You Can Talk All You Want To But It's Different Than It Was (No It Ain't, No It Ain't - But You Gotta Know The Territory)
I’ve been meaning to ask this question of Matt Yglesias and other Obama advocates who see his big appeal as being a “new beginning” in foreign policy. The question: what is the historical model for Obama’s “meet with Iran/North Korea/Cuba/Venezuela without preconditions?”
As I wrote in an earlier post, I think there’s a fundamental problem with the most readily available historical precedents. To whit: unipolar moments are rare in human history, and we are still, in spite of relative decline, in a unipolar moment, with America the overwhelmingly predominant power. This deforms any diplomacy we might engage in, even if we honestly come to the table trying to negotiate a “win-win” scenario with an erstwhile adversary.
I wanted to look at Iran specifically and ask: what’s the historical model that we’d be following if Obama did, some time in the spring of 2009, announce that he was ready to meet with the Iranian President without preconditions? The favored historical analogy for opponents of an overture to Iran is Chamberlain in Munich. I agree that this analogy is ludicrous. So: what’s the analogy that proponents prefer?
I’ve thought of three models for such an initiative to Iran, which I’ll identify by three different possible precedents:
- Nixon goes to China – Sadat goes to Jerusalem – Reagan goes to Reykjavik
1. Nixon goes to China. This is the most obviously inapplicable precedent, which is why I’ve put it first. As we use the phrase nowadays, when we say someone can pull a “Nixon goes to China” we mean that because of his credibility on some issue, he could seriously challenge the consensus view on that issue. So: McCain could engage with Iran, and that would be a “Nixon goes to China” moment. (And, as an aside, I don’t think it’s impossible that he could or would do that – he has a history of making friends with people who should be his enemies, just as he has a history of making enemies of people who should be his friends – but I don’t expect it nor do I think people should vote for him in the hopes of such an outcome.) But why did Nixon go to China? To outflank the Soviets and the Vietnamese. What, by analogy, could an Obama Administration seek to achieve by engaging the Iranians? If we “turned” them – who would we be turning them against?
The obvious answer is: the Sunni Arab world. Iran’s ambitions to be a regional power are probably fatally hamstrung by the fact that it is a Shiite power and a non-Arab power. America was attacked on 9-11 by Sunni Arab extremists. Its existing Sunni allies are essentially worthless. Why not try to turn Iran? The palpable yearning in some circles (Michael Ledeen is the premier example) for a friendly (post-regime-change) Iran derives from the fact that it would allow such a clarifying realignment. Why wait?
The problem is that Iran has no incentive to take the part assigned. There is no threat to Iran comparable to the Soviet threat to China. Al Qaeda is an enemy of the Iranian regime, but not obviously a grave threat to it. Even if we assume that the Iranian leadership was entirely pragmatic, the analogy fails. We can’t “turn” Iran because there is no common enemy for us to unite against.
Moreover, our efforts to isolate and eliminate al Qaeda depend on working with Sunni Arab and non-Arab Sunni-dominated countries like Pakistan. It would not escape any of these that warming relations between American and Iran would weaken their positions. Specifically: it would weaken their positions as they attempt to manipulate U.S. foreign policy towards policy outcomes they favor. They would, therefore, have a considerable incentive to make it difficult for us to achieve such a warming of relations. So neither side of the analogy works: Iran won’t want to join up with us against a common enemy, and the plausible common enemies are currently quasi-allies who we don’t really want to turn against.
2. Sadat goes to Jerusalem. After the 1973 war, Sadat made the strategic decision to abandon his alliance with the Soviet Union, and switch sides to ally with the United States. That necessitated some kind of rapprochement with Israel. Sadat, in fact, saw substantial potential benefits to Egypt from such a rapprochement, independent of the American connection, because he saw that Egypt’s Pan-Arab Nationalist ambitions were never going to be realized, and in the absence of such ambitions it could achieve its baseline strategic goals – return of the Sinai and security for the Suez canal – by making peace with Israel. The move required substantial ideological readjustment on the part of the Egyptian state, but Sadat was, for a time, in a strong enough position to turn the ship and, indeed, achieved all his hoped-for goals for Egypt (not for the Palestinians, however) at the peace talks with Begin.
Is there an analogy here to America and Iran? In one sense, clearly not. Sadat’s move made sense in the context of a larger global struggle in which he had an incentive to choose sides. America is far too dominant in the international system for there to be any real analogy. We can’t plausibly switch sides at all; everyone else defines their own positioning vis-a-vis where we are, not the other way around.
But in another sense, perhaps there is an analogy. Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem was not the beginning of an era of engagement; it was an end of an era of engagement. It relegated Egypt to the status of a bystander in Arab politics for a generation. Israel took advantage of the peace with Egypt to pursue a more aggressive policy against the PLO in Lebanon; Egypt condemned the Lebanon war but never contemplated taking action. In like fashion, I suspect that an overture to Iran would signal to the Arab world that America had no interest in being a serious player in the region, and they would presumably adjust their own foreign policies accordingly. That might be a good thing, mind you! But it’s not usually the way a policy of engagement with Iran is sold.
3. Reagan goes to Reykjavik. This is, in some ways, the most potent analogy, since it’s still unclear what Reagan’s objectives were at Reykjavik. What is clear is: Reagan offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons, Gorbachev agreed on condition that America also abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative, and Reagan refused the condition.
We can debate whether Reagan knew what he was doing. But, intentionally or not, he significantly transformed the nature of the Soviet-American standoff with this meeting. For one thing, the offer made it clear that America was in no meaningful sense committed to endless confrontation, or to “defeating” the Soviet Union. And, arguably more important, Gorbachev’s willingness to entertain the offer made it clear that the Soviets were also not so committed. There was ample room for continued distrust – did America plan to keep S.D.I. because it was secretly planning a first strike against the motherland? Were the Soviets so eager to kill S.D.I. because they were secretly planning to invade Turkey/Pakistan/West Germany/who knows? – but notwithstanding this, a fundamental change in the terms of confrontation had been inaugurated, and this change developed its own momentum over the succeeding half-decade.
The Reykjavik summit might appear to present a different Reagan from the one who said, “Mr. Gorbachev: tear down this wall!” but, in fact, they are entirely congruent. The common assumption behind both the offer at Reykjavik and the call in Berlin was that the Soviet leader could meaningfully change the terms of U.S.-Soviet relations by radical actions, actions that could be reciprocated.
Of course, as it turned out, confrontation with the United States was an important pillar of legitimacy for the Soviet system. Once the wall fell, the Soviet Union itself fell soon after. If Obama were to go to Tehran and say, on the one hand, we are ready to end our confrontation, open our markets, etc., etc., but on the other hand challenge the Iranian regime to “tear off this veil” (or whatever), the Iranian regime will react in a way that is cognizant of their own vulnerability, internally. It does not serve the regime’s interests to have an all-out confrontation with the United States. But it probably also doesn’t serve the regime’s interests to have Americans going around saying that we are eager to embrace them if only they will abandon certain policies that their own people don’t want to go to battle for (the Iranian nuclear program is very popular domestically, but how many Iranians are interested in ostracism or worse for the sake of continuing to support Hezbollah?). So the real question about this analogy is: is there an Iranian Gorbachev, a leader naive enough to believe that the system he leads could readily survive the retirement of its principal antagonist?
But the bigger problem with this analogy is probably timing. Reagan approached Gorbachev during a period when American power and prestige was ascendant, and Soviet power and prestige in absolute decline. The American economy had recovered dramatically from the late 1970s; the Soviet economy was plagued by historically low oil and gas prices on top of the usual problems of a command and control economy. The American military had been substantially upgraded after years of higher defense spending, and a decade after the end of the Vietnam War was not actively engaged anywhere on the globe; the Soviet military had been bogged down for years in Afghanistan and was suffering from severe problems of insufficient or degraded equipment. Nixon went to China at a low ebb for America, but the context of that rapprochement doesn’t have a good analogy in Iran. Reagan went to Reykjavik under opposite circumstances – but those circumstances don’t obtain today, when oil prices are at historic highs (which has done wonders for the Iranian treasury), and when America is bogged down in an open-ended military commitment. That difference in context would make all the difference in any grand gesture that might be made.
Best. Title. Ever.
— John · May 22, 12:50 AM · #
So, you’re kidding, right?
Iran is, at best, a second rate power. You are comparing it to Russia, China, and Israel with it’s erstwhile enemy. None of these apply.
I think it’s more like Libya (caved on nukes) or North Korea (likely, caving on nukes even though they actually have them). These are more likely the analogies.
But, Munich? Give me a break. Germany was truly a world power, with military strength to back up its bravado. This is not Iran.
Stop, please.
— Peter Schmitz · May 22, 03:58 AM · #
Why does there have to be a model? I would think that most successful diplomatic moves are made via good judgement, not by pattern-matching.
Incidentally, “Nixon goes to China” might be a more apt comparison for Obama eventually taking a tough line with Iran, and doing so with much more legitimacy than is possible for a Republican right now. I tend to think that agreeing to meet will be part of building legitimacy, and there may well be honest, mutual issues of concern, though I would hardly be surprised by a lot of maneuvering. Also though, part of the hope of negotiations is that Iran either gets cornered into making concessions it doesn’t want to, or at least makes a big fool of itself.
I can easily believe that Bush and friends would not be up to the task, but a skillful diplomatic effort could do good things, especially in terms of public attitudes in the Middle East.
— Mike · May 22, 08:45 AM · #
Peter, Mike, you can abandon the historical analogy altogether (I think eventually you have to abandon it, since no two situations are identical), but then you are on your own.
In your opinions, what would Obama offer Achmedinijad (or his replacement if he’s not there), and with what conditions, how would Achmedinijad respond, and why?
The first thing Obama is giving, I suppose, is a break in the international campaign of ostracism that we and Europe have been running for the past several years, which will grant Achmedinijad some additional PR and will encourage Europe and Asia to engage Iran more closely. (There is some possibility that Obama will pull a Bollinger and use the occasion solely to insult and mock Achmedinijad, but I don’t think that’s his style. Nevertheless, if you think he will, feel free to create your own model from that.)
— J Mann · May 22, 01:07 PM · #
Peter,
Did you actually read what Noah says about the Munich analogy? Do you need to look up “ludicrous?”
— Matt Frost · May 22, 01:21 PM · #
Noah, an excellent post. I would say that the Sadat Model is the best and that it does indeed underscore the somewhat dubious arguments upon which engagement is being sold. Your emphasis on the primary importance of America’s massive power advantage is absolutely right, and the key analytical tool for understanding possible diplomatic solutions. We have more power than the world has ever seen. We can either claim all the influence that such power can buy, with a military presence in the middle east and attendant concerns with the politics of the region, or we can unilaterally restrain our goals and ambitions.
If we choose the former, no deal is likely to happen. An America out of everyone’s face, military power off-shore, and with a hands-off diplomatic posture is likely to be the key condition for any deal in the region, with either Syria or Iran. This is the most important interest that all countries in the region have, whether they have ambitions or merely seek security.
This is why your Sadat analogy is apposite. If we seek to satisfy only our baseline goals (minimal chaos in Iraq, no proliferation, minimal harassment of Israel) and then stand back, there is a possibility that a deal could be made. After all, minimal chaos in iraq is probably in everyone’s interest, while proliferation is expensive and hard to do, and comes with all these international costs. Our position on Israel is a sticking point, but one could imagine an Obama administration moving enough on the issue to at least give domestic political cover for a deal.
But American restraint is a key part of the bargain, and if an Obama administration comes in preaching the Gospel of “liberal internationalism” (read: imperialism through international institutions, when possible) the Iranians and others will not be impressed. That is the fundamental problem with the arguments being made in favor of engagement: the liberal vision is for a highly institutionalized world where the use of American power to manage security problems has been somehow legitimized. Broad deals occur within this framework, we agree to consult with everyone, and all parties agree to let American power be the engine of solving common problems. But the institutions are largely a facade, the common problems are subject to divergent interpretations, and the locals understand that American power is not so easily harnessed. Minor deals might occur under any administration willing to negotiate, but any grand bargain will have to put the primary interest of our interlocutors on the table: American retrenchment.
— Brendan Green · May 22, 04:51 PM · #
Good post. I thought your Gorbachev analogy was interesting, but I think your characterization of the Iranian regime’s conception of their own legitimacy is too monolithic. Hardliners like Ahmadinejad might rely on an oppositional framework to maintain their legitimacy as popular nationalists, but that’s hardly the only strain of thought within Iran’s leadership. I think it’s a fair bet that there are moderate Iranian politicians who believe the system’s legitimacy should derive from good policy-making and genuine popular approval rather than a dangerous series of confrontations with a more powerful foreign enemy. Given Iran’s pervasive state of domestic unrest, I’m not sure if this proposition is altogether naive, either.
— Will · May 22, 06:27 PM · #
I can think of two exceptions that make Yglesias’s case: Cuba and North Korea. Decades of preconditions have failed to resolve the impass with Cuba; the result is the perpetuation of the status quo with no benefit. In North Korea, talks without preconditions created a situation of some mutual benefit — which the Bush Administration then abrogated and withdrew. The result of holding no talks until preconditions were met was a successful nuclear weapons test; after dropping preconditions, negotiations yielded a return to the status quo from the Bush Administration’s previous withdrawal.
If there is no direct precedent for the model, there are two, within living memory, for why its opposite does not work.
— James F. Elliott · May 22, 07:55 PM · #
James: presumably there are not only two alternative policies available in the world. I’m asking advocates of engagement to explain what their model is for engagement. So far, Brendan’s the only one who answered the question (and that includes Yglesias, who punted by pointing out – as I did in my original post – that unipolarity is rare enough that it makes analogies to the past very difficult).
I’m not sure there would be any downside to unilaterally dropping our confrontational posture vis-a-vis Cuba – i.e., not even bothering to negotiate an end to the embargo, just ending it. By contrast, in North Korea I’m not convinced we have any especially good options. The Agreed Framework didn’t really work. The Bush policy of confrontation has been a fiasco. Preemptive military action (which has been seriously discussed) would pretty much destroy our position in Asia, on top of being a humanitarian catastrophe. But it’s not clear that we have anything to offer North Korea’s leadership that they want, nor that we have any realistic mechanism for ensuring compliance with any agreement they might enter into with us. The situation in Korea is basically hopeless. So we just have to hope it’s not serious.
Iran is a much more interesting case than either Cuba or North Korea, which is why I focused on it in my original post.
— Noah Millman · May 22, 08:32 PM · #
“I’m asking advocates of engagement to explain what their model is for engagement. So far, Brendan’s the only one who answered the question (and that includes Yglesias, who punted by pointing out – as I did in my original post – that unipolarity is rare enough that it makes analogies to the past very difficult).”
Noah: I don’t entirely agree with Matt’s take on things, but to his defense, I don’t think the question makes sense. I have no model I’m thinking of. I doubt Yglesias does either. I’m sorry if I’m mistaking your meaning, but you seem to regard it as a necessity to draw historical analogies, and I think it’s more often than not unhelpful. Of course, for example, it’s important to have a sense of how one’s actions will be perceived in the context of history, but I don’t think such an analogy is of practical use. And as far as context, I think Bush drowns out everything before him. Obama will be breaking with Bush, and that’s probably the most important thing.
As far as how I see negotiations going, I think it’s pretty clear what we want (nukes, Hezbollah, Iraq), and what we’ve got (economy, military, influence). Admittedly, as Noah says, we’re not in a position of strength, so I don’t necessarily expect anything to come of it.
J Mann: Firstly, Obama ought to (try to) insist on negotiating with Khomeini. More substantively, he should discuss partnership in stabilizing Iraq, make lots of feel-good statements about regional issues, offer economic benefits, maybe threaten harsher sanctions. I’d say Iran is in a strong enough position to keep its nuclear program for now (thanks to Bush, in no small part), but I think getting any kind of concession could go a long way. They can’t credibly pretend to play nice, and staying the rebel isn’t going to work great against broad international resistance. So long as we keep a combative stance, that sort of resistance won’t materialize.
I would stress that we don’t have to get anything from Iran itself to see the benefits. Leadership in the area will help build international support. Most other countries have no more wish to see a nuclear Iran than we do, and it looks like it’s going to take more than just our insistence to do the trick. As I see it, the multilateral approach is about the only option (Bush having botched unilateralism).
— Mike · May 23, 05:48 AM · #