That’s not what the Democrats did in 1992, either in the primaries or in the general election.
The reason has everything to do with the culture war. Identity politics on the GOP side of the aisle involves stoking an emotional identification between their core demographic groups, the Republican Party, and the national identity. The white working class is the backbone of the American military. Stoking an identification between the white working class and the military, and between the military and national purpose, provides the emotional fuel for political mobilization. It imbues identity with purpose and connects that purpose to politics.
I expect this dynamic to continue. If Thomas Edsall is correct, both parties have now committed to their respective demographic “sorts” of the electorate. The GOP will be the party of the white working class and of the wealthy. The Democrats will be the party of the professional classes and non-whites of all classes. In a competitive political environment, the median voter theorem should hold true most of the time – which means that neither party can plausibly win a durable majority regardless of its demographic coalition. So the important thing about the sort is what kind of leverage coalition members have within each party to press their group’s interests. A highly successful sort based on identity, which makes it emotionally difficult for demographic groups to shift allegiances, drastically reduces those groups’ leverage. To the very extent that the GOP is able to cement white working class identification of themselves with the “real” America, and both with the GOP, to that same extent the white working class will have surrendered its interests.
It’s seemed to me that for the last several elections (at least W-Clinton,, Kerry-W, Obama-W, and GOP challenger to be named shortly-Obama), campaign level foreign policy was basically “whatever I imagine the incumbent did is wrong, and I will do the opposite, like George did that day he got hired by the Yankees.”
So Obama kicks W for being too unilateral, and for being soft on China and middle east dictators, and for not working hard enough on Israel-Palestine. And all of these accusations are meaningful from one angle but misrepresentative from another.
I think you’re right that there’s a strong signalling component to the early statements. Obama’s statement that unlike W, he would directly negotiate with Iran didn’t mean that Obama would actually directly negotiate with Iran or even that W wouldn’t, it meant that Obama wanted to signal a commitment to the healing power of discussion to smooth things over with our worst enemies.
— J Mann · Nov 29, 08:59 PM · #
Well, yes, the GOP’s foreign policy, to the extent such a thing exists, is about identity politics.
But that’s only because allegiance to the GOP is entirely about identity politics.
On domestic policy, the Bush administration gave us Medicare Part D, No Child Left Behind, the executive’s asserted power to wiretap and to detain & torture US citizens without charges or a warrant, surpluses turned into deficits, and Raich v Gonzales.
It’s not exactly a small-government, states-rights record. But Republicans applauded as loud as they could all throughout— as Bush left office, he had a 28% approval rating from independents, and a 75% rating from Republicans. (“Strong Republicans” and “conservative Republicans” liked Pres. Bush even more).
Now a Democrat is president. So ideas that Republicans supported up until a few weeks before the Dems tried to agree with them— most famously the health insurance mandate, but also Keynesian stimulus, cap and trade, Section 8 housing vouchers, etc.— they now reject, unanimously and ferociously, as unconstitutional tyranny. See: www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_06/024459.php
This is because Republicans don’t have views on policy; they just have a team that they like to root for.
— reflectionephemeral · Dec 1, 12:36 AM · #
Military jobs are among the best jobs available to men with IQs in the 92-108 range (the military almost never allows people with IQs in the bottom 30 percent to enlist). They come with pensions. medical care and good Department of Defense schools for your kids with few underclass kids in them. And they get you affirmative action points for applying for government jobs.
If you don’t want Americans between the 30th and 70th percentiles in IQ (i.e., the heart of the nation) to support an activist foreign policy, then figure out some other jobs where they can make enough to raise a family with dignity.
— Steve Sailer · Dec 2, 01:39 AM · #
Steve:
1. Agreed.
2. On the other hand, that seems like a reason the “heart of the nation” would want a large military. Not necessarily a reason to use it quite so promiscuously.
3. In particular, during wartime military service puts enormous strain on families. That has to be weighed in the “best job” balance.
— Noah Millman · Dec 2, 03:48 AM · #
Demographic groups do not vote as a bloc. This is one of the most annoying fallacies of political punditry. Even if a majority of white working class voters vote Republican, it doesn’t mean they all do. Margins matter—in the Deep South it makes a big difference whether 10% or 30% of white voters vote Democratic, even though it both cases people will talk as if every last one of them votes Republican. Even the miniscule numbers of black Republicans can occasionally make a difference.
— will · Dec 2, 06:38 PM · #
do any conservatives in the Douthat mold still exist on this site or have they all been assimilated into the squish borg
— JDP · Dec 3, 07:38 AM · #
wallah.
I always suspected Steve Sailer was math-challenged. I’m afraid the Sailer Strategy, much like the Southern Strategy, has run its course, because of the demographic timer. The GOP base is all white (non-hispanic caucasian), and there are fewer whites in the electorate every year.
Remember the internet meme of the jesusland map? I told Dr. Manzi that his liberty-as-means libertarianism is just localized mob rule— or as i put it…Distributed Jesusland.
The map of Distributed Jesusland looks just like the old Jesusland map, minus the cities.
Michael Medveds 2010 article states that the GOP 2012 candidate will need an impossible 65% of the white vote to beat Obama if minorities vote in the same percentages as 2008. Even St. Reagan only got 60% at the top of his game.
Plus the GOP field is deeply flawed. WECs make up 50% of the base, up from 40% in 2008.
Will ALL white christian evangelicals really vote lockstep for a mormon?
Pew says they will, but im doubtful. I remember the full page add the evangelical pastors took out in 2008 when McCain was considering Romney for his VP.
lol, what if Romney had been the VP? He’d be a sure nomination at this point i think.
IMHO the GOP can not win a general election in its current ideological position…forever defeat.
Because, like Nate Silver always says— demographics is destiny.
have a nice day.
:)
— matoko_chan · Dec 6, 03:04 PM · #
matoko_chan, the trend in recent years has been toward the GOP taking higher and higher percentages of the white vote. Even McCain got impressive percentages of it with a lousy economy. They won a presidential election in 2004 and made huge congressional gains in 2010 (because of the economy). If the economy is terrible, they’ll win in 2012. But if you’re really certain, load up on Obama re-election contracts at InTrade.
— TGGP · Dec 7, 03:53 AM · #
The trend is also for the white share of electorate to shrink while the minority share of the electorate grows.
i havent noticed Obama’s shared of the black vote or brown vote falling off. Have you?
Medved 2010.
“Consider the historic campaign of 2008, when President Barack Obama bested John McCain by a solid margin of 7.2 percentage points. According to the authoritative exit polls, the vast majority of voters (74 percent) identified themselves as “white,” and McCain won a landslide among this segment of the electorate, thrashing Obama by a resounding 12 points (55 percent to 43 percent). This was the same margin that George W. Bush commanded among white voters in his 2000 victory over Al Gore. In fact, because of the larger electorate, McCain’s losing effort actually drew 9.5 million more votes overall than Bush’s victorious campaign of eight years before.
Why, then, did Bush win the White House while McCain suffered humiliating defeat? The answer is that in eight years the nonwhite portion of electorate soared — from 19 percent of voters to 26 percent of voters. Among these voters, Obama won by a 4-to-1 margin — easily wiping out McCain’s big advantage among white voters.
For two reasons, these numbers command close attention for anyone concerned about the Republican future.
First, there is no chance that white voters will ever again comprise 74 percent of the electorate. Most projections for 2012 suggest that self-identified whites will comprise 70 percent or, at most, 72 percent of those who cast presidential ballots.
Second, it would be hard for any Republican to improve significantly on McCain’s hefty 12-point margin among whites, which means that without an improved showing among Hispanics, blacks and Asians, GOP contenders will lose every time.
The math here is brutal and eye-opening. If Obama in 2012 wins the same percentage of the combined black, Asian and Hispanic vote that he won in 2008 (82 percent), then in order to beat him the GOP candidate would need to win an unimaginable 65 percent of all white voters — whose numbers include such stalwart Democratic constituencies as gays, atheists, Jews and union members.
The 65 percent threshold represents a far higher percentage than Ronald Reagan won in his landslide against Jimmy Carter in 1980, or even his history-making 49-state re-election-sweep against Walter Mondale in ’84.”
now couple that with the Mormon Factor.
— matoko_chan · Dec 7, 07:57 AM · #
TGGP:
“They won a presidential election in 2004 and made huge congressional gains in 2010” Bush barely squeaked out a wartime president victory of 35 ec votes in 2004. Obama won by a margin of 192 ec votes in the same economy.
I live in Colorado. Why did the red wave turn to beach break in Colorado? Because of the Front Range cities.
Like I said, Distributed Jesusland can only win local elections anymore.
— matoko_chan · Dec 7, 08:03 AM · #
Its a puzzlement…..im pretty sure razib read Maynard-Smith, because we read it at the same time.
I think Islam is an EGT uninvadable CSS. I know razib had trouble with the appendices— would it help if i explained it to him, do you think?
— matoko_chan · Dec 8, 01:43 AM · #