Quote of the Day
Faith in reason is not only faith in our own reason but also — and even more — in that of others. Thus a rationalist, even if he believes himself to be intellectually superior to others, will reject all claims to authority since he is aware that, if his intelligence is superior to that of others (which is hard for him to judge), it is so only in so far as he is capable of learning from criticism as well as from his own and other people’s mistakes, and that one can learn in this sense only if one takes others and their arguments seriously. Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments.
— Karl B. Popper
I see you one Popper and raise you a Gadamer:
“In fact the denigration of authority is not the only prejudice of the enlightenment. For, within the enlightenment, the very concept of authority becomes deformed. On the basis of its concept of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could be seen as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be, in fact, blind obedience. This is the meaning that we know, from the usage of their critics, within modern dictatorships. But this is not the essence of authority. It is true that it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on recognition and knowledge—knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence, ie that it has priority over one’s own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed, but is acquired and must be acquired, if someone is to lay claim to it. It rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have better understanding. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge.”
For a slightly modernized translation, see Truth and Method, pp. 280-81. For a libertarian appropriation of Gadamerian reason, see Tom G. Palmer, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and Social Theory,” Critical Review 1, 3 (Summer 1987), 91-108; and more loosely, Gary Brent Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human Rights (Routledge: London and New York, 1998), 132-50.
But doubtless some clever little revisionist fellow will come along to say that Popper and Gadamer were saying the same thing in different languages. This is because German is dialectical to the point of mutual incomprehensibility; the jubilee will arrive when a sufficient German-to-German dictionary is published, and the Doktors relax into pre-Babelian bliss.
— Withywindle · Jun 21, 01:08 PM · #
I think Popper’s on to some ideas, but I think he overstates it. I’m not sure that the hyper-rationalism that Popper describes is a realistic worldview.
I guarantee you that for every person reading this, there is some argument that they wouldn’t bother considering, given time constraints and other opportunity costs.
For example, if I included a link to an article that made a new scientific argument in favor of intelligent design, my guess is that 80%+ of the people who were not currently sympathetic to ID wouldn’t click through. (I wouldn’t). If the article looked like it would take 30 minutes to a few hours to read carefully and citecheck, my guess is that no one not currently sympathetic to ID would bother to spend the time. If we add enough subjects (global warming, racial clusters of intelligence or personality characteristics, government role in the housing bubble, effectiveness of a given macroeconomic policy, etc. etc. etc.), sooner or later we would find an argument for each person that they won’t bother considering.
Popper is right that fallablism is an important part of rationalism, but at a certain point, we all use arguments from authority to determine which arguments are worth the time and effort it will take to consider them. I don’t read new arguments for ID or holocaust denial because the massive weight of authority indicates that they’re not worth my time, even though I concede that I might be wrong.
On the other hand, when I see Scott Sumner argue that Europe’s rightward move over the last few decades means that Europeans can’t really be said to have less market-oriented economies, that interests me, because it contradicts something I thought I knew, but that I don’t have a similar level of confidence in.
— J Mann · Jun 21, 02:14 PM · #
On some additional thought, surely no one but eccentric philosophers reject all claims to authority, do they?
Maybe a pure rationalist would, as Popper claims, “reject all claims to authority”, but that seems to be a powerful argument against radical rationalism.
Can anyone on this board honestly say that they would pay the same attention to a counterintuitive argument (say, that a bubble in agricultural products currently exists and will threaten the economy) if it was made by (1) their neighbor at a backyard party; (2) some guy on the subway who smells like urine and spends the rest of the time muttering to himself about his cats; (3) a Nobel prizewinning economist whose existing work impresses you; or (4) a Soros/Munger type who has made billions correctly predicting the issue at hand?
My guess is that if each of those 4 offered a link to a self-authored piece on their personal website, most readers would be more likely to carefully consider the piece for some authors rather than others.
I would guess that that’s even true of Popper – how could you live your life any other way?
— J Mann · Jun 21, 02:48 PM · #
J Mann,
Popper does not, despite his rhetoric here, reject literally any claim to authority, in the sense of not recognizing relevant expertise. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he goes to great lengths to show that falsification (a concept he developed in its modern form in that book, and which is central to the specific kind of rationalism he is referencing in that quote, which he called “critical rationalism”) relies on general acceptance of certain unprovable assumptions by working scientists, for example.
IIRC, Conor’s quote is from Volume II of The Open Society and Its Enemies, in which Popper calls for a society which is not doctrinaire in its beliefs, and recognizes the virtual certainty of error in any of our most fundamental beliefs. I don;t think its possible to read that book, which takes on Marx and Hegel, without reading the first volume in which he deals with all of this by attacking, and then in famous chapter 10, partially explaining Plato’s Republic. His philosophy could be read as somewhat stylized, but in general when it comes down to cases, he is usually arguing against stated certainty of knowledge linked to state power.
BTW, my favorite quote, by far, from Volume II is when Popper quotes some Hegel scholar writing this:
Amusingly, Popper was supposedly personally incredibly thin-skinned, and vituperative to intellectual critics.
— Jim Manzi · Jun 21, 08:15 PM · #
Gadamer seems to gloss over the incredibly relevant problem of distinguishing legitimate authorities from the pretend ones. He doesn’t even seem to want to consider that, on a given topic, there may not be a true authority – just a lot of people with dumb ideas saying they’re the authority. See: religion.
If you really had a real, perfectly trustworthy authority, then yes it makes a lot of sense to take the shortcut and simply believe what they say, because, by definition, that’s the position you’d arrive at if you genuinely and correctly studied the evidence. In the world where God exists, for instance, it makes a lot of sense to be a fundamentalist literalist. It makes no sense at all to be a pick-and-choose moderate Christian, since to any extent to which you deviate from the received authority of God’s word, you’re wrong by definition.
But God does not exist, God is not a real authority, and neither are the priests who pretend to his authority. Gadamer simply assumes that anyone who gets called an authority actually is. But why should we believe anything so naive, given the riches and acclaim traditionally bestowed on those considered authorities? There’s a lot of good reasons to get people to award you an authority you don’t actually have, and the desire of a certain kind of person to have an authority – like Gadamer! – ensures a steady supply of propped-up fake authorities.
In other words – I have a problem with authority, and so should you.
— Chet · Jun 21, 08:33 PM · #
Chet, Gadamer’s quote doesn’t require divine authority – it’s closer to what I was talking about, the existence of what you call “legitimate authorities.”
If you learned tomorrow that there was a broad scientific consensus that something you thought true was actually false, would that make you more likely to carefully look at the issue and reexamine your own assumptions? Alternately, if a professor you respected told you that she thought you were wrong about something that was in her field of expertise, would you give her careful consideration?
If so, then you’re recognizing “authority”, at least as that term is used in the section of Gadamer quoted above. (Per Jim Manzi, Popper considers that sort of authority as well, notwithstanding the quote that started this all, so Withywindle’s prediction was right and we can blame all of the confusion on the opacity of German philosophers).
— J Mann · Jun 21, 09:28 PM · #
I didn’t say that he did, but divine authority is just an example of a very common application of feigned authority. Gadamer doesn’t seem concerned even in the least that people often set charlatans up as “authorities” when they’re anything but.
I’m not sure that’s the case. I’d take another look because someone who was less likely to be wrong than I was told me I was wrong. Gadamer is talking about authority as someone we know is always right. Certainly such a person would be an authority, if they existed, but Gadamer doesn’t seem to recognize that a lot more than just those people get labeled “authorities.”
There’s something to be said for authority as a time-saving means of shortcircuiting your own rational inquiry, but you lose much if you’re not also engaging in rational inquiry into who the authorities actually are. And since that’s frequently just as hard as settling an issue of fact, I’m questioning, in reality, precisely how much time you really save by believing whatever the nearest authority tells you is true.
I accept as authority those who can defend a position well enough, and with enough evidence, for me not to have to rely on their authority for support. When my professors tell me I’m wrong about something, I reply “please continue.”
— Chet · Jun 21, 10:55 PM · #
“Psychology is to the leveling of authority as publicity is to charisma.”
Name that tune.
— James · Jun 21, 11:29 PM · #
Gadamer doesn’t seem concerned even in the least that people often set charlatans up as “authorities” when they’re anything but.
How can you make this claim about Gadamer based on the single passage Withywindle quoted? I may be misreading the passage (and I bow to Withywindle, a blogger I greatly admire, as an authority on Gadamer), but it seems to me that the passage is meant to challenge the “deformed” enlightenment concept of authority as “blind obedience.” The process of recognizing and knowing that another person “is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence” does not imply knowing that someone is “always right” (and I’m not sure where you’re getting that idea from this passage), and it is in itself, as Gadamer suggests, an “act of reason.”
In other words, Gadamer’s claim about the proper way to understand authority doesn’t seem very far from your own. Your concern with “feigned authoriy,” then, seems like quibbling to me, since it’s a concern which is tangential to the main thrust of this passage. Sure, one has to be careful not to place one’s trust in fake authorities, but that’s where the act of reason comes in.
In any event, I find the yeah-well-you-know-that’s-just-like-your-opinion- man style of challenging authority just as annoying, and just as ubiquitous, as the yes-master-whatever-you-say-master style of clinging to authority, so the Gadamer passage is music to my ears.
— Kate Marie · Jun 21, 11:52 PM · #
Hardly an authority on Gadamer, but I love that quotation, and I am deeply impressed by Truth and Method.
I do find Gadamer’s definition of authority open to the authority of God and revelation, and this is one of its attractive aspects; but it does not require any such authority.
— Withywindle · Jun 22, 12:06 AM · #
Appealing to authority is subrational. Even Karl Popper thinks so.
— Kristoffer V. Sargent · Jun 22, 12:07 AM · #
Well, but it’s not something that you can recognize, as though it’s immediately apparent when you see it. It’s a contention that you can, to some degree, substantiate with evidence, but any authority is just one flub from boob-dom. For instance DNA pioneer James Watson, surely an authority on DNA, nonetheless get it completely backwards on the subject of black people and their supposedly “inferior” genetics. (Actually by most biological measures the human gene pool across the African continent is actually superior to that of the West.)
All I know about Gadamer – who I’ve never even heard of! – is this single quote. It’s just amazing that he would hold forth at such length about the concept of authority with not even a single qualification about authority being unreliable. Surely that’s the most salient feature of “authority” – that its mantle is often claimed to shield propositions from scrutiny. Indeed, that’s the general thrust of Popper, above – that when we cleave to authority, we’re frequently doing so in lieu of applying skepticism to those positions.
The defense of authority is that it often saves us time to do, particularly when the application of skepticism would be re-inventing the wheel. But, I think we should be much more skeptical than Gadamer appears to be about frequently offloading our skepticism and perspicacity to others.
Right, see, that was my suspicion about where this all heads.
— Chet · Jun 22, 12:10 AM · #
Gadamer is correct that authority requires recognition, but it is a false recognition, for it requires an abdication of reason necessary to embrace the appeal to authority logical fallacy. Besides, any authoritative figure should be able to present his conclusions using appropriate reason, which paradoxically means that reason takes precedent and there is no need to recognize true authority.
— Dwight · Jun 22, 12:49 AM · #
Withywindle,
Gadamer here is simply building on Arendt’s definition of authority (from her essay “On Authority”), which I personally find rather convincing.
But, at the same time, I also agree with Popper’s quote.
The point is not that they are saying “same thing in different languages”, but rather that they are talking about different things using the same language (perhaps even literally, given that German was their first language) and admittedly the same word.
— Marko · Jun 22, 05:27 AM · #
To clarify further, Arendt’s authority was the authority based on the recognition of expertise of the person with authority (and presumably their “honest” intentions.
It is perfectly rational for a rationalist (who is not a doctor) to trust his doctor’s advice.
Since “Thus a rationalist, even if he believes himself to be intellectually superior to others, will reject all claims to authority…” clearly refers to rationalist’s claim of his own authority, both statements are quite compatible.
— Marko · Jun 22, 05:49 AM · #
“Psychology is to the leveling of authority as publicity is to charisma.”
Name that tune.
What is “15 minutes of shame”, Alex?
— Tony Comstock · Jun 22, 11:15 AM · #
Marko, IMHO if you read the Popper quote as is, it’s still not compatible. Even if you interpret “all claims to authority” to mean “all claims to the rationalist’s own authority” only, aren’t you still stuck?
If the rationalist is herself a doctor, and a faith healer tells he that he can prove that ginsing and tiger’s testicles are more effective than statins to reduce cholesterol, does the rationalist really not get to privilege her own expertise at all? Does she seriously have to view herself and the faith healer as equally likely to be right until she has time to review the faith healer’s self-published book?
I guess you could get around it by saying that she’s not privileging her own authority, she’s privileging the authority of the medical consensus, but if that were the case, then she would not be able to privilege her own opinion of what the consensus was.
If a shambling drunk on the subway told her that the consensus on tiger’s testicles as medicines was not a consensus of relevant experts, and that the relevant experts actually agreed, then a Popperian rationalist would be unable ethically to prescribe statins until she had examined the evidence, because she has rejected “all claims of [her own] authority,” which necessarily includes her authority to judge the authority of others.
(I agree with Manzi that Popper can’t possibly have meant that, so the quote needs context or re-translation).
— J Mann · Jun 22, 01:18 PM · #
J Mann,
but Popperian rationalist would ask the faith healer to provide rational arguments for that claim. I assume that such arguments would have to do with the scientific method and rigorous testing.
Similarly, would not the medical consensus only be plausible to a rationalist as much as it can be said to rest on the same grounds? I.e. “consensus of experts” functions a proxy for “people have tested this thoroughly and have come to a finding that is accepted by almost anyone in the field” (of course, there can always be dissenting opinions – and sometimes those opinions could even be correct – but they usually decrease in number, the more something is tested and results reconfirmed).
If something has not been tested thoroughly and in accordance with the scientific standards, or if there are reasonable disagreements (backed by plausible arguments combining our existing knowledge and logical conclusions from it) regarding how the tests should be made or interpreted, then there probably won’t be a consensus of experts in the first place.
— Marko · Jun 22, 05:40 PM · #
J Mann,
I feel like I might have not answered the main thrust of your argument, so just briefly: If a drunk told me that, I would only take it seriously if that person could put forward credible arguments (say point me to a reputable survey of experts for their position on the issue – and note that reputable here is a shorthand for “conducted in accordance with good practice standards of survey taking”).
If the drunk was able to do that, who cares if he/she is a drunk. I’d take note and look into it. Wouldn’t you?
— Marko · Jun 22, 06:14 PM · #
If you review the drunk’s evidence for the existence of an expert consensus, but you and the drunk disagree about whether that evidence is convincing, how do you resolve that evidence without privilegeing your own authority over that of the drunk?
(I submit that no one ever seriously considers the arguments of everyone who disagrees with them — at a certain point, you decide that some people aren’t worth a full hearing).
— J Mann · Jun 22, 07:23 PM · #
I think everyone retains the right to find a particular evidence convincing or not, but again the rationalist’s examination of the evidence would/should conform to some type of scientific good practice (i.e. follow “objective”, or “most rational” approach to appraising evidence.).
It is not about one’s own vs. someone else’s authority, but the authority of the method and the supposedly universal rational reason it embodies.
— Marko · Jun 22, 07:44 PM · #
“(I submit that no one ever seriously considers the arguments of everyone who disagrees with them — at a certain point, you decide that some people aren’t worth a full hearing).”
On an earlier comment thread someone said something about not being able to form a rule that would let Buzz Aldren punch people when he (we) need(ed him) to.
I don’t know anything about the author of the quote, except that his name comes up when people talk about philosophy. So perhaps that’s why my read was pretty straight-forward:
If you like to think of yourself as a rational, intelligent person, you might want to shut up and listen a little more than you think you need to.
That’s more advice than a rule, and I don’t have the standing or knowledge to argue that’s what Popper meant; but it’s what I got out of it, and it’s probably advice it wouldn’t hurt me to heed a little more often.
— Tony Comstock · Jun 22, 07:48 PM · #
We’re rehabbed and we’re ready, Tony.
— James · Jun 23, 12:51 AM · #
What is “That’s a funny ha-ha rejoinder”, Alex?
— Tony Comstock · Jun 23, 01:53 AM · #
I first read the ““Psychology is to the leveling of authority as publicity is to charisma” line in Tony’s citation of it as someone else’s quotation, after quickly skimming these comments, and I thought, wait, who’s quoting Poulos? Is Tony citing someone citing him from somewhere else? Then I scrolled up more slowly. “Oh…” I’m guessing that’s Rieff. So now maybe I automatically project Rieff’s content onto James, but I project James’s apothegmatic powers onto Rieff.
— Matt Feeney · Jun 23, 08:14 PM · #
Oh what a tangle web we weave, when first we practice to conceive?
— Tony Comstock · Jun 23, 08:55 PM · #
If someone claimed a faith healer cured them, I wouldn’t necessarily believe in faith healers as opposed to modern medicine, but I might be interested in what actually happened. Did faith inspire them to work harder at rehabbing an injury or modifying a bad lifestyle? Was it a placebo effect? Do they have the same condition, but just perceive the burden as less? Spontaneous remission? A hysterical ailment in the first place? Did the conventional medicine they were taking finally work?
I’m even open to the possibility of “pure” faith healing, although I think most claims of it have at least components of one or more of the above. Which is to say that healing has more to it than just the physical/chemical component. A rationalist has to entertain this possibility, even though some claims in this area are overstated.
— M.C. · Jun 25, 02:32 PM · #